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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis considers the implications of a combination of
changes in property rights resulting from state intervention. It
is argued that the resulting modifications in the exercise of
property rights are a response to the limited adequacy of
private ownership as a framework for economic activity, and that,
in some cases at least, rights to state property may fulfil the
same socio-economic functions as property rights for the private
interests concerned.
In Part I, the case of property in North Sea oil provides for
a detailed empirical study of this. The origins, evolution and
extension of the UK system of petroleum licensing to offshore
waters are considered. Particular attention is given to the
retroactive amendment of licence terms through the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act 1975» and the introduction of majority
state participation through the agency of a state oil company,
the BNOC. It is argued that, in spite of a considerable degree
of state intervention, the licensing arrangements have assured
the oil companies rights akin to property rights.
In Part II, conceptions of property are considered in the light
of the foregoing study, especially those of MacPherson, Reich, and
Pashukanis. It is concluded that a conception of property which
emphasises its connection with convertibility helps explain the
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The Socialisation of Private Property
Capitalism as a mode of social and economic organisation is in
decline. While all societies must reproduce themselves or cease
to exist, capitalist societies are unusual in having reproduced
themselves only at the price of partially destroying their
capitalist character. So great has the change been that in the
latter half of the twentieth century, it has become almost
d<» rigueur to use the oonoept of capitalism only with a qualifying
adjective or prefix like 'modern* or 'late* or 'neo-'."*" Some,
following Daniel Bell, have even rejected the concept altogether
in favour of a new and often vague alternative oonoept like
2
•post-indastrial' society. In retrospect it is clear that
one period of capitalist development, whether it be described as
'competitive' or 'classical', has given way to a new phase,
characterised by large-scale state intervention in economic
production and exchange, and a growing role for new states
possessing the raw materials necessary for capital accumulation.
In this context it is hardly surprising that some writers like
C.B. MacPhereon and Charles Reich should have argued that it is now
time to revise the individualist conception of property long
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associated with capitalism. State intervention in particular seems
1. For example, A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: Ernest Mandel,
Late Capitalism, and Robin Blackburn, 'The New Capitalism', in
Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Soolal Science, pp.16^-186.
2. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. See Krishan
Kumar, Prophecy and Progress, for a discussion of this trend in
social theory.
3. C.B. MacPherson (ed.), Property, and Charles Reioh 'The New Property'
in 73 Yale Law Journal (l36h)» pp.738-87» and ki shortened form in
MacPherson, op.cit., pp.177-198.
to have modified the role of the institution of private property in the
advanced capitalist societies to such an extent that the
dominant liberal conception has become problematic, if not
redundant. Ify objective in this study will be to take their ideas
as a starting point for a consideration of the impact of state
intervention upon conceptions of property.
The above writers - I shall call them she New Property theorists -
have argued that the liberal conception of property should be
'broadened' to inolude a number of rights not normally associated
with it like the right to a social seourity payment. They claim
that such a redefinition would be in line with current social changes
which have blurred the distinctions between proprietary and non¬
proprietary rights. For example, legislative restrictions on
the use and disposal of property in means of production have become
quite common in the advanced capitalist societies.
While I believe their argument is mistaken, it does seem to
me that we might benefit from considering the hypothesis that some
non-proprietary rights can fulfil the same social and economic
functions as rights of property. This need not compel us to revise
the dominant conception of property as private property, but it
may throw light on a paradoxical idea implicit or explicit in these
and other writings on property and the state. The idea has two
core propositions!
1. the institution of private property has been modified
by the imposition of statutory restrictions upon the right to use and
to alienate;
3.
2. at the same time some rights have been created which are
tantamount to rights of property although not recognised as
each by law (licence rights, for example).
This idea - that property rights in general have been
•restricted* relative to their nineteenth century predecessors
at the very time that other rights have acquired a quasi-
proprietary status - has a material basis in the real changes
in property-ownership, occurring in recent decades. I attempt
to explain what this social basis is and draw out some of its
implications by reference to a theory of capitalism worked out by
Marx and developed by Lenin. I also attempt to highlight and,
briefly, to disouss some of the problems about property resulting
from state intervention, in the light of my empirical research
into petroleum licensing in the UK sector of the North Sea.
In recent years there has been a burgeoning of interest in
property-ownership. There has been a new concern with Justifications
1 2
of private property, with concepts of property, with the
institution of private property^ and with the relationship between
1. For example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy. State and Utopia:
Lawrence C.Becker, Property Rightat Samuel L.Blumenfeld (ed.),
Property in a ^oonoxgyt Derek L. Phillips, Equality.
Justice and Rectification.
2. For example, C.B. MaePherson, op.cit.j Carl Vellman (ed.) Equality
and Freedoms Carol C. Gould, 'Contemporary Legal Conceptions of
Property and their Implications for Democracy', a paper presented
to the World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy,
at Basel, Switzerland, August 27 - September 1, 1979•
3. For example, John Scott, Corporations. Classes and Capitalism
Arthur Francis, 'Families. Firms and Finance Capital', in lit Sociology
(1980), pp.Iff7j Paxil Hirst, On Law and Ideology; Riohard E.
Flatbman, The Practice of Rights. Some recent writing leans heavily
on applications of new classical economics begun by Harold Demsetz:
'Toward a Theory of Property Rights', 57 American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings (1967X pp.347-359. Two recent examples axe
R. Posner's An Economic Analysis of Law. ch.3» and Kenneth Dam's
study of petroleum leases and licences in Oil Resources.
legal and. 'economic' ownership.^" A striking feature of much
of the writing is its North American origin. She notion of
property has a much greater practical role to play in US
constitutional doctrine than in the UK, and this seems to have
provided American theorists with an impetus not yet shared in
Britain. The New Property theories are very much a product of
a non-British constitutional environment. The designation
of particular rights as rights of property has a far greater
practical significance in the USA where property rights are given
special protection by the Constitution (5th and lUth Amendments)
than in the United Kingdom where the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty allows the State to exercise power over property
rights as readily as over any other rights (of. compulsory
purchase). As a consequenoe, there must always be an element of
juriiical insecurity in relationships between private interests
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and thft state in the UK.
Yet this revival of interest has not come about as a result of
present from the property owners themselves. Indeed, a feature of
capitalist development in the twentieth oentury has been the
surprising diffidenoe toward theories of property on the part of
1. For example, Charles Bettelheia, Economic Calculation and Forms
of Property: Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary
Capitalism: Piers Bieme and Robert Sharlet (eds.) Bashukanis.
pp.235-272} and see Posner op.cit.
2. See the discussions in Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory,
chs. 2 and 3* Throughout this study I have used the texm 'state'
without a capital letter, a usage common in the social sciences
but not to purely legal writings. However, when the term has
some specific legal reference, e.g. to international law in
chapter two, section 1,1 have preferred to write it with a
capital letter.
the owners themselves in the face of state intervention!sm.
This was remarked upon by several Marxist writers at the
beginning of this century. Both the Austro-Marxists (like
Hilferding, Renner^and the Bolsheviks (like Lenin, Pashukanis)
put forward the thesis that advanced capitalism or imperialism
no longer has the same need for certain tenets of liberal thought
in order to justify capitalism. This idea was based on several
features of the social structure which either could not be
found in laissez-faire capitalism or else had far less
significance at that time. In at least two ways capitalism had
become subject to a considerable degree of social control. Firstly,
the concentration and centralisation of capital had progressed so
far that large firms had an oligopolist role in the market. The
resulting demand for large sums of credit from the banks gave an
impetus to the concentration of banking capital! as a
consequence the largest banks and firms had formed close links
with each other in order to organise their business bet ter. The
size of the area in which these banks and firms (finance capital)
could operate without hindrance had become a matter of the first
importance. While finance capital operated transnationally, it
remained based in one particular cation-state and existed in
competition with the finance capital of every other advanced capitalist
1. The Austro-Marxists Kpe&ggribed. a social-democratic appropriation
of Marxian theory which had considerable influence in Central
Europe prior to the First World War.
6.
state. The second source of social control, state
intervention, also had to be understood in the international
context of oligopoly. A laissez-faire or 'nightwatchman' state
had little relevance to the needs of such national
capitalisms! on the contrary, finance capital required a strong
state which could protect it from foreign competition and also use
its political and military power to facilitate the export of
capital. Intervention in the national domestic economy was
welcome in so far as it assisted this phenomenon of
international!sation. Hot only was there a change in the function
of the state, but a limited socialisation of sectors of the
economies of advanced capitalist societies was also tolerated by
the ever-larger property-owners. It made little sense therefore
to encourage elaborations or Revised Versions of the grand
liberal theories which justified private property. Indeed, there
was much support for Hilferding's thesis that the liberal
ideology of the middle class was now in decline.*" The ideas of trade,
equality, peace and humanity were, he claimed, no longer suited to
the reality of advanced capitalism, and were replaced by doctrines
which sanctioned the expansion of finance capital! for example,
nationalism, state power as a good (the Machtstaat), the worship of
foroe (cf. Mosea, Pareto, etc.), and even racism. The relationship
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between contemporary liberalism and fascism was not so very distant.
1. Indeed, it has reoently been appropriated by non-Marxists like
Roberto Unger: Law in Modern Soolety. and Robert L. Heilbron&x:
Business Civilization in Decline.
2. 1Mb idea was developed philosophically by Herbert Marcuse in
his Studies in Critical Philosophy.
7.
The very property-owners themselves are no longer the
individuals in the classical liberal theories! property-ownership
has become de-personalised. The individualist emphasis in all
the various liberal conceptions of property has little correspondence
to the contemporary capitalist environment. Socio-economic
changes had struck so many blows against the single individual
property owner even in the first quarter of the century that the
disillusioned Schumpeter remarked!
The capitalist process pushes into the background, all those
institutions, the institutions of property and free
contracting in particular, that expressed thg needs and
ways of the truly private eoonomio activity.
The market has been transformed from an arena in which many
different companies, owned usually by individuals or family units,
engaged in competition with each other to one in which a small
number of very large corporations and financial institutions exert
a predominant influence over it, attempting to minimise
competition wherever possible. Traditional justifications of
private property, whether the labour theory or the utilitarian, do
not justify these particular concentrations of property as well as they
do personal possessions. For example, the idea of accumulation
taking place in Lookean fashion as a consequence of the individual
mixing his labour with an object or soil to produce property for
exchange presupposes a mode of production which is pre-capitalist.
1. This is the dominant theme in the study by Scott, op.cit.
2. J. Sohumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy.
pp.liil-lU2.
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In general, the liberal conception of property as private
property, as a bundle of rights to exclude others from possession,
use and management, and to benefit from any alienation of the object
for profit, had a •basic model* of ownership described by
A,.M.Eonore as one in which an individual human being (and his family)
has oontrol over an object or objects to use or dispose of as
he wishes."*" It is just this conception which lacks credibility in
the face of advanced capitalism's oligopolic character.
Not surprisingly, there have been attempts to revise the
liberal conception. With the exception of Hobert Nozick who has
re-asserted a highly individualist view of property, most
2
liberal writers have preferred to accept modifications to the
classical view to allow for legislative restrictions to property-
rights in the 'social' or 'national' interest. However, some
writers like C.B. MaoHierson and Carol Gould have gone further
and have argued for a replacement of the liberal conception
3
altogether.
These various ways of re-defining property either within or
outvith the liberal tradition are of course bound up with, and are a
response to, real changes in capitalism in the twentieth century
away from the individualism seen in its most extreme form in
1. A.M. Honors, 'Ownership', in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence.
First Series, (ed.) A.G. Guest, pp.l07-lu7»
2. For example, Lawrence Itecaeer op.eit., and Tony Honors,
'Property* Title and -Redistribution', in Wellman, op.ait.,
pp.107-116.
3. C.B.MacPherson, op.cit., and Carol Gould, op.cit.
9.
nineteenth century Britain. Liberal writers, like Lawrence Becker,
who accept a modified view of private property (particularly
with respect to natural resources) are basing their re-definitions
on the circumscribed character of property rights in contemporary
capitalism. To do this they must make an assessment of certain
'social facts' like the expanded range of social and economic
activities of the state. Some other writers in making such an
assessment have drawn quite different conclusions about the impact
of social change upon conceptions of property. Eugene kamsnka
and Alice Tay, for example, have claimed that a complex of
sooial and conceptual changes heralds a movement 'beyond
bourgeois individualism1 in the advanced capitalist societies.~
Similarly, C.B. Macpherson points to the interventionist role
of the state in the market to support his thesis that contemporary
capitalism is a 'quasi-market society' and no longer needs the
classical liberal conception which is only neoessaxy to a full
market society.
However, the critics of the private property concept have
not themselves been free from criticism. Marxist writers have
claimed that the reproduction of capitalist social relations has
already required the partial relinquishment of key liberal ideas
(like property) or at least a shift of emphasis to allow for a much
greater degree of state regulation in the interest of capital units
1. 'Beyond Bourgeois Individualism* The Contemporary Crisis in
Law and Legal Ideology', in E.Kamenka and B.S.Neale (eds.),
feudalism. Capitalism and Beyond.
based in the nation-state (i.e. in the 'national* interest).1
In these new social conditions the liberal conception of property,
stressing the inviolable character of property rights, ie
discarded whenever it might function as an obstacle to the
accumulation of capital, giving rise to a more flexible view
which tolerates ad hoc restrictions by the state, especially
in wartime. Some writers go further and attack the liberal
conceptions! for example, one American writer has asserted thati
The Individual's right to life, freedom and property have
no absolute or abstract existence; they are rights which
exist, from the legal standpoint, only because the
State protects them, and which are, as^a result, entirely
subject to the authority of the State.
Yet there is sometimes an irony in this sort of criticism.
The writer of the above passage, Harriman, and others who have
held similar views, are in no way demanding an end to private
property as ouch. Similarly, the once-fashionable attempts to
refashion the liberal conception in some 'social' mould did not
commit their advocates to a rejection of capitalist private
3
property. These lame attempts to conceptualise property in terms
of an individual owner's 'social obligations' or in terms of
1. On this latter point see Paul Mattlck, Marx and Keynes.
2. E.A. Earriman, 'Enemy Property in America', cit. in
E.B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p.130.
3. Fox an &ocount of these ideas, see Gottfried Metze, In Defence
of Property, pp.100-108. The reaction against individualistic
conceptions of property originated in Germany in the late
19th century in the work of jurists and economists like Gierke,
Ihering, and Adolf Warier whose 'sooio-legal* approach was A
scathingly criticised by Marx in his Marginal Hotes on Wager.
private property*s social funotion were savagely criticised, by
E.B. Paahukanis." In spite of using terras like the 'socialisation'
of private property, these sociological jurists were not
'evolutionist' Harriets who, witnessing a growth of state
property, saw in this evidence of the imminent demise of the
private property system. These writers had by no means
2
abandoned their commitment to the capitalist system, and their
re-definitions might even be construed as an attempt to justify
& modified form of private ownership in advanced capitalism.
Indeed, as Pashukanis noted, these 'social' conceptions of property
had definite social roots in the new imperialist stage of capitalist
development. It is this social context which encourages a form of
anti-individualist social criticism. It is a form of criticism
generated from within capitalism itself, and mi^xt be a useful,
perhaps even essential, theoretioal adjunct to the modifications
in the Institution of private property which are necessary to ensure
the reproduction and expansion of private property as a whole.
Heplacement of the dominant liberal conception of property
as specifically private property is ultimately dependent upon
replacement of the institution of private property as the dominant
form of property in society with a different form of property. It is
1. E.B.Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, esp. pp.3^-35 and 98-99«
2. Ihering managed to combine his advooacy of a social orienta^ "
in legal thought with a publicly expressed admimtion for
Bismark and aiser Wilhelm the First. Private Property and the
right of inheritance would always remain, he thought, and 'the
sooialistio and communistic ideas directed to its removal I
regard as folly' (Law as a Means to an End, p.396).
Similarly, Duguit's idea of 'socialisation' ought not to be
confused with Marx's. Ownership of the means of production
would always remain in private lands, and private property
predicated as usual t only the juridical concept on which its
production was based would be changed. The proprietor, he claimed,
had the duty and power both to use his property for the good of
society, and for the satisfaction of his own needs. Thus he
fulfils a social funotion, since any activity on his part
benefits the sooial welfare.
not simply a natter of re-defining a nasty liberal conception
which panders to the worst aspects of human nature, and, however
reprehensible the reality presupposed by the conception is, it
makes no sense to pretend that it is something else. What was
most distasteful to Pftshukanis about the 'social' conceptions
was their ability to mislead people by their superficial
radicalism and to oonceal the individualistic character which
property retained in the (relatively) new social environment.
Nonetheless, it is a social environment which is far more
organised and 'socialised' than ever nineteenth century capitalism
was, and so questions about the continued relevance of the
liberal conception are far from silly. While liberals prefer to
remould the classical conception to fit the now social environerant,
others will see in contemporary oapitalism agents of social control
which point beyond the private property system, and thus provide
empirical support for a new non-liberal conception of property.
In the early part of this century the principal socialising
foroe which provided an impetus to revisions or re-assessments
of property conceptions was the joint-stock company. The
dismantling of much of the apparatus of state regulation after the
First World War discouraged serious consideration of its role as
an agent of social control until the extension of the public sphere
was restaaed after Hie Berle and Means thesis1 that legal
1. A.A. Berle and G-.C. Means, The Modem Corporation and Private
Property.
ownership was increasingly irrelevant to de facto control of
large corporations led some to conclude that the traditional
forms of private ownership in capitalism were disappearing
and that the vast social power wielded by a small group of
iaen through the large private corporations was influenced
by considerations other than private gain: these were •soulful*
corporations, who had certainly made business deals but never
with Mephistopheles!
The significance of the joint-stock company was the
subject of protracted controversy between the •theorists of
industrial society' like Galbraith and Bell, and their critics
(everybody else), but ir did not generate much disoussion among
jurists and philosophers about the contemporary relevance of
1
the liberal conception. Of course, this debate has not
exhausted itself, being renewed by the growth of multinational
corporations and recently by the results of various impressive
2
pieces of empirical research like that of Maurice Zeitlin, which
indicate inter alia that Berle and Means* thesis was premature.
Nevertheless, systematic discussion of property and its legal
structure tended to become the prerogative of sociologists, with
jurists and academic lawyers oonfining themselves to brief
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comments, heavily influenced by the research of the former. The
1. Even in quite lengthy works on property like Seinold Noyes'
The Institution of Property, and L.P. Vinding Erase•s The
Bight of Property.
2. *0^kw»te <k^?Mpand Control', in 79 &8£3&2ftS Journal of
Sooiology (197^5, pp.1073^1119; see also the study by Francis,
op.cit., based on the Oxford Growth of Firms project.
3. For example, Stein and Shand, Legal Values in Western Society:
and Wolfgang Priadmann » Law in a Changing Society.
lh.
same reticence has not been evident in assessing the impact
of the other principal agent of social control, state
intervention!sou
Large-scale state intervention began during the post-war
period of social reconstruction and economic expansion, and
has become a 'typical* feature of all advanced capitalist
societies. As a consequence there has been a growth of interest
in 'eoonomic law1 or the relationship between public law and
economic policy.^ So too has there been a growing interest
in the relationship between the state and private property'
what boundary lies between the publio sphere and those vital
private interests when the state can at will modify, amead,
restrict or otherwise influence those interests? Is there a
boundary at all? Writers like Lawrence Decker hope that
by defining more precisely what property is and when restrictions
on it in the social interest are justified, we shall have a clear
picture of where the state may and may not tread. Other writers
like Jtirgen Habermas seem to think a 'politicisation' of
0
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capitalist society is inevitable. 'Theorists like C.B. MaePherson
and Charles Reich have based much of their Hew Property argument
on the expanded role of the states the interventionist role of the
state in the post-war period (which I take to have ended with the onset
1. With considerable problems of definition as a result, as
Terence Saintith points outs 'Public Law and Economic Policy',
in 9 Journal of Buolnoos Low (l97^l) pp»9~22.
2. Jtirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis.
of global recession in 1973-4) created a situation, they claimed,
which called for a new conception of property, broadening the
application of •property* to include at least some other
legal relationships between individuals and the state like
rights to receive welfare payments. While MaoPherson locates
his argument in a broader historical perspective to\fcich property
concepts are related, the new role of the state plays as important
a part in it as it does in Reich's argument.
This latter view presupposed a model of capitalism suited to
the socio-economic stability and uninterrupted growth of state
intervention in the post-war period. However, the element of
over-generalisation contained in its assessment of the consequences
of state intervention is now apparent, and the Hew Property thesis
has lost much of its plausibility. However apt its criticism of the
dominant conception of property as private property, it nonetheless
oontains assumptions about law and the state which are firmly rooted
in the liberal tradition. Por example, they tend to view the
state as primarily a neutral institution, giving little or no weight
to those theories which see it as having a thoroughly partisan
character. The extent to which the state can be, and has been, used
to create new forms of property which co-exist and perhaps compete
with private property is broadened as a consequence. Similarly,
their view of legal language and legal structure exhibits a rather
naive and uncritical acceptance of key liberal ideas like 'individual
rights'. There Is indeed a vast body of statutory regulation
of individual rights to use and to alienate property, but,
as sociologists and Marxists have been quick to point out,
the legal structure of property relations is an important
part of the institutional mediation of control but *it is
never the sole part'."" Indeed, Marx attacked the juridical
conception of property because, like all key liberal idea®,
it was market-based, and the market relations of capitalist
societies failed to disclose the real origins of social
inequality which were to be found in the relations of
production, the presupposition of market relations. Besides,
legal institutions like property have a considerable degree of
flexibility which allows them, even when modified to aooommodate
an expanded role for the state, to have the same economic affeot
as in their earlier more absolute form. A final assumption which
is both liberal and, in my view, wrong is that serious
consideration of any major aspect of socio-economio life in the
nation-state can take place without reference to the impact of
international economic considerations upon that port of the
social or economic structure. Since nation-states are not
simply autonomous units, the interventionist activity of a state
should be assessed alongside the internationally extending activities
of the more efficient economic units based within its frontiers.
There is an undisclosed national bias in the New Property thesis,
1, Scott, op.olt., p.V7«
a belief that we can comprehend, the state at the national level
or at the international level which may have corresponded to
the reality of laissez-faire capitalism (although this too
is contestable) but which is certainly not Justified at a
time when the international division of labour has become so
complex and interwoven. We no longer have a choice.
In spite of these criticisms, which I elaborate in Part II
of this study, the New Property thesis does point to a development
of real significance. In order to stabilise the capitalist
economy, the state has played a key role in regulating the
use and disposal of property, but it has had an equally
important role to play in providing the conditions which allow
for an extension of capitalist relations and which may involve
the creation of new forms of property-ownership. However, the
origins of this 'new property' and its implications are very
different from those contained in the arguments of the New Property
theorists.
The paradigmatic type of property in capitalism is
productive property and capitalist production is always production
for exchange. Property for one's immediate use or personal
possessions does not have the same social significance, nor
is it the source of so many intellectual 'puzzles' as is property
as exchange value. Consequently, it is quite mistaken to draw an
analogy between certain 'citizens' rights' arising from the state's
welfare functions end rights of property. The former category of
right is not essential to the accumulation of capital, unlike
property rights in the traditional sense (that is, as
exclusive rights to use, management, income and to alienate).
To apply the category of property to the former set of rights
seeme to me to he quite unjustified and thoroughly misleading,
nevertheless, a case might he made for an extension of the category
to some rights deriving from legal relationships between individual
corporations and the state which are neoessaxy to the establishment
of economic activity in relatively new conditions. After all,
improvements in technology and changing economic costs may make
certain economic activities possible and profitable for the
first timet for example, the production of shale oil, and the
construction of large-scale coal-to-oil liquifloation plants.
However, such forms of economic activity might present problems
for a system of full private ownerships the economic risks
involved in large-scale production or the large initial
investment may prove daunting even to the largest private firms;
and the social risks of new technologies like nuclear power
may create popular demands for state regulation. Tor these
and similar reasons, relationships between the state and (usually
large) private firms will tend to be established which involve
the state in a highly regulatory and perhaps participatory manner.
Arrangements involving the state in the latter capacity (like
•joint ventures') are at the present time much more common in
underdeveloped countries than in the advanced capitalist societies
but this has already begun to change, especially with respect to
petroleum and mineral exploration and development. The rights
which private interests have In these aorta of relationship
say well be similar to property-rights (in productive
property) in terms of their socio—economic function, even
though there is a difference in legal form. This seems to me
to be a line of inquiry worth pursuing not only because it may
throw further light on the socio-economic significance of
property in advanced capitalism, but also because of the light
it may shed on the origins and the effects of legal agreements
made between the state and large capital units in the advanced
capitalist societies. Above all, It may reveal some ambiguities
in the character of state intervention which the proponents of
a new conception of property have neglected or ignored.
It is just such a line of inquiry which I intend to pursue
in this study. In doing so, I shall draw on the theory
of capitalist development found in the work of Marx and Ehgels
and developed by various Marxists, especially Lenin. This was
outlined briefly above and is explained in detail in the second
part of the study. It has three salient features which I think
should be emphasised at this stage. Firstly, state intervention
is comprehended as merely one expression of a broad process of
socialisation of production. Private companies have also
introduced a degree of social control into their operations,
becoming more concentrated in scale and international in their
base of operations. Secondly, this theory strictly rejects
any suggestion that nation-states can be viewed as autonomous units
within an international context. On the contrary, it takes
cognizance of the fact that the degree of interdependence has grown
considerably in recent decades, and, it claims that this
means inter alia that an understanding of state action within
its territorial boundaries cannot be obtained without an
appreciation of its location in, and connections with, the
capitalist world economy. Thirdly, socialisation will only .
occur when it can be accommodated within a capitalist framework.
This is no simple matters the process of socialisation is an
attempt to resolve certain contradictions in the capitalist
mode of production but it must not socialise the private relations
of the capitalist economy out of existence. Since the objective
is to ensure the reproduction and expansion of specifically
private relations, that objective will function as a limit to
any partial undercutting of capitalism's own premisses. Indeed,
in so far as it is the capitalist mode of production which
generates problems or crises requiring a non-capitalist solution,
the reproduction of that mode of production will create the
conditions for the reproduction of the same problems of crises
whether capitalism has become partly socialised or not. The idea
that the process of socialisation only has the effect of
intensifying the basic contradictions in the long-term is an
essential one in Marxism's understanding of this process.
These three features of the Marxist theory of capitalist
development help to reveal crucial weaknesses in attempts to
'go beyond' the conception of property as private property, like
those of the New Property theorists. At the same time they help
explain why such theorists have no difficulty in finding social
developments which seem to provide empirical support for their
arguments.
In spite of these criticisms of their arguments, I nonetheless
intend to pursue their idea that state intervention can establish
certain rights to, property which have the same effect as rights
of property, and should therefore be understood ae property.
However, instead of looking at rights to property created by
the state's welfare roles (like the expectation of an income
in the form of a welfare payment) as an example of 'new property*
rights, a much better case can be made with respect to the state's
control of natural resources. Eights to state property in natural
resources can, and in some cases do, provide the same sort of
benefit to capitalist firms as rights of property.
Property in natural resources is a key area of conflict in
the advanced capitalist societies where private interests axe
frequently directly involved in their exploitation. In the last
decade, there has been a growing tension between state and private
control over their exploitation. Oil is the beet example of
this, being the most essential fuel in these societies, central to the
post-war boom and still a low-cost fuel relative to alternatives.
It is used as a raw material in the production of commodities
like plastics, synthetic fibres and chemicals.
In my empirical study I direct attention to the licensing of
North Sea oil because the rightB of a petroleum licensee to oil
resources seem to be an excellent example of 'new property'. In
addition, they point to the highly ambiguous character of state
intervention. The terms of a large number of licences were
unilaterally revised without compensation by the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipe-Lines Act in 1975» and licensees subsequently lost
control of 51% of their production to the newly established
state oil company, BNOC. In spite of this exercise in
•socialisation' of licence rights, the degree of economic
control given to holders of licences issued before this time-
was not radically altered.
In the first part of this study I examine empirically the
fundamental legal relationship between private companies and the
British state with respect to offshore oil exploration and productions
the licensing arrangements. The system of licensing is one which
implies a high degree of state regulation through the model clauses
included in each licence.1 Indeed, licensing in its various
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forms is often seen as a mode of state 'control*. In this case,
however, the licences have a contractual character as well.
Eights are granted to the licensee in model clause 2 in return for a
commitment to invest capital resources in petroleum exploration.
The regulatory and contractual elements in the licence co-exist.
However, licensing arrangements were substantially modified by
the Labour Government through the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines
Act 1975 and further modified by the introduction of majority state
participation in 1975-6. This alteration in the terms of licences
already allocated to include a greater element of state regulation
was presented as an exercise of social control over the large
private firms involved. The idea that oil produced from North Sea
1. I have, in mind here only petroleum production licences for
seaward areas, and it is such licences that I shall be
oonoerned with throughout this study.
2. See, for example, the discussion in Glanville L. Williams,
•Control by Licensing', in 20 Current Legal Problems (1967),
pp.8l-lo3»
fields was 'national property' provided the justificatory basis
for the legislation.
However, I shall argue that this type of licensing is merely
the principal legal aspect of a socialisation of economic
activity which is a pre-requisite for the involvement of any
private companies on a large scale. Ultimately, licence rights
have an economic function analogous to that of property rights,
although the difference in their legal character has the
consequence of introducing an element of uncertainty into the
relationship between licensees and state. Offshore oil exploration
and the development of oilfields oould not have taken plaoe without
a high degree of state regulation nor oould it have occurred so
rapidly without the involvement of large private companies on a
contractual basis. Nonetheless, the solution of one set of problems
creates another set of problems following from the relationship
established between state and private parties. The high degree of
state regulation and the possibility of unilateral alteration leadB
to considerable uncertainty about the stability of a licence
arrangement. The state is obliged to wear two 'hats' t firstly,
it acts as political power, introducing an element of regulation
into the market, assuring the private parties of their interests
and interactions, and motivated not by considerations of profit
but by the 'public interest'; and secondly, it presents itself as
a party to a contractual arrangement, promising to act .iuat like
a private party. This twofold character of the state's presence
is incorporated into UK licences; they possess a contractual
oharacter and at the same time they are the principal mode of state
regulation. The limits of that state regulation are fixed by
a particular constellation of political and economic interests
which may be expected to change over time, as indeed may the
priorities of any particular interest or interests involved.
The first chapter, 'Private Property and the Statei the case
of North Sea oil', is largely introductory. The principal
conflicts contributing to a decline in private ownership and
control are explained, and I provide something of a curriculum
vitae of the international oil companies. The terms on which
these companies are allowed access to oil from producing countries
have changed: new forms of legal agreement place the companies in
a contractual relationship with the state through the medium of
its national oil company. In spite of losing title to the
produced oil, the companies have so far retained control over
its disposal. A similar development has taken place with respect
to offshore oil development in the UK. However, it is
essential to note the differences in the forms of state: an
advanced capitalist state like Britain which is the home-base of
two oil majors will have an entirely different relationship to
the international oil companies than that of an industrialising
state like Iran or a traditionalist state like Saudi Arabia.
In section 3, I show how state regulation through oil licensing
originated in the UK for reasons explicable mainly in terms of
Britain's imperialist role in the world economy: its extensive
overseas interests and economic rivalry with the United States.
In the last section I show how the question of ownership of oil
gains significance only when the oil is actually produced from
the ground and becomes a commodity. The combination of state
ownership of the oil in situ and the state regulation through
the model clauses of licences can present a 'corporatist'
picture of state involvement. This is rebooted and I point to
the 'nationalist' dimension as one way of explaining the British
state's motivation for regulation of oil development.
In chapter two (Oil Companies and the State, 1962-7U), I
show how the licensing framework originated in an attempt to
overcome obstacles to petroleum exploration created by the private
property system or capitalist relations of production. The
various companies conducting seismic surveys in the North Sea
in 1962 were not willing to engage in proper drilling until
the British &tate intervened to establish firm legal conditions.
It did this by extending its sovereignty offshore, dividing
the continental shelf area into blocks and establishing a system
of licensing which allowed monopoly rights to be granted to
private companies. These legal arrangements provided licensee
companies with an assurance that their investment would be protected
both against other states and against other private companies.
The scale of investment required and the high risk involved
rendered this security factor very important.
There was another faotor which encouraged state intervention:
economic rivalry between Britain and the United States. Given
the preponderance of American companies in the international oil
industry, the decision to depend upon private companies to
explore and develop any resources on the continental shelf
implied that American companies would do the lion's share of
the work. A major reason for choosing a discretionary mode
of licence allocation was that it would allow British
Governments to discriminate against American applicants and
in favour of British ones.
Throughout this period there was very little state
regulation. Apart from encouraging the participation of
private British companies, state intervention was mainly directed
at securing the fastest exploration of the UKCS to benefit the
balance of payments and provide a share of economic rent. While
there was some state participation it neither assumed the form
nor the scale which might lead to any conflict between the
state'b role as regulator and aa participator. The licensee's
eoonomic control deriving from the licence gave his rights over
any oil or gas found the character of property-rights.
The increase in oil prices and insecurity of oil supply during
the oil crisis of 1973-U persuaded the British Government to amend
the terms on whioh oil companies extracted oil from the North Sea.
The advent of a Labour Government with a manifesto commitment to
increase 'state control' over oil development led to a conflict
with holders of licences already allocated. In chapter three, I show
how the Government strove to accommodate this commitment to the
existing interests of licensees not only by making amendments to
its legislative proposals but by issuing an invitation to the oil
companies to discuss and suggest amendments to the proposals
throughout the legislative process. She consequences of this
are explained.
The Government was of course quite competent to ask
Parliament to revise the terms of licences already allocated even
though these licences had a contractual character. The doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty ensured that its course of action
was in no way invalid. Nonetheless, a controversy developed
about the character of licence rights! were they or were they not
rights of property? This question was not satisfactorily resolved,
although the material interests involved (payment of compensation,
implications for British investments overseas) were made clear.
In chapter four I examine the other aspect of the Government's
regulatory proposals! the establishment of a British National
Oil Corporation (BNOC). This was a major new element in the
legal regulation of oil exploration and development in the UK,
but a common enough institution in all other oil-producing countries,
except the USA.. One major objective was to achieve 51S& majority
state participation via the BNOC in all commercial oilfields, and
I show how this was done through a series of voluntary negotiations
with holders of pre-197U licences. By examining the legal agreements
reaohed between lioensees and the BNOC, it is clear that, in spite
of the very different proprietary arrangements which resulted, the
economic control over the oil held by the licensees was maintained!
at least sufficient economic control for them to extract the
resources as they see fit, sell it, and make the substantial profit
which provided the motive for the initial investment.
By examining the constitution of the corporation we can
see that the form of participation was not, initially at least,
free from contradictions testifying to a tension between the
regulatory and operating aspects. This was subsequently
recognised and resolved by the Conservative Government in
1979.
In the second part I consider the question of 'new property'
in a theoretical way, reflecting also on the results of the
empirical study in the first part. While it is customary to
begin a thesis with a statement of the problem and then a review
of the extant literature, I have preferred to state the problem
and to sketch my perspective in a preliminary way in this
Introduction, and begin straight away with the empirical study.
I hope in this way to attain maximum plausibility for the idea
that a 'new property' can exist as well as to illustrate in a vivid
manner the relevance of the perspective sketched out here, and developed
in chapter five.
The work contained in the following four chapters is original
in two senses. Firstly, the vide range of Purees I have consulted
are original ones for the most parti official reports,
legislation (i.e. including Statutory Instruments), parliamentary
debates of both Houses, interviews with some of the people concerned,
reports produced by stockbroking firms, newspapers (The Financial
Times, The Times, The Guardian, and The Scotsman) and specialised
journals. I have also consulted books like the *UK Oil and Gas Law
Manual * of Professor Daintith end G.D.M. Willoughby and have
attended one conference and two seminars on this topic organised
by the Law Society and the International Bar Association.
Obviously, some sources were more important in some chapters
than in others. For example, interview material is used almost
exclusively in chapters three and four. Of particular assistance
for ohapter one, were the 'Materials' for the Honours course in
Oil and Gas Law at the University of Dundee.
Incidentally, the study does not presuppose any familiarity
on the reader's part with the technical terms peeular to the
oil industry. I have taken as much care as I could to explain the
meanings of particular technical terms as and when they appear
in the text.
It is also original in the sense that nothing has yet been
written which utilises the mass of empirical material relating to
oil lioensing in the UK North Sea in a social scientific way, as
distinct from accounts of 'the law' or 'histories' of law and
policy since l%k> Although my own perspective is an historical
one, it is not an account of 'events*. Neither does it claim to
be comprehensive in its treatment of oil company-government
relations in Britain during this period* Fiscal legislation, for
example, is not considered, on the ground that it does not present
the sari".; problems of property and the state's dual role as licensing
doe3. I do not of course deny its important role in securing
a share of the rent for the state.
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CHAPTER ONE
Private Property and the Statet
the oaee of Jtorth Sea oil.
With an ever greater share of wealth-producing activities
occurring at sea, policy decisions are being taken by
governments which will affect profound* F the allocation
of world resources and the relationship between the public
and private sectors. It is widely assumed that
institutions such as the price system and private property
which have been cornerstones of the economic system in
Western developed countries, can play only a minor role
in offshore developments.
Kenneth bam
1. K.W. bam, 'Oil and Gas Licensing in the North Sea', in
8 Journal of Law and Economics (1965)» P-5l«
Contentei
1. Conflicts in the production of oil
(i) producers v. consumers
(ii) produoexs and consumers v. the oil companies
(iii) private property v. oil
2. The international oil companies
3. Oil and the British State
h* Ownership of North Sea Oil
1. Conflicts In the Production of Oil;
In the twentieth century oil has assumed the role of the
most important fuel for industrialised societies, whether
capitalist or communist, taking the role vrhloh coal had for
capitalist societies in the nineteenth century. However,
there are several sources of conflict in the production of
oil which contribute to a decline in private ownership and
control of this resource. These conflicts are> (l) between
producing and consuming states; (2) between private companies
and both kinds of State; and (3) between the private property
system and the particular geological conditions in which oil
is found. I shall say a few words about each of these sources
of conflict in turn.
(i) Producers v. Consumers
A principal feature of the world oil economy is the
geographical separation between the major markets for oil
consumption and the location of major oil deposits. The
principal consuming states are the highly industrialised
capitalist economies of the United States, the United Kingdom,
Prance, West Germany and Japan. However, the major oilfields
are located in the Middle East, in West and North Africa, in
Central and South America, and in South East Asia. As a
oonsequence, much crude oil is transported in pipelines and tankers.
More than one half of the cargoes transported by sea are made up
of oil. Professor Chevalier claims that 'each day more than
80 million tons of crude (or half the production of Kuwait's
oilfields) are at sea'.1 Until recently the chief supply
routes converged on the two main importing areass Western Europe
and Japan. However, the USA is rapidly "becoming a third major
importing area as its domestic supplies diminish.
The Soviet Union is also a major consumer of oil but it
is at the same time a major producer, and thus stands apart
from the main traffic in the world oil economy. Oil
exploitation was begun in Russia in the late nineteenth century
by European companies searching for oil supplies as en alternative
to the near monopoly which Rockefeller's Standard Oil had
achieved over American oil products. After the nationalisation
of 1917 production was increased to obtain self-sufficiency in
oil. At the present time it is the world's major oil producer.
In 1979 its oil output was running at an average of 11.7® barrels
a day; more than 2m barrels a day above Saudi Arabia's current
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production. Since its oil is consumed almost entirely within
the Soviet bloc I shall not dwell on this topic further.
Until the late 1960s the relations between producer and
consumer states were organised largely by the actions of the
seven largest private oil companies known as the 'Seven Sisters'.
1. J.M. Chevalier, The New Oil Stakes, p.8.
2. The figures oomes from The Financial Times. November 23» 1979i
"The enigmatic giant'. The USSR is also the world's leading
producer of metallic minerals and coal.
Their role will he discussed separately in section two of this
ohapter. However, the last decade has seen a growth of control
hy the oil producing countries, organised in Q.P.E.C., over
many aspects of oil production: pricing, control over production
rates, etc.
From the late 1960s onward, these states acted to increase
their control over oil found within their national boundaries.
They have not all moved at the same pace nor attributed the same
significance to the same modes of control. However, despite
individual differences they have managed to act collectively through
OPEC with considerable success.
There were three ways in which the 'OPEC Revolution' took
place. It involved:
1. Seizure of control over pricing by OPEC and the assertion
of the right to set prices unilaterally.
2. Seizure of control over production levels; in other words,
the ability to reduce output if the particular states wished to.
3. Seizure of control over the physical oil distribution
system. This had two stages:
(i) OPEC countries nationalised the oil production
facilities end replaced oil company control with a framework
of medium-term lifting agreements, mostly with the majors,1 and
then
(ii) these were replaced after 1978-9 with more detailed
and restrictive contracts, with a wider range of would-be
1. The interests of BP, Shell and the Compagnie Francaisea de-s
Petroles (CFP) in Iraq, were nationalised in December 1975* At
the same time, negotiations between the Kuwaiti Government and
the two oil majors, HP and Gulf, were taking place with a view
to nationalising the companies' outstanding 1+0% share in
producing operations.
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purchasers (for example, the supply contracts between
the Iranian Government and Japanese oil companies,
signed in January this year1). The ability of the oil
majors to adjust supply in order to meet fluctuations
in demand was thus undermined.
This was by no means a unilinear development s OPEC was
formed in I960, and made little progress in realising any of the
2
above goals until the early 1970s. Taking advantage of a combination
of factors (principally high demand combined with a world
shortage of tankers), it forced a dramatic increase in oil prices
in 1973-U, and the Arab members imposed a production cut-back
in October 1973« The prioe increase was, however, followed by
a sharp fall in real terms between 197U and 1979* It was only
the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which re-created the right market
conditions for OPEC to take advantage of and to initiate another
sharp rise in the price of oil.
The demands of the producing states for higher prices and for
greater control over the development of their resource have arisen
not merely from theim perceptions of its ruthless exploitation by
foreign oil companies over the decades. In their view the major
consumers have benefited greatly from plentiful supplies of cheap
oil and should now pay its real worth. In addition, the distance
between some consuming states like the UK and the USA. and 'their'
oil companies is not considered great: to put it bluntly, they
are frequently seen as one arm of US or UK foreign policy. Hence
1. See 'Iran signs new oil supply deals* in The Financial Times.
January U* 1980.
2. There are various accounts of OPEC'a history but that of Stork
(Middle East Oil and the Sfaergy Crisis) has the merit of stressing
its conservative character: see especially chapter 8. A recent
and sober assessment of OPEC can be found in International Affairs.
vol.55 (1979) pp.18-32: 'OFEC's importance in the World Oil
Industry* by Edith Penrose.
the OPEC actions are levelled at the consuming states as well
as, if not more than, the oil companies.
The response of consuming states has not been uniform,
but in general the mo«& has been one of alarm over OFEC's new
role. Oil has a strategic character for the advanced capitalist
economies in both the military and the economic senses. Indeed,
the Interhational Institute for Strategic Studies has stated the
most serious security challenge for these societies in the 1980s
in the following terms:
How to ensure the supply, from an unstable Third World, of
the raw materials on which its economic wall-being,
domestij stability and political cohesion have oome to
depend.
The consumer states have acted in at least two ways to
dead, with the problem of insecurity of supply. Firstly, they
have acted individually and collectively, through the International
Energy Agency, to reduce their dependence upon external supplies
of oil. However, this has not led to any significant reduction
in dependence upon mainly Middle Eastern sources of supply. Seoondly,
they have attempted to find and/or increase indigenous sources of
supply of oil or oil-substitutes. This has been stimulated by
the price rises which have made some sources 'economic' for the
first time: for example, 'marginal' oilfields in the Horth Sea.
To achieve this, a considerable Increase in state intervention has
been necessary: private firms working in the energy sector have
been reminded of their social obligations in this way.
One must, however, be cautious about the increasing state
intervention in the consuming states: it does not necessarily imply
1. Cited in 'Threat to West's raw materials' in The Financial
Times. May 16, 1979.
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a decline in the role of private companies in the production
of oil within their national boundaries. Some writers* have
neglected the fact that the forms of state involved are quite
different from those in the producing countries. The
establishment of a state oil company and a petroleum revenue tax
does not make the British State resemble the State of Saudi Arabia
exoept in the most superficial sense. This point requires some
elaboration.
In the last decade there has been a trend toward increasing
oontrol by producing states over their oil operations. With
the exception of the United States, this has been a universal
phenomenon. Despite the faot that it is the home-base of two
of the major oil companies, Britain has followed this trend since
197U by establishing a national oil company and introducing 51%
majority state participation into all commercial oil fields in
its offshore waters. It also introduced a special petroleum tax
and increased its body of regulatory controls.
One interpretation of this trend, and particularly of
state participation in Britain, is that it indicates a 'decline'
in the role played by the private oil companies. The growth of
social control, in the form of state ownership end direct
participation, is obtained at the expense of private enterprise.
For example, J.C. Woodliffe asserts:
The last decade has witnessed on a global scale a dramatic
shift in the balance of economic and political power between
1. To name but a few: T. Daintith and I. Gault, 'Pacta Sunt
Servanda and the Licensing and Taxation of North Sea Oil
Production' in 8 Cambrian Law Beview (1977)» pp.33-9? 'The
general tenor of the developments in domestic policy here
described is a familiar one in the oontext of oil company _
Government relations the world over.' (at p.38)I J.C. Woodliffe,
'State Participation in the Development of United Kingdom
Offshore Petroleum Besources', in Public Law (1977)» at p.2i*9?
K. Chapman, North Sea Oil and Gas, p.98? Kenneth W. Dam, Oil
Resources: Who gets What How?, pp.3-20.
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the multinational oil company and the sovereign nation
state, -whether it be a producer or consumer of oil.
Nowhere is this change^in relationship more evident than
in the United Kingdom.
The present position, he claims, shows a movement in the
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direction of greater state involvement. Such a view neglects
the different forms of state involved, as well as exaggerating
the consequences of certain legal changes. It 1b particularly
inappropriate as a view of the development of state intervention
in the UK.
Indeed, the distinction between producer and consumer states
can be criticised for the same reasons. It abstracts from one
feature of their national economies (whether they are n#t importers
or exporters of oil) and ignores their different degrees of
industrialisation and their different political structures. It
also neglects their role in the world economy.
I have merely used it in these introductory pages to sketch
a general and preliminary picture of the world oil econoiay and the
tensions within it. It has been quite sufficient for my purposes
to consider as consumer states only the principal consuming countries
3
like the USA and the UK. These are also advanced capitalist
societies and their states are imperialist4 in character. The fact
that both the USA and the UK are substantial producers of oil should
not obscure this imperialist aspect, deriving as it does from their
economy and state taken as a whole. By focussing solely upon oil
1. 'State Participation', op.cit., p. 22*9.
2. loc.cit.
3. There are of course many other 'consuming countries' in the
so-called 'Third World', like India.
2*. See chapter five for an explanation of what I mean by
•imperialism'.
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policies and the municipal petroleum law It is of course
possible to find similarities in the actions of all producing
states in the last decade. Nonetheless, the real determinants
of a state's law and policy on petroleum development are to be
found in its socio-economic structure and in the dynamic of the
world economy. In Britain's case, the salient feature in this
context is the complex network of economic links between the
largest British firms and banks on the one hand, and the
industrialised and industrialising nations on the other,
(ii) Producers and consumers v. the oil companies
Until the late 1960s oil companies operating in many parts
of the world had been able to secure for themselves the ownership
of oil produced by their operations in return for ^.payment of
royalties and other taxes. One advantage of this was the
ability to conduct a profitable business in selling surplus 'owned'
crude oil to other companies.
However, a climate of economic nationalism in the producing
states led to the nationalisation of company assets in a number
of states. 'The nationalist mood was conveyed in a remark (made
somewhat earlier) by Sheikh Abdullah Tarikis
We are the sons of the Indians who sold Manhattan Island.
We want to ohsnge the deal.
The nationalisations began in Algeria in 1971 and in Iraq in
1972, taking place at a time when agreements between OPEC and the
1. Cited in J.E. Hartshorn, Oil Compan-iea r^d Governments, at p.312.
oil companies about increased control and revenue for the
producers were reached and subsequently revised in Tehran,
Tripoli, Geneva and in New York. In 1975 > Kuwait negotiated
the acquisition of the remaining assets of Gulf and BP, while
Iraq simply seized the remaining assets of foreign oil companies.
Negotiations followed in Qatar and Saudi Arabia which resulted
in takeovers of company assets.
The international oil companies were still to have a role.
They were to be employed as contractors on an ad hoo basis working
for fixed fees. In most states, however, the bulk of the state's
oil production is now sold back under contract to the former
concessionaires. The major part of the oil which does not go back
to former concessionaires is sold under long-term contracts. These
are highly flexible arrangements, containing three-month re-opener
clauses so that the terms applying to either volume or price
may be adjusted: this makes them 'contracts of long intention'
rather than long-term contracts.*
The form of legal agreement between producing state and oil
company (or companies) reflects the change in economic power and
has been characterised on the analogy of Maine's famous dictum
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as a movement from concession to contract. The old concession
has been described by Northcutt Ely as
.. .essentially a contractual agreement between a company and
1. For an elaboration of this, see 'Oil Companies adapt to a new
role', in Thf> Ttajik-ftv, March, 1977> P»85»
2. 'From Concessions to Contracts': two articles in The Petroleum
Economist. December 197^» PP-U59-61; January 1975» pp.21-25.
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a government which confers certain rights and
cox-responding obligations upon both parties. It
is also a document of title against which money
can be borrowed.
Hie element of title has now been removed and the present
arrangement is a contractual one of the kind described above. The
very idea of & •concession' has been discredited, since it carries
overtones of colonialism. Its purpose was simply to hold one
social and economic relationship in a country stable for usually
very long periods of time. Paradoxically, success in the
fulfilment of this task eventually led to accelerated change.
The decline in the role of the oil companies can be seen not
only from the success of these nationalisations but also when these
measures are seen against the background of earlier attempts
at nationalisation of foreign oil companies1 assets. These had
occurred in Russia in 1917» in Mexloo in 1938, and in Iran In 1951 •
In the first case it was part of a revolution and preceded a civil
war in which the Tsarist forces were partly funded by the oil
companies whose interests had been expropriated. In the second
case, a virtual boycott of Mexican oil by the major oil companies
followed nationalisation, and led to such a slowing down in
exploration and production that further substantial quantities of
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oil were not recovered for 30 years. Finally, there Is the case of
Iran. After the Industry was nationalised in 1951> all production
1. Ely, 'Changing Concepts of the World's Mineral Development Laws*
in World Energy Laws. ISA, pp.J+7-69»
2. The dispossessed companies threatened legal action against
anyone purchasing oil from the new Mexican state oil company,
thus preventing exports until the Mej&ean Government agreed
to pay compensation! the same strategy as that adopted by
Anglo-Iranian during the Iran crisis in 1951*
U4-
ceased and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now BP) threatened
to take legal action against any entity which bought and used
•its' oil. Since the Iranian oil industry lacked the legal
right to sell abroad the oil produced from concessions which
had been granted in accordance with customary international
law, no Iranian oil was sold on world markets. A settlement
was only leached after the CIA staged a coup end restored the
Shah to power in August 1953. The Shah took as his adviser on
petroleum affairs Thorkild Rieber, a former chairman of Texaco until
he was forced to resign in 19^0 for alleged pro-Nazi sympathies.
The privately owned oil industry has therefore become more
subject to the control of the producing states. However, this
phenomenon has extended even to the consuming states. For the
most part, these states have shown little reluctance in increasing
state regulation over the basic sectors of their economies like
steel, coal, gas and electrloltys this extends to oil too.
The poBt-war expansion of the international oil companies in
Western Europe led to various forms of state intervention in many
countries, even before the oil crisis of 1973* Oil was placed
partly in the public sector by the establishment of a state oil
company in France, Italy, Norway, Austria and Finland. Governments
also attempted to influence company decisions on refining and
pricing in their 'national interests'.
1. J. Stork, op.cit., p.5U* Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA men in
oharge of the coup later left 'public service* to become vice-
president of Gulf Oil. The State Department and the CIA were
controlled by the Dulles brothers* John Poster Dulles previously
worked for the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which
represented the Rockefeller oil interests; Allen Dulles had an
association with American interests in the Middle East going baok
to World War I.
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The United Kingdom proved something of an exception to
thiB. Before 1975 there was a conspicuous lack of state
regulation, despite the existence of a "burgeoning domestic
oil economy. An attempt to introduce a state oil company in
the late 1960s failed (see next chapter). This situation changed
dramatically in 1975 with the creation of a state oil company,
and legislation of new licence and taxation arrangements.
The United States was another very different case. Feu large
corporations arouse as much hostility in the USA a@ the large oil
companies. As recently as 1976 a Bill was introduced in the
1
Senate to divest these companies of much of their assets.
Pressures upon the oil companies came from the ecology lobby, and
from advocates of a free market who resent the oligopolist role
played by the oompanies and threaten to use the anti-trust
legislation to reduce that role.
However, in both the latter oases, any conflict between the
state and the oil companies (national or internationally operating)
is qualified by an awareness of common interest. The international
2
oil companies are either American or British based and make
massive contributions to their countries' balance of payments.'^
The British Petroleum Company is the biggest exporting company in
the United Kingdom. Further, these companies have
... effectively organized their activities around the world
behind the guarantee of security offered by the political
1. For an account of this, see The Times. February 23, 1976: 'Senate
Bill to break up oil groups'.
2. Shell has its operating headquarters in London.
3. For example, the UK balance of payments benefited by £1,100 million
from BP's North Sea activities in 1978 (HP Annual Report, p.7)«
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and/or military presences of the United States and
the United Kingdom.
(iii) Private property v. oil
The third source of conflict over property found in the
production of oil derives from the peculiar natural characteristics
of oil. The exploitation of some natural resources, and oil in
particular, has presented difficulties for systems of private
property. One legal authority has observed ironically that
... the searoh for an answer to questions on property-rights
in petroleum has beengsoarcely less arduous than the search
for petroleum itself.
Oil is like coal and other minerals in being a finite, non¬
renewable resource, but it differs from 'hard* minerals in
possessing a fugacious character. It is found in structural traps
in reservoir rook below the surface, and accumulates in the pore
space8 of a variety of sedimentary rooks, like sandstone and
limestone. Extracting it, according to one writer, is 'more
like squeezing treacle out of a brick than lifting buoketfuls
3
from a well*. The oil is capable of migrating through the
reservoir in which it is found to areas of low pressure created
by the drilling of wells. It will do so with no regard for the
boundary lines of surface owners.
If a reservoir should extend under land which has several
different owners, as is oommon in the USA, one of the owners could
1. P. Odell, Oil and World Power, p.190.
2. G.U.M. Willoughby, 'Property Eights in Petroleum', in The Law
Sooiety's Gazette. January 11, 1978, p.6.
3. Gerald Foley, The Energy Question, p.132. A good aocount of these
geological features is contained in A.F. Fox, The World of Oil.
pp. 57—9- —
not exercise his rights to the resource without disadvantageously
affecting the rights of others. It follows from the oil's
fugacious character that oil cannot he extracted unilaterally if
a reservoir reaches under the area of several owners or
licensees. As oil is taken out of the ground, the remainder
will prove more diffioult to extract, requiring expensive
reoovery techniques and will therefore be worth less.
The consequences of this for a system of private property
were first encountered in the USA.* Originally, the dominant
rule was the accession rule: the right of property in subterranean
mineral deposits rests in the proprietor of the surface (cuis est
solum, eius est usque ad ooelum et ad infernos). However, this
was modified at an early stage in one of two principal ways. Firstly,
it was assumed that analogies could be made between oil and wild
game or percolating water (in fact oil cannot percolate through
subsoil over great distances). From the analogies US judges
constructed a 'rule of capture' whioh had the effect of modifying
the accession rule. This 'rule of capture' simply meant that the
oil belonged to whoever could get it, and the surface owner's right
to the deposit was made subject to it. As a consequence, he would
lose title if oil under his land were drawn off by drilling on
adjoining or nearby property. Alternatively, the surface owner was
denied the ability to exercise full rights of ownership over such
a volatile commodity at any point prior to reduction to possession
at the wellhead.
1. For an excellent account of this, see Chevalier, op.cit., pp.1*5-71
see also T.C. Daintith, 'The UK Petroleum Regime*, in Proceed
of the Petroleum Law Education Trust Seminar, held at
Cambridge, January, 1978 (hereinafter Proceedings). IBA, vol.1,
paper 1*.
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The result of these modifications of the accession rule was
drastic for the production of oil. There was a destructive
proliferation of wells as rights to produce were sold off in
small lots and each owner tried to produce as much as possible
from his piece of land. A multiplicity of private owners and
lessees drilled wells and extracted oil at a feverish pace in
competition with each other. This had two immediate consequences!
firstly, a surplus of oil was created, leading to a lowering
of prioes; and secondly, considerable wastage of oil resulted
from the competitive drilling and extraction. State
intervention followed and a system of •pro-rationing' established
whereby each field was to be treated as a whole and rights to
the oil in situ were apportioned among a number of different
lessees or owners. Drilling and extraction was carried on at a
controlled rate and waste prevented.
Although this phenomenon has only been seen in the
United States, full private ownership and the rule of capture
has become a 'bogey' which legislators in other States have
struggled to avoid.^
As early as 1917 the British Government was persuaded by
S. Pearson and Son to introduce a scheme of state licensing of
2
oil exploration. Apparently, the assumption was that at common law,
the rule of capture or something very similar would be applied by
courts in the UK to modify surface owner's rights, with the attendant
1. In fact there are several systems of ownership in the USA: title
to minerals and hydrocarbons may exist in the Federal government
the state government, or an individual, depending on surface
ownership.
2. For a fuller discussion of this see section 3 below.
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risk of competitive drilling. Before the Pearson company would
aot as an agent to explore for oil deposits this matter had to
he clarified. I shall return to this in section
The expansion of oil exploration and production into
offshore waters on the continental shelves of States has
added to existing problems about property in oil. In the
United Kingdom it is not absolutely dear what the exact character
of rights possessed by the Crown really is ('sovereign rights').
Similarly, there is some doubt shout the character of the rights
possessed by licensees in the oil and gas in situ under the
Continental Shelf, since the international regime seems to exclude
the ownership in fee system adopted for onshore deposits by the
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934* In addition, it is not clear
whether the ownership in fee principle is qualified by a rule of
1
caPtrrre •
However, there is a clear trend toward state regulation as a
means of combating the adverse effects of unfettered competition
among private owners and licensees. As the state itself has come
to assume ownership of all petroleum deposits in situ, the basic
legal relationship between private owner, lessee, and the State has
been replaced by one between the State and sin operator, usually
holding a lioencc as opposed to a lease or concession. It is now
also the norm for a State to function as a partner in the operations,
1. These problems are discussed in a general way by T.C. Daintith
in 'World Energy Laws: Surveys and Prospects', in World Energy
Laws: Proceedings of IBA Seminar on World Energy Laws held in
Stavanger, Norway, May 1975. Some clarity may be ©merging with
the passage of time: see the discussion in Terence Baintith's
paper, Correlative Bights in Oil Reservoirs on the United Kingdom
Continental Shelf, paper presented at the European Offshore
Petroleum Conference and Exhibition in London, October 2k-27,
1973.
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through the medium of a state oil company.
This has not brought an end to problems about property,
particularly in the new offshore areas of exploration and
development. To the extent that private oil companies are
employed by a State to exploit oil resources, the fugacious
character of the oil will compel different licensees sharing the
same reservoir to reach agreement as toihow and when it is to be
exploited and in what proportions the oil is to be divided.
Before I examine these matters, some words must be said about
the various private owners of the means by which oil is produced
and distributed.
2. The international oil companies
Large private firms in the advanced capitalist societies
certainly dominate these economies hut they can no longer function
within the national frameworki they must, as Paul Mattick notes,
'become and must remain multinational corporations1." Another
author notes t
Any company of importance that wants to survive has to be
international and multinational, (since) companies with
worldwide operations may find it easier than purely rwtiMBSl
companies to reduoe costs by moving raw materials, production
and distribution facilities, and manpower in conformance with
optimization objectives.
The petroleum companies were the pioneer international corporations.
Of all capitalist enterprises they were the first to adopt a
worldwide strategy of profit maximisation, the first to locate a
1. Marx and Keynes, p.262.
2. G.A. Steiner, cit. in Mattick, op.oit. p.262.
large amount of their assets outside their home countries,
and the first to depend on foreign-derived income for more than
half their profits. There are no better examples of the use
of oligopoly power than the ways in whioh these international
oil companies controlled markets, fixed prises and reduced
competition over a period of several deoades.
The following table, showing the rank and turnover of the
world's largest industrial companies in 1978, shows the prominent
I X
place which the largest oil companies have in the world capitalists^
1. General Motors 63.2 | billion
2. Exxon 60.3





8. Standard Oil (California) 23.2
The asterisked companies are British or partly British based;
the others are all American.
In fact not all the oil companies are the same size. We can
divide the companies into three groupsi firstly, the majors;
secondly, the independents, and finally, the national oil companies.
The majors, or the 'Seven Sisters' as Enrico Mattei called
2
them, are the largest of the internationally operating oil
companies. They are Esso, Shell, HP, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco
T|
and Gulf.
1. Sourcei The Economist. December 29, 1979? 'The Giants'.
2. Enrico Mattei was the head of Ente Nazionale Idrocsrburi (EKl),
the Italian state oil company until his death in a mysterious plane
crash. Under his direction, EMI tried to obtain alternative
sources of oil to those controlled by the majors.
3. Esso is the trade name of the Exxon Corporation, otherwise
known as Standard Oil of New Jersey.
These companies are responsible for about 80 per cent of all
the oil production in the world outside the United States and
£(3 rw.fr.Wie¬
the socialist tates. They also own or control over 70 Pe*' cent
of the total refining capacity in these areas, and operate directly
or indirectly through long-term charter fifty per cent of the tonnage
of internationally operating tankers.
Since they control most of the refinery capacity and market
outlets in Western Europe, these oompanies are the biggest
buyers of oil. Their bargaining strength is considerable, since
as Kenneth Sam points out they have
... a wide range of ventures in progress, of which operations
within any one country's jurisdiction will normally constitute
only a minor proportion. Many are well-capitalised
companies w|th the capacity to generate internally cash
needed ...
The fact that their operations axe international does not
however imply companies owned and/or controlled by several nations.
It only means that their operations are world-wide, employing
citizens of many different countries and having nationally registered
subsidiaries in many different states. Their leading personnel,
their shareholders and their basis of operations are limited to those
2
of three nations: the USA, Britain, and Holland.
In general, these companies or 'groups' consist of a top
holding company with numerous associated and subsidiary operating
companies. Each is integrated vertically, controlling most of its
own requiremente of crude oil, owning or controlling through long-
term charters most of its own transport facilities, owning its own
1. Oil Resources, p.32.
2. The Butch involvement through Shell is of minimal significance
relative to the other two nations.
refineries, and controlling its distribution outlets all over
the world. The separate 'groups* are often closely associated
through joint ownership of subsidiaries and through long-term
supply or marketing agreements (e.g. the Arabian American Oil
Compaq, Shell-Mex BP). They are also in competition with
each other, this taking the form of attempts to maintain or
increase their shares in the markets for final products or to
obtain a position in new markets, through strategic acquisition
of raw material supplies and refinery and distribution
facilities, through improvements in products and throrigh
advertising. Price competition (pre-1973) was always avoided
as far as possible and market-sharing agreements were not
unusual. Selling crude oil has not been their main interest
since most of their profit until reoent years came from the
production of crude oil.1
The national character of these companies is often given
2
too little weight. In some accounts, like .Anthony Sampson's, (I
an almost rigid separation between the 'economic' and the
•political* is presupposed: their autonomy from their home state
is treated as almost absolute. The erroneous character of this
view is best illustrated by looking at the relationship between
the USA, the home state of five of the 'Seven Sisters', and the
1. E. Penrose, 'Middle East Oil: the international distribution
of profits and income taxes', in The Growth of .Visas. Middle
East Oil and Other Essays, pp.lJj.Q-1.
2. The Seven Sisters: the Great Oil Companies and the World They
Made.
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American based oil companies. However, this is well documented
in most of the general studies of the oil industry and there is
no need to repeat the details.1 It suffices to note that this
does not always take the form of direct assistance to the
American majors in their foreign operations. A more oomplex
form of support developed in the 1970s when the majors as well
as the domestic oil industry and American business as a whole
stood to benefit from an increase in oil pricest both seotions
of the American oil industry, domestic and international, would
benefit from higher prices in terms of increased profits, while
removal of the cost advantage given to their European and
Japanese rivals by cheaper oil would benefit many American companies
2
in the chemicals and textiles industries.
American influence upon the international oil companies extends
to the non-American majors, Shell and BP. Both companies have
considerable assets in the US, and depend on their US subsidiaries
for large proportions of their total income. The former is
part-British and part-Dutch in ownership, but nonetheless insists
that its non-American employees, if they are candidates for
senior managerial positions, have periods of servioe in the US
subsidiary, the Shell Oil Company, which is 60^ owned by Shell
International. According to Peter Odell,
... all the managing directors have been sent to work in
the USA at various parts of their careers.
1. For a detailed account see Engler, The Brotherhood of Oil. > i\>, ..<■>\
pp.98-lU5» or Stork, op.cit. '
2. This form of support is central to the explanations of the oil
crisis of 1973-'* advanced both by Chevalier, op.cit. and Odell,
op.cit.
3. Oil and World Power, p.21.
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The HE subsidiary is so large that it contributes about one-third
of all the Shell Group revenues and profits.^
BP's involvement in the United States is even greater:
nearly one-half of its current assets are located there. This
is largely the consequence of its attempt to diversify its
sourcob of supply away from the Middle East. In 1969» the Alaskan
leases of BP's American subsidiary, BP Inc., were proved to
oontain 5^ of the biggest oilfield in the Western World, the
Proudhoe Bay complex. Since US legislation required the oil to
be sold domestically, and since BP had no refining or
marketing facilities, it sold most of its Alaskan interests to
Sohio (Standard Oil of Ohio), a small domestio oil company
possessing infrastructure but lacking access to crude oil. In
return it obtained a stake in Sohio which was linked to oil
production from Proudhoe Bay: as production increased, so did
BP's share in the company. By 1978» BP had acquired majority
control of a company employing 22,000 people and selling 20m tonnes
of orude oil in the USA every year and had invested #6.2 billion in
Alaska. In addition, the two companies own nearly one-half of
2
Alyeska, the trans-Alaskan pipeline operating eompany. The
strategic significance of this investment by a foreign company in
the USA is considerable: the Proudhoe Bay oilfields contain over
one-quarter of the proven crude oil reserves in the USA and BP, via
Sohio, controls over one half of those fields. The possibility
1. loo cit.
2. All the figures are from The Guardian. July 11, 1978: 'IP's
Alaskan adventure pays off in the US'.
of political action against these interests was, as we shall see,
one which vexed successive British Governments from the late
•60s onward and influenced the pattern of UK oil policy.
By contrast, the concentrated character of these large firms
is often given too much weight. Together the seven ma.jor oil
companies dominate the international oil industry (and have eight
large counterparts which dominate the huge American market! Th&ir
operations extend throughout all the stages in supplying
petroleum products! until recently, ownership of reserves,
recovery of crude oil, pipeline transport, refining and selling
through servioe stations.
These few oil companies have always done most of the business
involved to all phases of the industry. As early as the eve of the
First World War, the seven majors already dom1.na.ted the
international oil market. One of them, Shell, was present at all
phases of the cyole of production and possessed a highly
diversified supply system. Two of them alone controlled the
Middle East: the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Shell.'
The term 'seven sisters' was coined by Fnrico Mattei, the
2
chairman of ENI, to connote the degree of co-operation that
existed among the majors. Both internationally and in the USA the
largest oil oompanies have adopted a 'live and let live' convention,
minimi sing competition among themselves and avoiding price-cutting.
The opportunity to exchange thoughts on common policy has been
facilitated by the fact that they frequently engage in joint operations
1. For a good account of the period up to 1970, see Chevalier, op.oit
chapter 1, pp.15-33•
2. See page 17, note 1.
The history of the oil industry provides famous examples of
agreements to curtail competition! the Red Line Agreement made
in October 1927 divided up the oilfields in the Arabian Peninsula
among the majors and was not dissolved until 19h&i the 'As Is*
Agreement, made at Achnacarry Castle, Inverness-shire in 1928
supplemented this by ensuring co-operation in marketing as well
as in production: they agreed to freeze the market at it was.
However, this co-operation was only won by necessity, that is,
the desire to conserve profits, and the agreements were broken
whenever one of the parties thought it would gain an advantage
by doing so. At the present time, it is not necessary for them
to form a cartel since any rise in costs (or fall in profit)
automatically leads to a rise in prices.
The reasons for this concentration oan be found in the
industry's history. It has been a history of shortage, fear of
shortage and glut in turn and the hectic rising and falling of
prices. Put simply, the industry is subject to over-supply, leading
to the possibility of price collapse. Cartels have developed in
order to keep prices up! those oil companies who were best able
to diversify their risk did this.
There are a number of phases in oil production: exploration
and production; transportation; refining; transportation of the
refined product to the consumer; and marketing. Control of the
various phases allows for an averaging out of respective profits
in various phases, and so they have tended to be organised by the
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same corporate groups. Hence their con^&mtrated character has
been very evident to the general public. This horizontal integration
(forward and reverse) helps to avoid problems of supply: shortage
or excess.
Paul Frankel identifies two other features of oil production
which have acted as a stimulus to concentration of private
capital. Firstly, the high risk involved in oil production:
a well may be drilled at a site thought to be favourable from a
geological point of view, but there is no way of being certain
that a deposit will be found or that sufficient oil will be found
to recover the expenditure on exploration. Technological
innovations have reduced this problem, but have not eliminated
it. Secondly, a high degree of fixed capital is required in
oil production. The best example of this is the cost of
2
constructing and installing production platforms in the North Sea.
Both of these features encourage operating companies to
miniraise the risks involved, and one way of doing this is to
diversify sources of supply. To do this successfully, a company
must be of a certain size and hence there is a tendency toward
concentration.
However, in spite of all this, the oil industry is not the
most concentrated of industries. There is no single firm like
IBM which dominates the entire industry. The biggest oompanies
in the aluminium and the car industries have a such bigger share
1. Paul M. Frankel, •Structural Analysis of the International Oil
Industry up to the immediate post-World War II Situation', in
Proceedings (1978) op.cit., vol.1, paper 1.
2. A steel platform coBt £155*2 million in 1975 (source: Department
of Energy, North Sea costs escalation study).
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of the market than the large oil companies have. All the major
industries in advanced capitalism show a high degree of
concentration and, whatever its peculiar circumstances as
an industry, the oil industry is "by no means exceptional in
being highly concentrated.
The second group of companies are known as the independents.
However, the term 'independent' is a rather misleading onel it
is used to describe private companies which are smaller than
the majors, although still large by comparison with most
corporations and still privately owned. Unlike the majors they
are often not integrated in their operations, being less secure
in either sources of supply or outlets for their products and
confined in their operations to a few countries or even one.
These companies are marginal operators and do not provide
an alternative to the very large units. Paul Frankel desoribes
1
them as the 'collapsible extension of the main structure'.
Competition between them and the majors certainly exists but
has often been exaggerated. The involvement of independent
companies exploring Hew areas like North Africa in the 1960s
certainly influenced the majors, and as early as 1962 and 1963
twelve independents were carrying out seismic surveys in the
3
North Sea.
1. Proceedings, op.cit. at p.1.7.
2. See Chapter Two, p. 93.
3. First Report from the Public Accounts Committee, North Sea
Oil and Gas (1972-3) H.C.122 (hereinafter PAC Report), p.83.
These included Sun Oil, Phillips, Marathon and Envoy Oil. Five
of the majors were also present.
Host of these companies are American owned, although
some British Independents like Tricentrol and Burmah secured
interests in the North Sea and have received favourable
treatment in licensing rounds organised under Conservative
Governments. Many of these companies are organised in Brindex,
the Association of British Independent Oil Exploration Companies.
The American independents first became a force internationally
in the 1950s. They diversified their interests abroad to obtain
cheaper supplies of crude oil than had been available from their
fields in the USA and thus increase the profitability of their
domestic refining and marketing operations. However, in response
to the demands of domestio oil producers for a ceiling on imports
of cheap oil, the Eisenhower Administration established an import
quota system in 1959^ a mere 13^o of US oil consumption could then
come from abroad. Those companies which had made commitments to
find, and produce and export oil were suddenly left without a
market, and a general surplus of oil was created. The companies
affected, like Occidental, Atlantio Richfield and offshoots of the
Rookefeller Trust like Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco), then
proceeded to challenge the Seven Sisters* agreements of prioe
oontrol by offering crude oil to independent refiners at prices
lower than the majors'. They also built their own refineries and
made a variety of oil products available on the markets. The
result was intense competition between these oil companies and the
majors £>r the European and Japanese markets.
1. See Odell, op.cit., pp.3U-i+2, for an account of this.
This situation has ceased to exist since the 'OPEC
Revolution*. In the face of the rising cost of oil, the
independents have attempted to consolidate the modest share
of these markets which they obtained.
The third group of companies are the national oil companies.
It is more accurate, however, to call them state oil companies
since, as we have seen, the majors are also national oil companies
of a sort. I shall, however, retain the conventional use in
this study.
Just as all nations are not alike, so their national oil
companies differ. Those companies established by OPEC states
like the National Iranian Oil Company (KIOC) are an attempt to
increase those countries' shares of revenue from oil
development, and also to control rates of production. In
addition, they have a symbolic aspect, representing an
assertion of national independence against colonialism. However,
national oil companies have also been established in the advanced
capitalist states. In such cases, it should not be interpreted
as a radical or socialist phenomenon! it is not an attempt to
seize a commanding height of the eoonomy. In the postwar period
it proved popular among Vest European nations, like France and
Italy, as a response to their lack of indigenous oil supplies and
consequent dependence upon supplies from the Middle East, which
was of course controlled by American and British companies.
Ae a result of the growing fears of interruption to oil
supplies which followed the oil oriais of 1973-U, national oil
companies have assumed a greater importance in the advanced
capitalist states. While attempts to introduce such a company
had failed in Britain in the mid 1960s, a British Rational Oil
Corporation was finally established in 1975* supplementing
the state share in BP.
The reasons for the creation of national oil companies
are not to be found prlnoipally in the realm of profit-making
economic activity. There is rarely any claim that a national
oil company will do anything better or more cheaply than a
private oil company, and it may well be required to do things
from time to time which will not be advantageous in this sense
of the word 'economic*. Such companies are however now the
norm in all oil-producing areas, except in the USA and in Chile.
The role of the privately owned oil companies in world oil
produotion has changed dramatically since 1970. The price-fixing
cartel of the Seven Sisters has been replaced by that of OPEC.
As described in section 1, a wave of nationalisations reduced
their dominance in the Middle East and North Africa. The methods
by which they are granted rights of exploration and production
have altered radically,^ and they have lost the decision-making
role over produotion rates in the most prolific areas which axe
controlled by the OPEC cartel.
1. See 'From Concessions to Contracts', op.oit. For a history of
the oil concession as a legal instrument in the Middle East, see
J.E. Hartshorn, op.oit. pp.312-19.
The form of legal agreement Itself has oome to have 'overriding
importance in view of sensitive political and nationalistic
feelings'.1 The trend has been away frcm the concession form which
gave companies exclusive long-term rights over most of a country's
2
territory in return for royalties and income taxes, toward a
contractual relationship based on methods such as joint ventures,
participation arrangements or service contracts, with the state as
owner. The notion of a property-right vesting in a foreign oil
company, with corresponding rights of control, the 'theoretical
3
cornerstone of the concession concept'^ smacked of colonialism, of
national rights being exchanged for 'baksheesh', and was therefore
removed.
The significance of this development for the oil companies
is hard to gauge. If a government has the power to unilaterally
alter whatever arrangement is in foroe, it makes little difference
whether it is a concession or a participation arrangement.
Certainly the old concession terms were more favourable than the
modern agreementsi these give companies rights of property which
are diminished by joint venture and participation agreements
and eliminated by production-sharing oontraots. However, even the
concessionary rights could be effectively defeated by the host
government if it chose to enact increased tax rates upon company
operations.
1. op.cit. p.U59.
2. The famous D'Arcy ooncesBion, granted by the Persian Government
to William Knox D'Arcy, gave him the exclusive right to explore
for and exploit the petroleum resources of Persia, excluding
five northern provinces, for a period of 60 years, and exemption
from all Persian taxes. See Odell, p.29.
3. Ely, op.cit., p.1*3-
In all the various types of arrangement, the company or
consortium contracts with the producing government to provide
the capital and expertise required to develop the petroleum
resources in return for a right to a share of the produotion.
The implications are stated quite bluntly by Horthcutt Ely:
When all is said and done, what is important (to the
companies) is how nruoh oil the company is allowed to
take away from its operations and at what cost. Whether
its right to this oil is characterised as a "contract
right" or a "property right" is less important, as a
practical matter, than the amount of profits that the right
produces. These profits do not depend on the nature or
the type of agreement as much as |hey depend upon the
specific terms of that agreement.
The changes in the oil companies' role resulting from these
new legal arrangements and from the dominance of the OPEC cartel
2
over pricing and production ought not to be exaggerated. The
oil companies themselves have not remained passive in the faoe of
a changing and less favourable olimate in the main producing
centres. Perception of a decline in profitability (or 'increasing
cost' ) was already leading many companies, both majors and
independents, to diversify their operations. This diversification
has been of three kinds:
1. Diversification into competing energy sources like coal.
This was begun in the 1960s in anticipation of lower future profits
in the Middle East, and has included all the major alternatives:
1. op.oit., p.Ul. See also Tugendhat and Hamilton, Oil: The
Biggest Business, at p.335* the problem is not one of the
particular form of the concession but 'the security of
tenure and precise financial terms attached to it'.
2. For a sceptical view of the changes in the Middle East resulting
from the new legal arrangements between governments and companies,
see Dam, op.cit. pp.12-20.
3. For the oil companies' point of view, the decline in profits is
preceived as an increase in cost.
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coal, gas, nuclear energy and hydroelectricity, and some of the
minor ones like wind, wave and solar power. Coal has proved
especially attractive since, like oil, it is a fossil fuel and
requires essentially the same geological techniques to extract.
Most companies, including BP since the 1970s, have extensive
coal interests in the western states of America, Canada and
Western Australia.1
2. Diversification into new sources of oil supply. This
process also began in the 1960s when oil companies spent large
sums of money looking for oil on- and offshore in Indonesia,
West Africa, Alaska and the North Sea: in spite of a situation
characterised by increasing supplies and weakening prices! In 1969.
the Amerioan periodical 'Business Week' described this as:
... the wildest, and the most widespread oil rush in
history ... in the face of an oversupply of orude
so massive that if not one additional barrel of oil were
found the world could maintain its current consumption
for more than 30 years.
The more recently discovered resources of oil have been found
on public lands like Alaska. In the United States where one-third
of all land and most of the undersea continental shelf is owned
by the federal government, this has led to a oonfliot between oil
companies and environmentalists.
Despite mixed success (not all areas are like the North Sea)»
the profits from Alaskan and North Sea oilfields have been so great
1. 'Big Oil is buying rocks', in The Economist. September 16, 1978.
2. Cit. in Stork, op.cit., p.li+6. See also T.C. Daintith and
I. Gault, op.cit., where the greater political and legal security
of the North Sea is emphasised.
that they have provided the e&pital for a number of large
takeovers by oil companies, and for further diversification."
3. Diversification into economic activities unrelated to
energy. This is also a process which began in the 1960s. Many
oil companies have extensive interests in mining, where there is
a technology overlap with oil extraction. Companies like Pennzoil
and Kerr-MeGee have diversified into extraction of phosphate and
copper, as well as coal and uranium. In reoent years, Atlantic
Richfield has purchased the seoond largest copper company in
the US. Several companies have diversified into more exotic
areas like retailing (Mobil), office equipment (Exxon), publishing
(Atlantic Richfield), and even farming (Kerr-McGee established
2
itself in agricultural fertiliser production).
In addition to this strategy of diversification, the oil
companies have attempted to move the locus of profit from the
producing to the consuming end. Consequently, their loss of
ownership of reserves at the point of production need not imply
a simple decline in their overall role. They still have
considerable control over transportation, refining and marketing:
in other words, over disposal of the oil. They can therefore
manipulate the various markets for cude oil and finished products,
distributing them only at the highest rates. Furthermore, the large
price increases in 1973-U and 1979 have Increased company profits
1. See 'Spreading, and clipping the oil majors' wings', in The
Financial Timea. September 12, 1978.
2. 'Big Oil is buying rooks', op.cit.
considerably! for example, in 1979 their profits increased
by between 25> and 100^. ^ The rate of increase in official
prices has been greater than the rate of increase in real
coats, and price increases greater than the increases in company
costs have been passed on to the consumers temporarily solving
2
the crisis of profitability.
In this section I have provided an outline of the international
oil industry and have suggested that private control over the means
of production and distribution has not been significantly diminished,
by changes in the legal arrangements between companies and the
governments of producing countries. Most investment and
organisation of production is still carried on privately.
Unlike those who emphasise the scale and multinational character
of these companies, I have preferred to stress their national
character. Indeed, not only are they nationally baaed but they
are based almost exclusively in two advanced capitalist nations!
the USA and the UK, with the former playing the dominant role.
The relationship between the oil companj.es and their home-states is
a close one as will be seen in the next section which deals with
the case of Britain.
3. Oil and the British State
Long before the formation of OFIDC, state intervention in the
exploration and development of petroleum deposits had occurred in
the UK. The idea that oil is a natural resource which 'belongs*
1. 'US oil majors continue strong advance in profits', in The Financial
Times. January 26, 1980; Bp's after-tax: profits rose by nearly
four times in 1979 ('HP's after-tax profits soar to £1.6bn.' in
The Financial Times March Ik, 1980).
2. The maximisation of profit is the sole objective of these
corporations. Considerations of planning, for example, have 'no
more replaced maximum profit than the jet aircraft has replaced
motion* (M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, p.2).
to the nation has been a common one for decades. Indeed, the law
established in 193U to regulate onshore development through a
licensing system also provided the legal basis for offshore
development at a much later date (in 19^4).
This early form of state intervention was obscured by the
comparative laok of suooess of onshore drilling and also by the
veiy conspicuous involvement of the British utate in the international
oil industry through Shell and BP. Yet the origins and development
of the licensing framework provide an essential perspective upon
the measures of 'socialisation' taken by the Labour Government
between 197U and 1976 (which I examine in Chapters mid Four).
There are in fact two forms of state intervention here. Firstly,
there is state intervention in oil production indirectly through its
majority shareholding in BP; and secondly, state intervention in
the assumption of ownership of petroleum deposits onshore and,
with qualifications, offshore as well. In this section I shall
look at both of these in turn, with a view to ascertaining the
consequences of the state's role for private production of oil.
I do not consider for the moment the role of the BNOC.
While interest in the possibility of Indigenous sources cf
oil only arose during the First World War, the British Government
had acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company slightly earlier in 1907* The impetus to this action came
from anxieties about 'national, security'. Paul Frankel notes that!
... even at the highest level of imperial and world power
of the British, except for coraparaEiemail quantities
in Trinidad, there was no oil Jn the British Empire and
Commonwealth on a large scale.'*'
This made Britain dependent upon oil supplies from the
United States for the Royal Navy's oil-burning fleet. However,
that dependence was minimised by the acquisition of a substantial
shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. At that time
Anglo-Persian held the first of the Kiddle East concessions, the
D'Arcy concession, in what is now Iran. Security of supply was
assured since the Middle East was mainly a British sphere of
influence from the beginning of the twentieth century onward.
The arrangement concluded between the original owners of
the Company and the British Government provided the company with the
capital it required to expand its oil operations, and, in return,
allowed the Government to nominate directors of the company with
a power of veto over the Board's decisions. The idea was that this
would allow Government control over company policy and the
disposition of produced oil.
The real situation was, however, rather different. Since
that time, every Government has striven to assure BP, as it is now
called, its independence in 'commercial' operations. In a discussion
of its accountability in the House of Commons in 1965, the Prime
2
Minister made some revealing remarks about this. The Government-
appointed directors have, he said, a general obligation to report on
all matters which they consider should be referred to, or brought to
Proceedings, op.cit., at p.l.5«
2. 711 H.C. (Oral Answer) (May 1+, 1965), cols.1111-1113.
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the notice of, the Government. These reports were made to the
Treasury quite frequently but were 'mainly of an oral character'»
written official reports were not sent in. th the main they would
not interfere with decisions which represented 'genuine
commercial considerations'* The Chairman of BP has olaimed that
the company's decisions are taken
... commercially and without influence from Ministers ...
(though) we probably have an advantage over anyone else in
the olosenes^ of our collaboration with government
departments.
There is considerable irony in this last remark in the light
2
of the Bingham Report. It seems that both HP and Shell had
consultations with the Government in 1968 and 1969 which led them
to believe that the Government would support their sending oil to
the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia. For several years these
coaqtanies sent supplies of oil to Rhodesia via a circuitous route
through Mozambique and thus undermined the effeot of United Nations'
sanctions. Whether or not successive Governments knew of this (and
some members certainly did) is less important than the support given
to the companies by the Government in 1979 by refusing to proseoute
3
the companies concerned.
Successive British Governments have indeed provided considerable
support for BP in its international operations, especially in the
company's attempt to secure sources of oil outside the Middle East in
1. First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries,
Nationalised Industries and the Exploitation of North Sea Oil and
Gas (1971a-1?) H.C. 3U5 (hereinafter NIBC Report). Minutes of
Evidence, Q.$76, 581.
2. Report on the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Rhodesia.
by T.E. Bingham and S.M. Gray, 1978. See also Martin Bailey,
OijLffltp.
3« See remarks by the Attorney-Generalt 976 E.C. (December 19, 1979)
ools. 627-39.
the faoe of nationalisation threats. The two main thrusts of
this effort were* firstly, a huge investment in the North Sea,
and secondly, the exploitation of Alaskan oil through the gradual
transfer of Standard Oil of Ohio to HP.
With regard to the first, the Conservative Government
intervened as early as 1962 to suggest that Shell undertake joint
exploration work in the North Sea with HP. Shell then proceeded
to make overtures to BP, which resulted in one of the North Sea's
strongest partnerships.1 HP's stake in offshore operations in the
North Sea is very large, amounting to 9?6 of the licensed territory in
2
1977 » Similarly HP was given diplomatic assistance in its efforts
to establish itself in Alaska and the United States. By the early 1980s,
HP's access to American and North Sea crude oil will be slightly
larger than Exxon's.^
However, the company has never been used as an instrument
of polioy. The right of veto held by the Government-appointed
directors on the Board has not in fact been exercised, and the
nearest a Government actually went toward 'controlling' the
company ooourred in October 1973 when the Prime Minister, Edward Heath,
tried to compel HP (and Shell) not to reduce their oil supplies
to Britain. The chairman, Sir Eric Brake* was reminded that the
Government had a controlling share in the Company but would still
1. See NISC Report, Appendix 18.
2. Woodliffe, op.ait., p.295. It has proved lucrative tooi
according to Lord Kearton, chairman of BNOC, it made a profit
to £1 billion on the Forties Field by Spring 1979 ('Small is
beautiful to the Tories - or is it?' in The- Observer. May 13,
1979). """
3. The Economist. June 18, 1977* 'High-ootane salesmanship for
BP's super-blend*.
not accede to the request unless he was told which other
countries would suffer as a result and the request was made in
writing."" At this point Mr. Heath backed down.
The major obstacle to useS1 aa an instrument of Government
policy has always been the extensive overseas operations of the
company. Shortly after the oil orisis the idea was once again
discussed with respect to the Government's proposed changes in
Worth Sea operations but was rejected because 90 per cent of the
2
oomparty's operations were overseas. It was thought that 'the
use of BP would bring serious repercussions in relation to other
oil companies', and two areas in particular would experience
'problems': Alaska and EP's retail outlets in the USA.
The de facto relationship between BP and Government is then
rather different from the one which may be inferred from the
de iure one. Nor is the de facto relationship absolutely stable.
Opposition to BP's 'relative autonomy' was very evident in the
autumn of 1978 when the Labour Party National Executive Committee
issued a policy statement demanding that BP and its subsidiaries
be nationalised. This demand followed publication of the
Bingham Report and was supported by the then Etaergy Secretary,
Tony Benn, also a member of the Committee. At roughly the same time,
the Department of Energy also made known Its dissatisfaction with
the Government's relationship with BP. Apparently, BP failed to
consult the Department over several major decisions, including
1. The incident is recounted in Anthony Sampson, op.oit., p.263.
2. NISC Report, para.75).
3. loc.cit.
purchase of assets worth £l+3m. in Western Europe. One of the
Department•s objectives seems to have been to require BP to
report directly to it and not to the Treasury as has been
the custom since 191i+«*
In spite of this, the de facto relationship between
Government and BP shows no sign of changing. Indeed, HP's
'autonomy' has been reinforced by two recent developments.
Firstly, the Government shareholding has been substantially
reduced. From 191h until 19*>7 i* had held the majority of the
share capital but in that year it fell to 1+8.2%. Following the
collapse of Burmah Oil Company Limited in 197k it inoreaeed,
as Burmah's 21.5% shareholding in BP was transferred to the
Bank of England. In an attempt to raise money for public
expenditure a sale of BP shares was held by the Labour Government
in 1977• Nicknamed the 'sale of the century' it represented
an unprecedented sale of public assets, equivalent to
one-fiftieth of all the shares held by all the investing institutions
in the UK. The government was left with a share of $1% once the
Burmah shares were included. Another smaller, sale held by the
Conservative Government in 1979, reduced this further. Secondly,
the Government authorised the Bank of England at the time of the
1977 sale to assure potential applicants for the shares that it would
1. 'State may change its link with BP', in The Financial Times.
October 18, 1978*
2. 'The drama behind the huge HP share deal' in The Financial Times.
June 18, 1977. US investors received a 2C% allocation of the
shares on offer, and 'every City house of standing' was
involved, thanks to the Bank of England: see acoount in
The Guardian. July 1, 1977$ 'Anger in US at BP shares bungle'.
not alter its relationship with the company. The offer document
stated that:
It is the Government's intention to maintain its
relationship with BP in a way which does not breach
the traditional practice of non-intervention in
the administration of the company as a commercial
concern.
It is often forgotten that state intervention in oil
exploration and production took place on a considerable scale
with reBpect to onshore oil deposits. This occurred in two
phases: in the period 1917-18 and in 193U, and was designed to
facilitate private exploration and production by providing a
legal framework which removed certain barriers to the operations
of private companies.
The origins of petroleum licensing in Britain lie in war.
During the First Vorld Wax, the Government, anxious to find
secure sources of fuel supply, introduced a Bill to encourage
the exploration and development of possible onshore petroleum
2
deposits. The provisions dealing with the establishment of
a royalties fund to remunerate existing owners under whose land
exploitable oil deposits might be found proved unacceptable to
Parliament, and the Bill was dropped. Instead, the Government
made a new regulation under the Defence of the Realm Act 191'-*
authorising its agents to enter privately owned land to search for
1. Cit. in PHa nwnancial Times. October 19, 1978: 'HP and the
Government'.
2. This and the following paras, owe ouch to the account of
onshore lloensing law up until 1961* contained in Terence Daintith
and G.D.M. Willou^iby, A Manual of United Kingdom Oil and Gae
Law (hereinafter Manual), pp.10-13.
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and extract oil deposits, and to prevent others from doing: so.
There was still considerable oonfosion about the law on
property in petroleum deposits at this timet the Government
was uncertain as to whether or not a rule of capture existed
at common law, and hence the possibility of unrestricted
competitive drilling.'1' This matter was raised in an exchange
between the Government and G. Pearson and Sons, a British
company with extensive oil interests and operating experience
in the USA and Mexico. The company offered its services to the
Government but emphasised the need to avoid the unrestricted
competitive drilling which had led to a great waste of resources
(and fall in profits) in the USA. A condition of the company's
offer to aot as agent was that a permanent legislative framework
be enacted by the Government, which would prevent competitive
drilling.2
The outcome of this exchange was the Petroleum (Production)
Act 1913. This Act left the contentious issue of property rights
in petroleum in situ alone, and tackled the problem of
competitive drilling by forbidding any searching or drilling for
oil except by persons holding a licence granted by the Minister
of Munitions or persons acting on behalf of the GovezMMafet
(like Fearson's). The prohibition applied to surface owners as
well as to others, but they retained the right, by denying entry to
their land, to prevent even licensees from operating. Apparently,
1. The Government seems to have assumed that, in 1917* United
Kingdom courts would have applied the rule of capture to
modify surface owners' rights. This is doubted by
Professor Baintith (Proceedings, op.eit., at p.ij.2).
2. Letter scheduled to Agreement Between Mfwiatft-c of Munitions
and S. Pearson and Sons Ltd/isrr?;9l88 (1916) t extracts are
contained in Materials for the Oil and Gas Law Honours course
at the Unitsrsity of Dundee at C.102.
this Act 'was viewed strictly as an interim measure to get
Pearson's operations under way'.1 In the event, the results
of Pearson's drilling proved too poor to merit intensive
drilling and the company soon gave up. Very few attempts were
made to explore for oil under licences granted under the
1913 Act.
Nonetheless interest in onshore petroleum deposits revived
more than a decade later. Phis time private companies were
more concerned about the nedd to negotiate with a multitude of
surface owners than about the possible threat of competitive
drilling. In 1934, the National Goverahet secured the passage
of a new Petroleum (Production) Act which had the effect of
nationalising all onshore oil deposits. Uncertainties about property
rights were, it claimed, acting as a barrier to exploration and
so such a drastic step was necessary. No provision for
compensation payments was included even where subsequent exploration
might show the presence of large deposits under someone's land.
The Act retained the licensing system and elaborated it by the
promulgation of model clauses. As Professor Laintith notes:
The main provisions of this Act, relating to the vesting of
petroleum in the Crown, the issue of licences, and the
promulgation of rngdel clauses, are still in force and have
not been amended.
The relationship between the State and licensee established
1. T.C. Naintith, Proceedings. op.cit., at p.4»3«
2. loo.cit.
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by the 1934 Act differs radically from the 1918 Act. The
licence ewisaged in the 1918 Act was like an 'administrative
permission*"5" similar to a dog licence or a cinema licence. It
was not without value since it conferred an exclusive privilege
but did not give any property rights in oil to the lioensee.
By contrast, the 1934 Act added to the exclusive
privilege conferred by the licence an clement of transfer of
property rights. Thus, the licence operates to transform the
property of the Crown in any oil in situ into the property of
the licensee in oil at the wellhead. Whether or not the licensee
has any property in the petroleum deposit in situ and at what point
the transfer of property takes place are different questions which
I shall deal with later. The essential point here is that the
licence serves as a vehicle for a transfer of property,
remunerated by a royalty. Some of the Crown's rights are 'conceded'
to a private party. The grant of a licence has the character of
a commercial transaction and has always been ztonsidered a
contract between Crown and lioensee. However, these licences
resemble the type of licence issued under the 1918 Act in
possessing a regulatory character, effected through the model
clauses, included in each licence. These cover most of the
specialised rules relating to petroleum operations.
It should be stressed that the 1934 Aot was not intended to
provide the basis for a © tate petroleum industry! private companies
were to do the actual operating. There were two overriding objectives*
1. Cf. Manual* the licence may be 'legally analysed as
administratively granted exemptions from legislative
prohibitions' (p.26).
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1. to displace obstacles to private exploration and
production created by uncertainties about property
rights in the deposits;
2. to organise and control exploration and production
through the licensing regime so as to avoid competitive
drilling.*
As it happened, no major oilfields have ever been
2
discovered under the UK mainland or territorial waters. Since
193k a mere 362 exploration and appraisal wells have been drilled
and yet total onshore oil production per day is only 0.17% of the
rate from offshore production.^
The main significance of the 193U Act does not, however, lie
in its application to onshore exploration and production, but
rather in its extension to areas outside territorial waters in
which international law recognised in the UK rights to the sea-bed
and subsoil and their natural resources. I discuss the ma er in
which this was done in chapter two. At this point it is sufficient
to note that no substantial modifications were made to the
regulations contained in the model clauses: the main changes were
made in the mode of licence allocation. To this day offshore oil
production is principally regulated by th terms of licences
incorporating model clauses similar to those made under the 193U
1. T.C. Daintith and I. Gault, op.cit., p.28.
2. Property rights in petroleum in the bed of the territorial sea are
vested in the Crown not by the Petroleum (Production) Act 193U but
at common law. It should be noted that small oilfields have been
discovered onshore and because of their cheaper cost can be quite
profitable: for example, the Wytch Farm field in Dorset.
3. 'Why onshore exploration has been so slow-moving in Britain', in
The Times. January ll+, 1980.
Act. Many of the important elements of current UK policy and
regulation were already reflected in the early provisions: for
example, the device of a negotiated work programme as a stimulus
to exploration and a guarantee of applicants' competence; in
addition, elements of economic control of operations through
restrictions on assignment of licences, on the disposal of
production outside the UK, and compulsory unitisation of
operations where the same field underlies adjoining licensed
areas.
It is little short of remarkable that the main vehicle
of regulation of exploration and production of oil from the UK
continental shelf should have been licences which contained regulatory
elements little changed since 1935- However, this dependence
upon regulation under contractual forms was to lead to a
'crisis of legality' in 197U-5 when the Labour Government wished
to make considerable changes in the licensing regime.
U. Ownership of North Sea Oil1
In several important ways the development of North Sea oil
iB subject to state control, in spite of the involvement of large
private oil companies in its extraction. The vesting of all rights
exercisable over petroleum in the Crown was done through the
Continental Shelf Act 1961;. Private companies are allowed to
explore for and exploit petroleum only after being awarded a
licence in one of the lioence 'rounds' held at periodic intervals.
Each licence contains a number of detailed regulations in its model
1. The North Sea is by far the most productive sector of the UK
Continental Shelf and while much of what follows applies to the
shelf as a whole it is the North Sea alone which conoerns me
in this study.
clauses which, inter alia, restrict a licensee's ability to
*
assign his interest and provide for compulsory unitisation.
The licensee does not have property rights in the oil in situi
only once the oil reaches the wellhead doec he have title to
it, and even then the state oil company, BTCOC, has a right to
51% of the oil produced from most fields.
Much of this state control was introduced unilaterally in
1975 through the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Act once
the real extent of oil reserves became known. In this respect
the action of the British Government in revising: the terms of
current licences resembles that of most producing states. The
similarity was increased by the nationalist rhetoric of the then
Labour Government, which aocused its predecessors of having 'given
away' a potentially valuable NATIONAL asset. Whatever grounds
there were for doubt about the real extent of the Crown's
proprietary control over the development of North Sea oil, these
were removed after 197U. or so it seemed.
Nonetheless, the origins and the form of this 'social control'
show just how limited it is and has to be. I have shown in section one
how the special characteristics of oil (its fugacious charaoter,
exhaustibility, and difficulty of access) make a system of full
private ownership both inefficient and socially undesirable. The
origins of onshore licensing in the UK, as I sketched them in the last
section, showed how recognition of this factor and fears about
national security led to the nationalisation without compensation
of onshore deposits of petroleum* a course favoured by at least
1. Unitisation is a technique developed in the US to avoid wasteful
exploitation of oilfields in which there Subsist a number of
separate proprietary interests, whether of mineral owners, lessees,
or, as in Britain, licensees. The holders of the separate interests
agree, or are required, to exploit the field as a single unit, and
to appoint a unit operator for this purpose.
one oil company. However, all this regulation was done on the
assumption that it would not prejudice the efforts of private
oil companies to explore for and extract any oil that
happened to exist. This applied both to onshore and to offshore
deposits.
Admittedly, the extension of the licensing system was done
with one major innovation in Government policy on regulationt a
discretionary mode of licence allocation was adopted. Petroleum
licences ©©wring •blocks' of sea-bed could only be applied for
by invitation in the course of licence 'rounds* held at whatever
intervals the Government thought necessary. One of the objectives
of this system was certainly to encourage all licensees to carry
out their exploration work as vigorously as possible,1 but another
one was to allow discrimination against some applicants in particular:
American companies. It functioned as a means of reducing their
inevitable dominance in the North Sea, given their greater
capital resources and experience. It allowed discrimination in
favour of British companies and increased 'British' ownership
of any oil reserves: whether such ownership was public or private
was less important than the fact that specifically British companies
would be in control of it. We are not therefore viewing state
regulation of private companies but more specifically the maximisation
of British private companies' involvement in a potentially very
profitable branch of production. Of course, discrimination in favour
1. Applicants had to produce work programmes for the desired blocks
and evidence of their ability to carry them out. This is
discussed in chapter two.
of public sector companies like the British Gas Corporation (BGC)
and the BNOC has also been common: this represents, as we shall
see in chapter fmx, a simple attempt to ensure security of oil
supplies in the event of a national emergency.
It should be noted that this discrimination through the mode
of allocation did not involve simply ensuring that British companies
received particular licences. Host licences are granted to
consortia and not to a single oompany. Companies agree to work in
a joint venture and thus reduce the element of risk and the capital
cost of offshore drilling and development. The companies concerned
appoint one of the consortium's members, usually an oil oompany,
as Operator, to organise and supervise the work of drilling and
extracting. For example, Shell is the Operator in the Brent, Dunlin,
Cormorant, Fulmar and Auk fields. The system of joint venture
encourages American consortia to invite British companies to join
them and thus improves their chances of success in applying for
licences. This theme of rivalry between British and American
interests in the North Sea is one to which I shall return later.
A further kind of discrimination occurred over size. This
was one of the few major areas of difference between Labour and
Conservative Party oil pol&giies. Successive Conservative
Governments have favoured the involvement of small British companies
in offshore oonsortia and expressed this preference in two of the
largest rounds in 1961* and 1971-2 with the result that hundreds
of small British companies became involved in North Sea oil
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activities. Considerations of efficiency would have led to a
preference for the large companies and this has been the choice
of governments in Norway and Labour Governments in Britain.
One consequence of involving so many small companies was
that much uncertainty was created in 197U-6 when they had
great difficulty in meeting the cost of their contribution
to field development.
However, much of this state regulation is of recent origin,
and, as I have shown in the previous sections, it has tended
to be faoilitative. In other words, some kinds of state
regulation have been necessary to permit private economio
activity on a significant scale. Alternatively, and more
recently, it has been designed to ensure that the development
of oil has corresponded roughly to the interests of British
capitalism as a whole (taxation, security of supply, etc.). It
should not be interpreted as an attempt to control the anti-sacial
activities of oil companies or to curb abuses of private
power. It may be so interpreted but, in so far as this element
exists at all, it is only an incidental function of the body
of legislative rules.
Indeed, a methodological oomment may be made at this point.
To the extent that one limits one's focus solely to the legal
rules concerning petroleum licensing in the UK, a picture will
emerge of capitalist activity which is highly regulated by the
state and of state regulation which has increased dramatically from
1975- This does not preclude consideration of the role of discretion
and of policy, and is the kind of view found in the work of
Daintith and Willoughby, for example.1 Such a view has the
effect of masking the real dominance of the private oil companies
and of exaggerating the element of autonomy which the state,
and especially the advanced capitalist state, has from those
private interests. By adopting a broader perspective, admitting
certain 'social facts' usually considered the subject-matter of
political science or economics, quite different conclusions result.
For example, if we admit (and few would not) that the real power
of the oil companies extends far beyond the legal powers they
have as licensees, and inoludes control of capital or means of
production and in this case exploration too, an analysis of the
licence itself becomes much less important for an assess -mmt of
state regulation. Indeed, an understanding of the licences
themselves will become quite impossible unless some examination
is undertaken of the various forces which produce petroleum
licences. In other words, instead of beginning our investigation
of licence rights with a study of the licences themselves, we
should begin with a study of the various social, economic and
political forces which give rise to petroleum licences. I have
adopted this approach in the first three sections of this chapter
to explain why private ownership of oil resouroes, as opposed to
1. Manual op.cit. See also various contributions to the Energy Law
Seminar at Cambridge, September 29 - October 4, 1979 (Proceedings,
I2A)s (volume l) Bernard G. Taveme, 'Concessions and New Types
of Exploration/Production Contracts' (Topic H, Paper l)i
(volume 2) Michael 3. Elliott, 'Comparison of Terms to Attract
Petroleum Development in Four Countries: the United Kingdom
(Topic Q, paper 3); Bosalyn HIggins, 'Ten Years of State
Involvement in the Petroleum Industry: the United Kingdom
(Topic R, paper l).
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concessionary or contractual arrangements, has become less
and less favoured by producing and consuming states, as well
as by the oil companies themselves. Without in any way minimising
the impact of OPEC'a role in the international oil industry, I
have suggested that company profitability need not be significantly
affected by alterations in the legal arrangements for the
development of oil resources which gives the state a greater
regulatory and even participatory role.
Once we have noted a methodological tendenoy in some
approaches to exaggerate the implications of state regulation
and the absence of private ownership of the resource in situ,
the question remains, whether or not the difference in legal form
between licence rights and property rights really matters. Is
it to be explained awav TSy referring to socio-economic factors?
Can we, without more ado, simply describe some or all licence
rights an property rights in the pragmatic manner favoured by
economists like MiacKay and Mackay,1 dismissing the difference in
legal form as a mere 'legal fiction'?
In one sense there clearly is a differences the rights
conferred by a licence (rights L) cannot be identical to rights
of property (right®P) because L means something different from P.
Nonetheless, we can argue that rights L have the same socio¬
economic oonsequences for the holder of those rights as do rights
P for their possessor. In this way the difference between the two
is minimised and this is how I argue in the following study.
However, it iB not my intention to avoid the question altogether.
1. D.I. MaciCay and G.A. Maokay, 'The Political Economy of North Sea
Oil'. But see also Dam, Oil Resources, chapter 17.
I do attempt to show that the difference in legal form has
Bom® significance: practically, by rendering the licensee's
rights more or less uncertain relative to the state than those
of a property owner and leading to a network of legal or
extra-legal techniques designed to minimise that uncertainty;
and theoretically, by supporting a thesis advanced by
Fashukanis that law and political power exist in an antithetical
relationship to one another. This latter concern with the
implications of the difference in legal form between lioence
rights and property rights will be an important theme throughout
thee study. In addition, it has a political significance which
should not be underestimated. The idea of petroleum aB a resource
which 'belongs* to the nation has been oomaon in the UK for
decades, but with the discovery of large quantities of petroleum
offshore and Britain's entry into the EEC, the idea has aoquired
a new significance. The juridic concept of property in offshore
oil has an ideological connotation, in the sense that it serves
as an expression of the primacy of a national interest over all
other national interests and over any particular intereats,
eapecially those of oil companies, many of which will be
foreign-owned. It thus serves to legitimate a specific
relationship between oil companies and, the British state. The
validity of this use of the concept does not concern me here: I
only note that it does have this ideological connotation.
In these preliminary remarks about the ownership of North Sea
oil I have argued that ownership of oil resources is bound up with
ownership of the capital resources required to explore for
them and to extract them. The extent to which the latter leads
to a de facto ownership of oil resources can be masked as a
consequence of the choice of a particular methodology, or
neglect of the real links between some states like Britain and
the USA with the principal holders of capital for oil
development. Adoption of a historical approach to the development
of law and policy on petroleum licensing helps to bring out
the degree of private dominance in oil development in the UK,




Oil Coapaaiea and the State. 196Q-197U
Hitherto the sea has been treated as primitive tribes
treat the Jungle or praisie - for hunting or gathering food.
But on the continental shelves alone a rioh oontinent
the size of Asia waits to be mined and farmed.
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!+. The crisis of legality
1. The Legal Framework
Oil companies first became interested in the North Sea as
a potential source of petroleum in 1959» when major fields of
natural gas were discovered at Groningen, a province in the
N.E. Netherlands. This discovery was sufficiently large to be
classified as 'major* by world standards. As much as 1,100,000 million
cubic metres of natural gas was thought to exist there.^
Geologically, the Netherlands belongs to a sedimentary
basin the centre of which lies in the North Sea and also covers
some of the other surrounding countries, including Denmark and
N.W. Germany. It seemed very possible that conditions similar to
those at Groningen might be present under part of the North Sea.
Once the possibility of potentially rich petroleum-bearing strata
under the continental shelf was established, the high cost of
offshore exploration was removed at a stroke as a prohibitive
factor.^
The most attractive feature about possible oil and gas
discoveries was their location within 300 to 700 miles of one of the
most densely populated industrial regions in the world. The
North Sea was on the doorstep of some of the world's largest markets:
for example, in I960, the U.K. was the non-communist world's biggest
oil consumer, after the U.S.A. and Canada. The transportation costs
would therefore be low, and the task of finding market outlets
easy to solve.
1. 'Rush to the Sea', in Petroleum Press Service, June 1963,
pp.211-13*
2. The dominant assumption was that any petroleum found would be in
the form of gas. Until the late 1960s, oil was not thought to
exist in largequantities in the North Sea.
Nonetheless, the continental shelf had not been more than
sketchily explored and a programme of preliminary surveys was
necessary before its prospects could be assessed.
The proximity to Western Europe had another advantagei a
strategic one. Throughout the period following the Second World
War nationalism was a growing force in the Middle East. Relations
between the oil companies and the government of producing countries
had become increasingly strained, culminating in the formation of
O.P.E.C. by oil-producing states in I960. The objectives were to
present a collective front against the international oil industry,
and to secure a greater oontrol over their product and the rent
accruing from its sale. Although for many years a weak
organisation, its establishment in I960 added to company fears for
the long-term profitability of their operations. Prom their point
of view, the location of alternative souroes of supply to reduce
their dependence on the Middle East was a sensible, though not
urgent, task.1 The North Sea appeared a distinctly safe political
environment by comparison with the Middle East. Most West European
governments did not, for instance, treat oil as a public utility
(unlike gas), and private companies therefore had considerable
freedom to produce and benefit from the resource.
Nonetheless, there is a risk of rereading history in the light
of subsequent events. At this stage (1960-3) no-one, including the
oil companies, could have predicted the speed with which O.P.E.C.
gained the power to set world oil prices, or the suddenness of
nationalisation measures in the Middle East. The context was one of a
1. BP was an exception: its heavy dependence upon the Middle East
for supplied of crude oil dictated a policy of diversification of
sources of supply. Since the early 1960s when it was a 'crude-long'
company, With... much crude oil in supply but few distribution
facilities, it has diversified its sources faster than the other
majors, acquiring large interests in the North Sea ami the U.S.A.
continuing abundanoe of cheap oil from the Middle East, to be
supplemented by new oil and gas discoveries in North Africa;
and for which easy markets could be found in Western Europe.
Apparently, the North Sea discoveries and their implications
•went largely unremarked' by •policy-makers' who
were more concerned with protecting their declining
coal industries from the existing flood of cheap oil
imports which the integrate^ oil companies ... were
pouring into the continent.
The third reason for oil company interest in North Sea
exploration conoassacd competition. Large quantities of oil had
been discovered with the American market in mind, but they had
been excluded by the introduction of a quota system by the United
States Government in the 1950s. Several oil companies were
therefore compelled to move into the West European market to
sell oil they had originally planned to sell in the United States.
The competition between the majors (e.g. Esso, Shell) and the
•independents' (e.g. Occidental) was 'the most important single
factor in European oil system so competitive in the
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1960b'. There was a competitive advantage to be gained in
conducting preliminary surveys in the North Sea as quickly as
possible. The geological data thus acquired would be of much value
when companies came to apply for production licences at a later stage.
A final reason has been suggested by Peter Odell. The oil
companies, he claims, did not think that any oil or gas found in the
1. L. Turner, 'State and Commercial Interests in North Sea Oil and
Gas; Conflict and Correspondence', in Saeter and Smart (eds.),
The Politioal Implications of North Sea Oil and Gas, p.93*
2. P.R. Odell, 'The Economic Background to North Sea Oil and Gas
Development•, in Saeter and Smart, op.clt.. p.7b>
9h•
North Sea would represent a threat to the status quo.1 It
was generally accepted that the amount of oil available from
the North Sea would be small relative to the total Western
European demand in future. Any oil found in the North Sea
would provide a small but useful addition to Western Europe's
indigenous energy supply. It would not, however, be so productive
as to replace traditional sources of supply* that is, the Middle
East and North Africa. This was not only the expectation, but
it was also what the oil companies wanted. Relative to cheap oil
from traditional suppliers, the high cost oil from the North Sea
was not attractive but this merely reduced their interest in
rapid exploration. It did not eliminate it altogether, since any
oil from the North Sea could be integrated into the existing
infrastructure for foreign oil without any major difficulties.
What the oil oompanies wanted above all was
a build-up of knowledge of the North Sea potential
together with the opportunity to experiment with offshore
drilling and field developments in deep water - in
preparation for their expectation of an increasing need
for such offshore oil later in the centuiy.
By 1963, many oil oompanies had made clear their interest
by conducting preliminary surveys in the North Sea. In spite of
natural barriers to exploration (the bad weather restricted
operations to the summer months alone), the number of companies
engaging in exploratory work increased to more than 1*0 in 1961*.
1. Odell, op.cit.. p.53.
2. Odell, op.cit.. p.53.
3. 'Rush to the North Sea', op.oit.. p.211.
9$.
The U.K. eoast wag the base for the most active exploratory
operations in the North Sea. The unusual character of this
'rush1 was commented on by one industry journal thuss
The decision of so many companies, at one and the same
time, to take a stake in the North Sea search is
reminiscent of what usually happens when governments
suddenly invite applications for prospective oil lands
under more or less favourable legal conditions.
An example of this was Libya before Gaddaffi's seizure of
power. However, the considerable interest in the North Sea was
not due to the adoption of a generous oil law, but to a re-evaluation
of the geological potential and the economic costs.
Nonetheless, the economio activity had a definitely provisional
character, being confined to seismic surveys and other work of a
preparatory kind. It was unlikely that exploration wells would be
drilled until a legal framework was provided, since otherwise
there was insufficient seourity for individual company interests
from encroachment by other oompanies or oonsortia, or, less likely,
by another nation-state. The problem was outlined by one
industry journal thus»
At present, if oil and gas were discovered, it is doubtful
whether the governments of the North Sea countries would be
able to protect the original operators and prevent others from
rushing in and exploiting the new resources on their own. Also
such finds could lead to territorial disputes among the
North Sea countries themselves.
The high cost of exploratory drilling underlined this point. While
1. loc.cit., p.211. However, rapid exploration by the large oil
companies in offshore areas was common in the 1960s, in spite
of an oil glut. Hamilton interprets this as evidence of their
Faustian drive for more and more oil, in 0. Tugendhat and
A. Hamilton, Oil, the Biggest Business, p.352. More realistically,
Chapman claims that the speed of development in the North Sea has
been mainly due to 'fundamental politiosl and economio forces that
are themselves ultimately based upon the world geography of
petroleum produotion and consumption'i North Sea Oil and Gas, p.8.
2. 'Rush to the Sea', op.cit., p.213, W emphasis. It was also
suggested in this journal that preliminary activities had ceased
in some cases because a legal framework was lacking (in June, and
October 1961* issues).
survey activities could "be carried out relatively cheaply, one
test well oould cost (at that time) up to £1 million to drill
in the North Sea.1 Plans might "be made to commence drilling
operations but investment on the required scale was unlikely
to be made until some legal guarantee existed that it would not
ultimately benefit other (competitor) companies.
A legal framework was not only necessary, it also had to
be introduced as soon as possible. She 'uncertainty' about legal
conditions was, it seems, inhibiting test drilling in the
2
North Sea. Since such drilling oould only take place in the summer
months, it was essential to remove the obstacles to this in time for
the drilling season in the summer of 1965* Furthermore, the
more aggressive companies were concerned that failure to introduce
a system of licensing and allocating 'blocks' at the earliest
opportunity might allow their slower competitors to erode the
advantage they had gained in collecting and evaluating geological
data, to he used when licences were eventually allooated.4
The first step in the provision of a legal basis of offshore
exploration was taken in 196J+ with the passage of the Continental
1. 'N.Sea Hush Gathers Force', in Petroleum Press Service. May 1964.
pp.l61t-7.
2. loc.cit.
3. Weather conditions originally prevented drilling in the winter
months. However, technical progress was so rapid that by
December, 1961*, it was assumed that operations would go on
through the winter months.
I*. L. Turner, in Saeter and Smart, op.cit., p.9l*.
Shelf Act. This had two principal effects* firstly, it
amended U.K. law to allow implementation of the Continental
Shelf Convention and secondly, it extended the licensing
provisions of the Petroleum (Production) Aot 193U to the
area beyond territorial waters.
Ratification of the Geneva Convention removed the uncertainty
surrounding the basis in international law of oil exploration in
the North Sea outside territorial waters* it also brought the
Convention into force. While it already had some customary
legal validity, it oould not come into force until ratified by
a minimum of 22 states* the U.K. was the 22nd state to do so.
Under the Act 'any rights exercisable by the United Kingdom
outside territorial waters' were assigned to the Crown.* There
is, however, no specification of the nature or extent of these
rights. To the extent that 'sovereign rights for the purpose of
2
exploring ... and exploiting' are granted to the state by
international law, the Crown has property in the resources of the
seabed and subsoil, although their precise legal character is not
entirely olear. J.P. Grant suggests that the use of 'sovereign'
in the Convention is politioal rather than legal since the actual
rights conferred on States under the Convention are not identical
with the normal sub-divisions of territorial sovereignty into 'dominium'
1. The ontinental Shelf Act 1961*, s.l(l), excepting rights
in relation to coal (see subsection (2)).
2. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art. 2, para. 2.
(the ownership of territory) or •imperium' (the exercise
of governmental powers), particularly with the former.'' The
coastal State does not own the shelf hut has merely an exclusive
right to the resources of the shelf t such a right is exclusive
in the sense that
If the coastal State does not explore the continental
shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may
undertake these activities, or make a claim to the
continental shelf, without the express consent of the
coastal State.
Furthermore, the rigfrts
... do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or
any express proclamation.3
In addition, the coastal State cannot exercise full governmental
powers over the shelf, but only such particular powers as the
Convention permits and which are necessary for the enjoyment of
that exclusive right. The Act makes it clear- that the shelf regime
is not assimilated to the State territory. It merely provides the
means by which the UK could make claims to a continental shelf
area, although it did not specify the extent of the claims.
Given these various characteristics, can we describe these as
rights of ownership of petroleum in the ground? Although the answer
to this question is not clear, the lack of clarity has not given
rise to any difficulties in practice. There is also a sense in
which the question is a red herring. In international law there is
1. In Manual, p.172.
2. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art.2, para.2.
3- Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art.2, para.3.
4. Cf. Manual, p.172. With respect to the objects of those rights*
under Art.2, para.li, a coastal State is entitled to explore for
and exploit all mineral and non-living resources on or under the
continental shelf. It is not entitled to the fish swimming in the
waters above its continental shelf (of. Manual, p.173) •
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certainly an important practical difference between 'sovereignty*
fc>ver territory or territorial waters, for example) and 'sovereign
rights' to which the Convention refers.1 However, from the point
of view of municipal law, the words in the Act can be taken simply
as delimiting and characterising the rights which the Crown has.
Does the Crown hy 'having' these rights 'own' anything? Indeed,
it does. It 'owns' the resources of the seabed and subsoil to the
extent that sovereign rights over them are granted to the State by
international law.
None of the above is modified by the ideological use to which
'ownership' has been put vis-a-vis North Sea oil since 1961*. The
relationship of the Crown to the resources in situ has been described
by members of British Governments and in political party documents
2
as one of 'ownership'. By contrast, during the passage of the
Continental Shelf Act, a government spokesman asserted that the
3
Crown did not have rights of ownership of petroleum in situ.
Daintith and Willoughby designate this latter view as the 'official
view', ^ since it reflected the prevailing interpretation of the
1. The distinction has become much less important since 196h»
particularly after the North Sea Continental Shelf Case [1969]
1*1 ILR 29. ic.X R<p3 - i Ilr.
2. For example, 691 HC Deb., col. 1*8$ (April 30, 1975), and Labour's
Programme IQ71. at p.32: 'We will bring North Sea oil into public
ownership and control*, to which the White Paper responded in
July 197U* 'Britain's oil is of course already publicly owned.
Public ownership was established by the last Conservative
Government but one under the Continental Shelf Act 196k'
(Cmnd. 696) (at p.3).
3. HC Deb. Standing Committee A, col.19 (February 12, 19&U), oit. in
Manual. p.232.
1*. Manual, p.232.
position in international lav. However, changes in international
law since that time have changed this somewhat,* and, in addition,
the dominant assumption made by Governments in recent years has
2
certainly been that the concept of 'public ownership' is applicable.
The second principal effect of the Act was the extension of
the licensing provisions of the Petroleum (Production) Aot 1934 to
the area beyond territorial waters. The Geneva Convention had
left the details about licensing arrangements to individual States.
As a Convention among States (persons in international law), it
was concerned to allocate rights in international lew to the
States themselves. What the States did with them was their own
affair. Legislation was therefore a necessity imposed by municipal
law and the British Government did this by extending the licensing
provisions of the 1934 Aot over the continental shelf. This was
supplemented by Regulations which set out the procedure by which
the Minister of Power would award licences.^
The almost casual way in which this legal framework was
established seems quite remarkable. Preparations were left almost
entirely to one Department, the Ministry of Power. Consultations took
place with other Government Departments and with two committees set
up by interested oil companies. These covered legal matters,
1. In particular, the Horth Sea Continental Shelf Case 1969, which
suggests that the term 'ownership' is now applicable.
2. For example, the ooncept is implied by statements made by a
Conservative Minister, Lord Dtrumalbyn, at the time of Britain's
entry into the EECi 336 H.L. Deb. (November 22, 1972) at col.1019,
and 346 H.L. (Oral Answer) (November 15, 1973) at col.751' 'The
Government have made it clear that North Sea petroleum is a
national asset in the same way as oil and gas and other minerals
found on land in the United Kingdom*, and 'there is no doubt that
the ownership is national. What happens is that a licencd to
exploit is granted to various licensees' (ool.752). See also
Lord Carrington's assurance that 'North Sea oil belongs to us*
(348 H.L. (Oral Answer) (January 21, 1974) »t 00I.II89).
3. The Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea)
Regulations 1964.
technical end operational subjects. The Institute of
Petroleum provided technical advice, and the TUC and the Institute
provided advice on safety, health, and welfare of employees
of licensees.^" In November, 1963s a Bill was introduced
into the House of Lords by a Conservative Government. However,
it was not treated as an especially important pieoe of legislation,
and obtained a plaoe on the parliamentary agenda only when another
2
Bill had dropped out.
The lack of imagination was remarkable. Despite the various
consultations, the legislation to apply to offshore territory was
in many respeots identical to that applying onshore. 'Special*
legislation for oil exploration and production was clearly not
considered necessary. One consequence of this procedure, and
of the apparent aversion of policy-makers to making specific
legal rules in this caBe, was the absence of any re-negotiation
clause in the licences themselves. As we shall see, the only way
a Government could revise the terms of licences onoe allocated,
should there be significant discoveries, was to take unilateral
action, which raised the question of legality. Ironically, in
spite of the comprehensive legislation since 197k» introducing new
licence regulations, a unique taxation system and a national oil
company with an extensive range of activities, there is still no
re-negotiation clause.
1. PAC Report, para.13 p.ix. for See r
2. Interview with Mr. Angus Becket* Lord Balogh later desoribed
it as 'one of the most amateurish productions of the then
Ministry of Power', in A UK Socialist View of North Sea
Developments, Financial Times Conference, 1972, pp.110-13-
The final step in providing a secure legal framework was
to resolve any potential delimitation disputes with neighbouring
States. While this is not a onoe-and-for-all matter, there was
one delimitation problem at that time which had to be resolved
as soon as possible if exploration in the North Sea were to be
quite secure* the borderline between UK and Norwegian sectors.
b<? u cta i Lj J\{ i it' c (J*
The frontier of sovereignty between various coastal States
was, according to the Geneva Convention, the median line between
them, but in the case of North Sea States, it proved necessary
for States to reach agreements between themselves to demarcate their
respective zones at an early stage of exploration.^ These
delimitation agreements were an essential part of the provision
of legal security for the operating companies and were essential
if certain borderline territories were to be allocated for
exploratory activity at all. The UK State reached such an
agreement with Norway with remarkable speed, given the potential
for dispute.
The existence of a trench on the seabed separating Norway from
the Continental Shelf rendered the extent of the Norwegian shelf
unclear, and. Norwegian doubts about the effects of the Convention
in the light of this geographical peculiarity persuaded it against
ratification* a dispute arose between the two Governments. On one
interpretation of the Convention, the country was not entitled
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to any significant share in the open sea. The British Government
1. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art.6, para.l.
2. For fuller* discussion of this, see E. Young, Offshore claims and
■problems in the North Sea. 59 A.J.I.L. 505» 506 (1965) and the
references cited there.
settled this dispute in 1965, but only at the cost of
forfeiting any claim to part of the North Sea which it might
well have acquired if the dispute had been submitted to
international arbitration. The territory gained by Norway-
was later discovered to contain the Statfjord oilfield, one
of the largest in the North Sea. The speed with which the
Government reached agreement on the Norwegian Trough is explained
by the policy of rapid exploration. The Government was anxious
to remove all obstacles to this goal.
The cavalier attitude to one small part of the North Bea
is perhaps easier to understand when one oonsidere the size of
territory to vhioh the UK was entitled under the provisions of
the Convention. Since the UK forms the western boundary of the
North Sea over a length of some 500 miles, it was therefore
allowed oontrol over nearly one half of the North Sea area including
much of its most promising structure. The UK sector covers about
100,000 square miles, and is roughly equal in sise to the combined
sea areas belonging to four other North Sea countriest the
Netherlands, West Germany, Norway and Denmark. The UK sector of
the North Sea was by far the biggest.
To sum up: by 1961*, the means for and the interest in offshore
exploration in the North Sea existed. The absence of a legal
framework acted as an obstacle to that exploration. To remedy this,
it was first necessary to establish a legal regime which firmly
vested in the UK State rights over the seabed and subsoil, and
secondly enabled the State, by virtue of those rights, to
confer on private companies rights of extraction of petroleum
by means of a licensing system. The State is then enabled, by
virtue of its right, to confer extraction rights on others. The
Continental Shelf Act established a legislative framework within
which, subject to further exercises of State power (by way both
of delegated ligislation and of lioence granting), the companies'
operations could be oarried out. Finally, the principal
delimitation dispute with Norway was resolved.
2. Licensing and State Regulation
The initial assumption of 'ownership* by the ®tate was designed
to overcome specific barriers to economic activity like the
adverse effeots of unfettered competition between private companies,
each possessing or having access to the technology required for
exploration. This did not exhaust the ®tate's role however, sinoe
the system of licensing was not designed merely to transfer
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exoluoive rights to whiohever companies wished to explore for oil
and gas. There were at least three other objectives which the
licensing system was designed to aohieve. These were:
(i) Discrimination in favour of British applicants. The method
of allocation was discretionary in order to discriminate in favour of
British companies which applied for lioences. This was not an
unusual choice, and was also chosen by the Dutch.1
1. For an official statement of this objective, see para.8 of the
Memorandum submitted by the Department of Trade and Industry to
the Public Acoounta Committee; op.oit. p.25. For discussion
of this see Kenneth W. Dam, Oil Resources, pp.25-6, and pp.UO-lj
and Keith Chapman, North Sea Oil and Gas. pp.9V$.
(ii) Intensive exploration. The idea of a work programme was
introduced whioh would commit a licensee to carry out a specific
amount of work. This was designed to exclude inefficient
applicants and also those whose principal goal was to 'sit* on
the block or blooks until they had appreciated in value to the
extent that a profit could be made on disposal of the interest.1
(iii) Securing the maximum share of the rent. This would be a
valuable source of additional revenue for the atate, and could be
obtained in various ways, like taxation, gtate participation, or
royalties. Balance of payments deficits would also be ameliorated
2
by revenue from this souroe.
The overtly 'nationalist1 aspect of the licensing system
lay in the method of allocation by discretion. The international
oil economy was dominated by Americen-owned oil companies, and it
was considered vital to regulate their inevitable entry into
North Sea exploration activity. An official view expressed the
problem thuss
Although it was recognised that American oil companies would
inevitably play a major part because of their numerical
superiority, technical expertise and ownership of or ready
access to the equipment needed for off-shore drilling, it was
considered essential that British interests should be well
represented.
The discretionary mode of allocation seemed to resolve the problem.
Private companies wishing to explore for oil and gas had their
1. PAC Report, para.16 pp.x-xij Memorandum, op.cit. paras.8 and 11,
pp.25-6. The work programme is discussed in Dam, op.cit. pp.3^-6,
and Chapman, op.ait. pp.92-3.
2. PAC Report, Memorandum, paras. 6-7, pp.2i+-5«
3. PAC Report, para.16, pp.x-xi; the possibility of discriminating
against American oil companies is given as one major reason for
preferring the discretionary to the auction method.
applications for lioenoes examined by a Government Department and
evaluated according to several general criteria.
The regulations made under the 1961* Act instituted
arrangements whereby seaward areas were divided up into blocks
of an average Bis© of 250 square kilometres. Licence rights for
these blocks were to be allocated in 'rounds' of licensing in
which applications would be invited for a specific number of
blocks 'offered': the timing of such rounds wae subject to the
Minister's discretion. The size of these blocks proved a source
of some controversy: most of the oil companies favoured larger
blocks than those chosen by the Ministry of Power in 19&U. The
decision about size was, however, bound up with the 'nationalist'
factor. The Ministry wished to involve as many British companies
as possible, to the extent that it encouraged smaller British
companies to form consortia and hence become eligible as
applicants for blocked It was obviously easier to involve smaller
companies in this way if the blocks were smaller. In addition,
the larger the number" of blocks available, then the less lik lihood
there was of disappointed applicants.
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The blocks were allocated by the Ministry among the competing
applicants by reference to general (and extra-statutory) criteria
which remained similar for each round. The basic elements in the
criteria were these: the financial and technical capability of
applicants, thtir previous licensing experience and exploration
1. Interview with Angus Beoket, also interviews with George Williams,
chairman of UK00A, and Soger West, senior executive in the Gulf Oil
Company.
2. Initially, licensing was the responsibility of the Ministry of
Power, changed to the Ministry of Power and Technology from
1967-1970. and then the Department of Trade and Industry from
1970 until the creation of the Department of Energy in 1973*
work, their contribution to the British economy, and, where
foreign companies were concerned, fair treatment by their
Governments of British applicants in their territories.
In the first round, the most valuable blocks attracted
a concentration of applications which left wide soope and much need
of the power of discretion. Of course, the relative value of
the various blocks was not a matter of certainty at that stages
areas like that lying opposite the Dutch natural gas discoveries
at Slochteren were perhaps exceptions. Where such a concentration
of applications existed, the obligation to submit a work programme
for the blocks applied for showed its significance. Applicanta
for widely wought after areas were obliged to upgrade their
programme or drop out. An element of auction entered here in the
comparison of the work programmes proposed by applicants for the
first period of the production licence: 'the bigger and better
the programme, the greater the chance of success'.^ Apparently,
a 'going price' came to be known for each area. This was denominated
in such things as holes drilled and exploration work undertaken.
Whoever was QSfef&lMfeg to pay this could not expect to be awarded
a licence. Where an applicant's programme of work for a particular
block was deemed insufficient to the Ministry, he was informed that
unless he increased the level of exploration and drilling activity
promised he was unlikely to be awarded a licence for that particular
2
area. This bargaining prooess allowed the Ministry to introduce
1. T.C. Daintith and I. Gault, Pacta Sunt Servanda, op.cit.




some competition into tha^work programmes. Once an agreement had
"been reached, the work programme became part of the licence
obligations of the successful applicant.1
The use of discretionary power, a common characteristic
2
of public law jn Britain, was considerable here. Comparing the
various work programmes submitted by applicants was a task which
required elaboration of the general criteria and a weighting or
'points' system was introduced to compare applications. A numerical
weight factor was applied to each of the items included in the
oriteria, and the weightings
... represented the relative importance of the oriteria in
the matter of determining the suitability of applicants as
potential licensees. They varied from company to company
according to the extent to which the criteria were met.
The details of this weighting system were not made public. When
a House of Commons Select Committee inquired about this, it was
not given examples of how the ratings worked in practice.'4
However, it seems that during the first four rounds a high rating
was given to participation by British companies in a licence and, in
5
the second and third rounds, to participation by public Bector companies.
1. It should, however, be noted that the work programme related to
each licence and not to each block. Consequently, if the licence
area vras large, then the licensee would have greater flexibility
in discharging his obligation.
2. ral questions of legal control of discretionary powers such
a - - , -se see de Pmith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action.
C • j •
3. i'ilhC port., Appendix 19. p.251.
U» Appendix 12, Answer 2(e), pp.233-i*.
5. l-.'C.civ.
109.
It is not suggested that this use of discretionary power is
unusual, in domestio law, merely that it allows a Government to
exert some influence on the capital and national composition of
licensees, as well as the rate at which exploration takes place.
Under s.2 of the 193U Act, the Secretary of State's discretionary
power is so wide that it
... should not be difficult to find, by reference to other
criteria,.genuine reasons for deciding against the foreign
applicant.
An unusual feature of the discretionary method of allocation
concerns competition. The assignment of rights to the Crown by
the Continental Shelf Aot oreated a condition of scarcity. Private
companies wishing to explore were dependent upon the state for
righto to do so. Even if they had access to the necessary
technology, only the state could provide and assure an
exoluaive right to conduct operations offshore. The possibility
of competing private interests was replaced by the State's monopoly.
However, an element of competition was reintroduced in the method
of allocation. As we have seen, applicants were encouraged to
compete with each other in the submission of work programmes
for promising areas.
The result of the first round of licensing was that 53 licences
were awarded by the Conservative Government to companies or consortia,
including all the majors. The initial work programmes called for the
expenditure of £80 million over six years. Consequently the
combined enterprise of the various groups represented one of the
2
largest ventures in oil industry history. The licences varied from
1. Manual, p.26.
2. For some interesting comments on this round see: '£80 million
North Sea Search *»in Petroleum Press Service. October 196U,
pp.36^-6.
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one to ten blocks in size and, since each licence could cover a
number of blocks and each licensee was allowed to receive a
number of licences, the licences covered 3^8 blocks and the
number of licensees was a mere 23.
The manner in which licences were awarded was the subject
of some controversy! it was suggested they ought not to have
been awarded so near to a General Election. The new Labour
Government refused to alter them ho fever in 1965,"*" and did not
differ significantly in its approach in the seoond and third
rounds. In order to increase the participation by British
companies, the Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Power waB
active in encouraging the formation of British consortia to apply
for licences (this of course included banks and insurance companies).
This dirigisme seems to have increased the total British share
from 2% to 35%.2
The second round was not significantly different from the
first, and neither was the third one (with the exception of an
emphasis upon jtate participation). However, by the time of the
third round, in 1969» certain technological barriers to drilling
in the deeper waters of the northern North Sea were surmounted with
the consequence that vast new areas of the continental shelf became
accessible to exploratory drilling.
3
3. State Participation; the Nationalised Industries.
It is often forgotten that tate participation was not a concept
1. See 710 B.C. (Oral Answer), cols.222-4 (April 6, 1965), and
703 H.C. (Oral Answer), cols.225-6 (December 1, 196U)i 'As these
licences have already been issued the Government have concluded
that it would not be in the public interest to disturb them'
(Fred Lee, Minister of Power, at col.225).
2. Interview with Angus Becket>
3. Although the British Government held a majority shareholding in BP
throughout this period, its relationship to Government is a unique
one, giving it considerable independence! for that reason it is not
considered here, (see chapter , section 3)•
foreign to actual North Sea developments during this period.
Despite rejection of the scheme for a National Hydrocarbons
Corporation, there was a form of state participation in petroleum
development in the North Sea from the very beginning. This
involved the British Gas Council at first (1965) and then
the NCB.
Even in the first round of licensing, the public sector
interest was 9*296, and this grew to 15*5% in the second round.^
Indeed, from the seoond round onward, the criteria for licence
allocation were broadened to take account of proposals made for
facilitating participation by public enterprise. A high rating
was given to applicants who included such proposals in their
2
plans. The third round was far more important in this respect
since new criteria were adopted, which stressed additional
partioipation by the Gas Council and the National Coal Board.
Preference was to be given to groups involving the Gas Council,
the National Coal Board (NCB), and other British companies. It
was also laid down that applications for licences in the Irish
Sea should provide for participation by the Gas Council or the NCB
3
through direct partnership or some other arrangement.
There are several reasons for looking more closely at the form
of state partioipation during this period. The late 1960s marked a
1. PAC Report, p.89. This figure includes BP's interest.
2. NISC Report, pp.233 and 251. The 'rating' according to a system
of weights in the discretionary award of licences is explained
on P*lod2of this chapter.
3. NISC Report, p.232*.
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turning point in North Sea developments. Gas deposits were
discovered in *commercial' quantities shortly after licences
had "been granted in the second round in November 1965* HP found
gas in what became known as the West Sole field. Three other
fields were discovered subsequently: Leman Bank, Indefatigable
and Hewett, all in the southern part of the North Sea. At the
same time, the Norwegian Government introduced a state oil company,
Statoil, as part of an aggressive oil policy. The Labour Party too,
as we have seen, was deliberating institutional forms which might
maximise state participation.
One writer has claimed that the stress upon additional
participation by the Gas Council (BGC) and the NCB can be fully
understood only in the context of Labour Party internal politics,
and that increased publio sector involvement 'appeared to be a
partial concession to views held by important segments of the
Labour Party'."*" The author is right to stress the link but
draws the wrong conclusion. This form of participation was
2
essentially conservative, and was even advantageous to the oil
companies involved.
To demonstrate its conservative quality, one must penetrate
the ideological fog surrounding the notion of 'participation'
itself. If we say that the tate 'participates' in an activity,
this implies that the activity remains primarily private (or, at
least non- tate). Yet the term conveys the notion that in some way
1. K.W. Bam, Oil Resources, pp.29-31, esp. at p.31-
2. For discussion of degrees of participation which explains why
this form was conservative see chaptersone and four.
'the people' as a whole are involved, presumably to their
advantage. There remains however a studious vagueness as to
the degree of involvement or control. 'Participation' dodges
the issues about control, while exploiting the favourable
connotations of popular involvement in 'a good thing'. With
these points in mind, let us examine the practice of tate
participation during this period.
In preference to the form of participation envisaged by
the Fuel Policy Study Group of the Labour Party, the Government
decided to encourage involvement of certain nationalised
industries after the review of licensing in 1969. This involvement
was not compulsory exoept in the Irish Sea, where it was to be
obligatory for applicants to provide for participation through
direct partnership or some other arrangement.
State participation of this kind could be considered
'successful' in the North Sea, since private companies were far
from reluctant to invite either of these bodies to participate
in their consortia. The preference given to applicants who
promised to do so in the rounds of licensing undoubtedly had an
influence upon American owned companies, like Gulf and Conoco,
which proved especially enthusiastic to involve the nationalised
industries in their plans.
Before we can understand the role taken on by the nationalised
industries in 'participation', it is neoessaxy to digress a little
and make some remarks about the way companies operate in the North Sea.
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For the most part, exploration is carried out by
oil companies which axe transnational in character but largely
American owned."*" As a rule however, these companies have
tended not to operate singly in the North Sea, but in consortia
made up of more than one oil company often in partnership with
other providers of capital who have no or only limited experience
in oil-related developments.
There is nothing unusual about these 'joint ventures', as
they are called: in fact, the formation of consortia is a common
practice in the oil industry. They are to be found throughout the
world in the development of oil and gas fields, and have been
2
described as 'the standard worldwide practice'. Even the biggest
companies like Shell and Esso conduct operations in this way.
The legal form of such joint ventures is established by a
joint operating agreement. Such agreements are particularly common
in North Sea operations since production licences are rarely applied
in any way other than through Joint Venture Associations, principally
for reasons of cost. The purpose of such agreements is to establish
a contractual framework within which the joint venture operations will
be conducted by the parties: especially, the manner in which the
joint operations will be carried out, and the proportions in which
1. NISC Report, pp.20-1, Q.3-
2. Proceedings. Vol.1, Paper ll*.2. A rather oonfused treatment
of the joint operating agreement can be found in the NISC
Report, loc.cit., and also at p. 1*05, Q.20l*~6: it is not clear
what the difference la between a partnership and a joint
venture in this account*
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costs incurred axe to be allocated, as well as the proportions
in which any petroleum extracted will be shared out between
the Joint ventures. Each Joint venture is governed by a
specific ' perating greeraent' which constitutes a common law
contract."5"
This organisational form for individual enterprises has
implications for the ownership of oil. To start with, the oil or
gas becomes the property of the licensees at the point at which
it comes out of the ground: prior to that it remains the property
of the Crown. The product at the well-head constitutes the
fruits of the 'partnership*. However, ownership of the oil at
the well-head is 'divided' according to the party's interest, as
is the responsibility to dispose of and transport it. The
agreement imposes upon each party a specific duty to take and
separately dispose of its oil. Failure to do this constitutes
a breach of the agreement.
This has the effect of avoiding any concept of a partnership
and of avoiding
... any confusion with American an^i-trust legislation when
you are involved with US partners.
The terms of each Joint venture are such that actual physical
ownership of the relevant proportion of well-head output rests in
each partner which he may dispose of at will.
1. A good account of Joint operating agreementa, and especially
of their principal clauses, is contained in
ProoeedingB. vol.1, Paper llj,: 'Joint Operating Agreements', by
Adrian 33.G. Hill.
2. NISC Report, pJ+2, Q.179» See also T.C.Daintith, Correlative
Rights in Oil Reservoirs on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf,
op.cit.
The terms of the consortium agreements are regulated
solely by perating -greements which are common law contracts,
1
and are subject to the relevant jurisdiction with the UK.
Although the detailed terms of these agreements vary from case
2
to case, they tend to funotion in the following manner.
One of the parties in the venture is selected to act as
Operator. As such, he has two separate and distinct roles in
the Joint Venture. In the first case, he is co-equal with the
other parties, deciding jointly with them what is to be done, and
abiding by the agreed decision-making process. All material
decisions are discussed in the operating committees on which each
partner has a representative although the voting procedure ensures
that those parties with the largest financial committment have the
Irr number of votes. The results of exploratory surveys are
reviewed and drilling programmes discussed. In the second case,
as perator. he is in effeot a contractor charged with the task
of carrying out what has been agreed and reporting back with the
results when it has been accomplished.
The Operator is not therefore the sole party with •control'.
Nor is it the oase that the perating ommlttee and other members
of the consortium merely play a passive role. Power is not distributed
in a straightforward manner among parties to a licence, and
when considering the effects of forms of i tate participation, we
1. Examples of such agreements are contained in Appendices 3 and 5
(Annexes 1 and 2) of the NISC Report. See also Jfef tp¥*m>
vol.1, Paper lJ*. /
2. The following is based on an account contained in the NISC
Report, Appendix 21, pp.265-6.
mast discover how it relates to this process of conducting
operations Jointly.
In this case, the form of iate participation through the
nationalised industries did not limit the private appropriation
of oil at all. The NCB and the BGC simply participated in joint
ventures for the purpose of applying for licences, and then
contracted with the oil companies to pay an agreed proportion
of the initial and subsequent fees, and any royalties. They met the
stated proportion of exploration and development costs and were
therefore entitled to an agreed proportion of the oil and gas
produced. Representation on the perating jamittee followed and
alBo the ability to participate in the decision-making process.
Profits and loases were shared in the agreed proportion. The
details of such agreements were set out in the operating agreements
between the parties. Naturally, both organisations built up a
staff capacity to deal with the additional work."1"
To put it bluntly, participation by the nationalised industries
in oil exploration required them to adopt a role differing in no
significant way from that of a private company participating in
a joint venture. Indeed, their participation proved an advantage
to foreign companies when applying for licence blocks since it
increased their 'wei hting' in the discretionary allocation
process. For American companies like Gulf and Conoco which had been
1. This was of course on a muoh smaller scale than the staff required
by the BNOC. The reason being that 'the detailed work that
demands large numbers (i.e. of staff) is the responsibility of
the operator, and the members of the joint venture pay for
this work to be done for them'j NISC Report, Appendix 21,
p.266.
slow to involve themselves in the North Sea, tate participation
of this kind offered a means by which their initial coolness
toward North Sea potential could he remedied.
This attempt to 'redefine' public ownership by-
introducing tate participation brought few gains to the
Government. 'Participation' only meant a share in licence
operations and that on condition the tate oompany behaved like
any private company in such circumstances. Such a form of
participation was quite compatible with continued private
control over licence operations.
However, the idea of itate participation had a significance
at this time beyond the activities of the National Coal Board, and
the British Gas Council. The reasons why participation assumed
the form it did reveal much about the relationship between oil
companies and British Governments.
A significant attempt to regulate licence operations in the
North Sea centred on the 4ate petroleum company proposed by
the Labour Party. Obviously, any such proposal raises two
spectres for private companies: firstly, the possibility of
intervention in private production to the detriment of profitability;
and secondly, the probability of competition from an organisation
not subject to the laws of the market.
Prom the mid-1960s onwards, the actions of the Norwegian
Government showed that tate ownership of oil resources did not
necessarily imply a passive role for the tate in their development.1
In addition, the discovery of substantial quantities of natural gas
1. Stat© participation of some kind (to be arranged by the parties)
was made compulsory in Norway in I967.
in the North Sea led to some demands for greater 'public
control'.
In 1967 f the Labour Party National Executive Committee
recommended that a National Hydrocarbons Corporation be
established, following the Report of a Labour Party Study Group
on the North Sea. The new institution would have several
funotions. All unlicensed blocks were to be vested in it and it
would take over existing rights of the nationalised industries:
the Gas Council and National Coal Board, to participate in
onshore and continental shelf operations. In addition, it would
have
... the power to search for and produce oil and gas in the
North Sea? act as the monopoly buyer of all gas produced
by the existing oonsortia? and be responsible for assessing
the economic advantages of the^various possible uses and
the sale or export of the gas*
Another nationalised industry would thus have been created,
but not involving any taking of private rights. Nationalisation
of oil companies' operations was excluded.
A similar rejection of nationalisation as 'both impracticable
and unnecessary' had been made by one of the Study Group's members,
Peter Odell, in 1965* Writing on the subject of 'control' of the
oil industry in Britain, he favoured instead 'state co-operation with,
2
and direction of, the oil oompanies concerned'.
1. A National Hydrocarbons Corporation, p.2.
2. P. Odell, Oil: The New Kelsdit• December, 1965,
p.18. """ —
The proposal for a National Hydrocarbons Corporation was
much discussed and elaborated a year later In a report made
by the Fuel Study Group established by the Labour Party National
Eaceuctive Committee.1 Surprisingly, it was not even partially
realised in Government policy in the form envisaged in the plan.
Prior to the third round of licensing, in 19^9, the Government
instituted a major review of future licensing policy. The review
oommittee included officials drawn from the Departments concerned
2
and also 'top-ranking professionals'. They looked closely at
the question of tate participation and the idea of a National
Hydrocarbons Corporation. Yet in spite of the maturity of the
proposal, the presenoe of a Labour Government, and the innovations
then being introduced by the Norwegian Government in its oil
policy, it was decided that British oil policy should continue
as before with only minor modificatione. The basic policy decisions
remained the same, as if the discussion of state participation had
not taken place at all.
Why was the Labo r Party proposal rejected by the Government?
As we have seen, this was neither an immature nor a revolutionary
proposal. Nonetheless, it was rejected and £ate participation was
only made compulsory in the Irish Sea in the third round. The
Department decided thati
1. A National Hydrocarbons Corporation. p.5 et seq.
This proposal is also discussed in Adelman's book, op.cit. at
p. 21*1.
2. PAC Report, p.27.
... the public interest would best be served by building
on the existing arrangements for public enterprise
participation in continental shelf activities.
The justification for this decision was extremely weak.
It was argued that expectations at that time were that offshore
petroleum discoveries would take the form of natural gas. Since
restrictions on the disposal of gas were considered adequate, there
seemed no reason for a radical change.
The real reasons can however be located not here nor in any
weaknesses of the proposal itself, but rather in the international
implications of the adoption of such a proposal.
Right from the beginning of North Sea oil development,
British oil policy had been framed with one eye on the possible
international ramifications of decisions taken. For example, the
financial terms of licences were cautiously formulated because
the epartment thought that
(i)f the UK were to impose onerous financial terms it
ai^ht have incited OPEC countr a to follow suit, to the
detriment of.our overseas oil interests and our balance
of payments.
Further, in conducting a review of existing financial 'packages'
in 1964 (that is, compositions of royalties, annual increments,
and so on, to be paid by the oil companies), the Ministry of Power
concluded that no existing package was
... ideally suited to the unique olrciHiijances of the UK which
had a large stake in the international oil industry, had
virtually no indigenous production, but had prospects based on
an unproven offshore area.
1. PAC Report, p.28.
2. PAC Report, p.2i», para, 6(iii).
3. op.oit., p.25, para.9.
The 'package* finally agreed upon was
... thought to be as favourable to the Government as any
in completely unproved areas throughout the world, while
not providing ammunition to OPEC in their demands for ^
higher revenues from British oil companies operating there.
A basic policy consideration was therefore that the terms
adopted by the UK should not react unfavourably upon British
oil companies operating overseas. While the consideration was
probably more important in the first two rounds than in the
third, it did not MSttppear altogether. It appears to have been
a dominant assumption that were the British Government to adopt
an aggressive stance vis-a-vis those oil companies in the North Sea,
this would have constituted a potential danger to the overseas
interests of British oil companies.
We can be more preoise about the form this question of
foreign policy took by the late 1960s. At that time, the British
Petroleum Company was attempting to break into the Amerioan market
through a bid for the Sohio company, as well as its exploration in
Alaska and arrangements with two American oil companies, Atlantic
Richfield and Sinolair. As one writer has noted:
During 1969 there was real doubt as to whether the American
authorities would use the anti-trust regulations to block
BP's attempted entry, and, during this period, no British
Government was flging to take actions whioh might offend the
American majors.
It is in this context of international bi siness interests that
the real reasons for rejecting the NEC idea can be found." The
1. loc.cit.
2. L. Turner, in Saeter and Smart, op.oit., pp.97-8.
3. Of course, the Ministers themselves may have disliked this form
of state participation on principle. For example, the Minister of
Power until mid-1968, Richard Marsh, was described as 'less than
lukewarm toward takeover proposals' in The Petroleum Times,
September 13, 1978• Of. Lord Balogh'e sharp criticism of
Marsh in 3^6 H.L. Deb. (November 21, 1973) co!.10$9«
objections made by the major oil companies themselves to the
Government against a state oil company must have carried a
great deal of weight in such a context.
While, in practical terms, the idea proved irrelevant, itB
rejection by the then Government does show how influential foreign
policy considerations have been (and can be) in determining the
exeroiee of public ownership of North Sea oil. In addition it
provides some perspective for other forms of State participation
which have been developed in the UK sector of the North Sea,
particularly the British National Oil Corporation introduced
much later in 1975*
Another aspect of Government policy at that time was the
securing of the maximum share of rent. It is one which need not
conoern us for long here. The royalties (12-^b) were not designed
to secure a large share of this, and taxation was not likely to
produce a large share. During this period, the objeotive of
securing rent took second place to the two other objectivest
promoting the interests of specifically British companies, and
securing an intensive exploration programme. This can be seen in
various remarks made in the course of the Public Accounts Committee's
investigations. For example, the British Government drew on the
experience of other countries when working out the conditions to be
used in determining the amount of revenue to be derived from North
Sea activities. However, one of the three basic policy sonsiderations
waz that the lioenoe terms should not react unfavourably on the
British oil industry operating overseas (i.e. HP and Shell)."1" Hence
1. PAC Report, pp.2^-5» paras.6, 7 and 9«
no existing package of terms used by other countries was thought
suitable to the unique circumstances of the UK with a stake in the
international oil industry.* This keen concern for British
oil interests' overseas security and its influence on North Sea
policy formation was criticised by the Public Aocounts Committee
2
in its report.
To sum up: the licensee certainly obtained a considerable
freedom during this period by virtue of holding a petroleum licence.
One can legitimately describe this as a kind of 'ownership',
although in lav there are qualifications to that 'ownership' and
it may not even deserve to be designated 'qualified ownership'.
However, the manner in which a licensee chose to conduct his
operations was left to him, and the obligations contained in the
model clauses of licences were few and not onerous. Ministerial
powers over licence operations did not include, for example, a
power to control the rate at which petroleum was produced. At no
time was the degree of .tate regulation comparable to that present
from 1975 onward, whether one considers licensing or jfcate
participation.
Governments assumed responsibility for protecting the interests
of British oil companies operating abroad, and this 'imperial'
role had an influence on domestic oil policy. For example, it
inhibited the growth of a tate oil company. By contrast, the
Norwegian Government had a greater flexibility in its oil policy,
since it had no historical or structural links with the large oil
companies.
1. op.oit., p.25, para.9.
2. op.oit., pp.xxv-xxvi, para.73«
!+. The Crista of Legality
Until 131k, the system of licensing blocks on generous terms
proved highly advantageous to licensee companies. The rights which
successive Governments transferred allowed the companies a
degree of economic control over exploration and production which,
in the event of success, guaranteed a very high rate of profit on
oil* so high, it was exceptional in Britain, and compared
favourably with that obtaining on investment in South Africa. As
one firm of stockbrokers, Cazenove and Co., pointed outs
Irrespective of accuracy, it is apparent that the return
from North Sea oil will be considerably more than the
international majors are currently obtaining from their^
heavily taxed Middle Eastern and North African sources.
The regulatory controls contained in the model clauses of
licences did not reduce the companies' control over their
operations in any significant way. In addition, no threat was
posed by the form of tate participation which operated in the
North Sea: compared with forms of participation favoured by
OPEC members, it imposed little additional burden, if any, upon
oil companies.
However, these conditions had begun to change after the
fourth round of licensing in 1971-2. The allocation of a large
number of licenoes on terms which remained substantially unchanged
from those awarded in 196!+, in spite of the fact that recent
1. Cazenove and Co., The North Sea: the search for oil and gas and
the implications for investment, 1972. p.113.
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discoveries clearly showed the potential of the northern North Sea,
began a controversy which was ultimately to lead to a revision
of the licence terms in 1975 •
In retrospect, it is not difficult to see why the fourth
round proved so controversial. To begin with it was very large,
although not the largestt 282 blocks were awarded covering
2k,000 square miles, compared with 3k8 blocks covering 32,000 square
miles in the first round, and 127 and 106 blocks in the second and
third rounds respectively.^" As an experiment in a different mode
of allocation, 15 blocks were allocated by auction. The sum of
the highest premium bids for each of the 15 blocks put out to
2
tender totalled £37 million, a fact known to the Government before
the 282 blocks were allocated on a discretionary baBis. It was,
therefore, known to the Department of Trade and Industry how highly
the applicants valued some of the territory before the larger number
of blocks were allocated by discretion. Nonetheless, the results
of the auction did not, in their view 'invalidate the policy reasons
which led Ministers to their original decision to proceed with a
round of discretionary licensing simultaneously with the tender
experiment* > Since the termB of the whole offer had been publicly
announced and applications submitted on the basis of those terms, it
was thought that setting the terms aside in the light of the auotion
experiment's results 'would have been criticised as a serious breach
1. PAC Report, p.U5.
2. op.cit., p.33» para.U8.
3. '
127
of faith on the part >of the Government and would have jeopardised
Her Majesty's Government's reputation for fair dealing'.*
This emphasis upon rectitude might have seemed more plausible
had the licence terms not been identical to those in earlier roundst
even those of the first round in 1961* when applicants considered
prospects good only for gas! Licences were still being granted
for an initial period of six years, and half this area could be
held for a further forty years. There was no provision for
re-negotiation of the terms. Yet circumstances had altered
dramatically since the early rounds: as early as June, 1970, a
consortium including Phillips, HP and Shell, discovered oil in the
northern North Sea in territory licensed in the second and third
rounds. An earlier discovery, Ekofisk, on the Norwegian side of
the median line was estimated by mid-1970 to have a production
2
potential of 150,000 barrels a day. Between the end of October, 1970
end June, 1971» several discoveries were made and were declared
commercial: the Forties Field, held to be in the world class, and
3
Auk, Josephine and Brent. The prospects for discoveries of oil
in large quantities in the North Sea were good.
Yet in spite of this radical change in prospects, a large number
of lioences were awarded on terms identical to those awarded at the time
of the first round in 196k when virtually nothing was known about
prospects for oil and gas in the North Sea. The official
justification for this was based on the need to halt a reduction in
1. loc.cit.
2. PAC Report, p.30» para.3U-
3. This latter discovery was not however made public knowledge
until 1972.
drilling activity on the continental shelf which was causing
some concern. The number of exploration wells drilled in 1969-70
was hi, while the number in 1970-71 was only 22. As the number
of obligatory wells remaining to be drilled under earlier work
programmes had fallen to below 50, a smaller number of rigs would
be needed in future. It was concluded that a major licensing
round was required to open up further territory for exploration,
and
to attract to the United Kingdom shelf more of the technical
and financial resources of existing operators as well as
those of companies not so far represented.
Otherwise these resources might go elsewhere.^ When measured against
work to be undertaken in exploring blocks, the round was highly
successful. Two hundred and twenty-five wells were to be drilled
according to the work programme. This emphasis upon a work
programme followed the pattern established by easlier rounds in which
the licence conditions were geared to rapid exploration for oil
and gas, and gave little weight to revenue.
However, another explanation is more plausible. The then
Government was for the most part ignorant of the resource potential
in the British sector of the Horth Sea. A detailed assessment of
'oil traps' could only be built up as wells were drilled and the
extensive seismic information evaluated. While the oil companies
certainly submitted much information concerning seismic and drilling
1. PAC Report, pp.30-1, para.35* It was also argued that the
balance of payments impact of recent OPEC actions made
intensive exploration and development more pressing than ever;
also that since a number of part-blocks had been surrendered
it made sense to make them available for further exploration
at once rather than to let them lie.
results (as they were required to do), the teohnical competence
of the Ministry was poort the technical staff numbered six
in 1970 and seven in 1971• Tbis lack of technical expertise
may go some way to explaining why the Department was still in
doubt whether a major oil-bearing province had been discovered
or not.
As a way of obtaining knowledge of the blocks' market value,
a small auction experiment was perfectly appropriate in the
circumstances. However, by holding it simultaneously with a large
discretionary allocation, there was no opportunity to learn from
the experlemnt until after the round; that is, until after a large
number of licences were allocated on terms which envisaged no
amendment at a later date. There waa then a greater body of
information available about potential oil reserves than was
subsequently claimed and more information was obtained after the
auction experiment. Whatever uncertainty remained about
potential reserves in the North Sea, it cannot be seriously
oontended that oil disooveries on a large scale were not expected
at this stage.
Much of the critioism directed at this round was highly
partisan politically, aimed either at the Department of Trade and
Industry, or more broadly, at the Conservative Government. While
this is hardly surprising given the consequences of policy decisions
in the fourth round, it is possible that a false perspective
night be oreated, suggesting that the oil companies' unusually
advantageous position was entirely the result of a Conservative
Government1a policies. In fact, the round was very like previous
rounds and the policy considerations differed little from those
of successive Governments since 1961*. One might note that the
Labour Governments from 196k to 1970 did nothing to modify licence
terms, in spite of some criticism of the first round awards while
in opposition. In those six years, the Labour Governments made
no significant innovations in licensing policy, apart from putting
some stress on participation by the nationalised industries.
Nor should the? novelty of an auction experiment be
misunderstood. The auction method of allocation was considered
in the review which preceded each round. An auotion experiment
seems to have been considered at the time of the third round."'"
An auction experiment would have pro1"* ded a "%ful indication
of the value of blocks at an important stage in North Sea
development. The new developments in rig technology allowed
exploration in the deeper waters of the northern North Sea and
it was likely that blocks in that area would be in demand in the
near futuret hence, the suggestion of a small auction experiment
which could, have produced information useful in future allocations.
The imminence of a General Eleotion may have persuaded the
Government that such a consideration was not of the greatest
importance.
Finally, the blocks allocated in the fourth round were not
necessarily the most productive ones: quantity is not the same
as quality. Although fewer blocks were allocated in the third round,
for example, their oil-bearing potential was considerable. Of
the 9 billion barrels of recoverable reserves being produced in 1978
1. PAC Report, pp.28-9, paras. 2k-$* Interview with Angus Backet
Under Secretary at the Ministry of Power and Technology, 1969-70•
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or planned for production, about half had been found on blocks
awarded in the third round.*
The inquiry conducted by the House of Commons Publio Accounts
Committee into the arrangements for exploiting North Sea oil and
gas did nothing to soothe any anxieties which might have been
felt after the fourth round. Its report, published in early 1973»
was highly critical of government policy and of the existing licensing
2
and taxation arrangements. Moreover, the fact that the
Committee was composed of MPs from both the major political parties
and had a Conservative majority gave its report added force.
The principal points of criticism concerned, firstly, the
terms on which licences were allocated. In the light of the
improving prospects of the North Sea and the hardening of terms
in other countries, the Government should have considered tougher
3
terms. Too many licences had been allocated for the most
promising areas of the North Sea. Moreover, they had been
awarded on terms which ha- remained virtually unchanged since
they were fixed in 1961*.^ Those terms allowed licences to run
for forty-six years in respect of half the territory.
Secondly, it c ^ticised the taxation arrangements.'* Since
taxation was the principal method by which the Government oould
obtain rent from the oil companies, it was of considerable
1. A. Hamilton, North Sea Impact, p.108, note.
2. PAC Report, op.cit. The Committee took care to emphasise that
they were not criticising the part played by the licensees in
exploring for and exploiting oil and gass see para.53.
3. PAC Report, para.86.
1*. op.cit., para.88.
5. op.cit., paras. 62, 66, 97(l) and 97(2).
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importance. In this respect oil differed from gas8 since the
pricing mechanism of oil was beyond Government control, it was
not able to take a share of co^jMT profits by keeping them low,
as it oould do with gas.
However, there was a loophol in the taxation system which
allowed oil companies to pay only minimal taxation. Under the
then UK tax law, companies would be able to write off against
eventual North Sea profits not only the oapital allowances
engendered by these operations, but also massive tax losses
accumulated by the trading companies of large integrated oil
companies abroad, principally as a result of the posted price
system operated by the OPEC countries. That is, UK tax
revenues from continental shelf operations were being pre-empted
by other national Governments.
The Committee was careful to emphasise that while this
would benefit the oil companies, not all the companies operating
offshore were in fact oil companiest about one half of the 2l+0
companies which held production licences for the continental shelf
were not ail companies, e.g. ICI.^"
It recommended that a change be made in the taxation arrangements,
and that a review of the licensing regime be conducted in the light
of the Report in order to increase the Government *s share of rent.
A climate of dissatisfaction with the existing relationship
between the State and the licensee oompanies in the North Sea was
1. op.cit., para.51* (p.XX).
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developing in 1973* 'Ihe knowledge that the economic benefits from
the recently discovered oilfields would accrue to the licensees
alone, and to the oil companies ir. particular, provoked
demands for political action.*
However, the principal factor which rendered the existing
licensing and taxation arrangements intolerable was the 'oil crisis'
of 1973-i*» and specifically the quadrupling of oil prices in a
few months. From this followed a massive increase in the
profitability of North Sea oilfields, and in the overall profits
of oil companies. Since the British Government could not claim
any significant portion of the new profits to be made in the
North Sea on the basis of the existing arrangements, the generosity
of those arrangements was merely underlined. This also applied to
those marginal fields that were suddenly made 'economic' by the
price rise! that is, the fields which had their development
cost reduced relative to the future profits on oil extracted and
sold.
In addition, the strategic importance of oil for the advanced
capitalist societies was underlined. Each state saw its control over
oil supplies threatened and began a review of its oil policy. Those
states fortunate enough to have indigenous supplies of oil obviously
1. For example, Labour's Pr^frr-nimng 1973. p.32, and the various
speeches made by Lord Baloghi e.g. 336 H.L. Deb. (November 22,
1972) cols. 996-1005} 337 H.L. Deb. (December 13, 1972)
cols. 662-666} 331 H.L. Deb. (June 7, 1972) ools. 362-i|03}
3k6 H.L. Deb. (November 21, 1973) cols. 1057-1068. See also
his article, The North Sea Oil Blunder, in The Banker. March
197U, at p.287t 'I think this revolution (i.e. the OPEC
price rise and oil embargo) amply Justifies the need for
re-negotiation'.
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had fewer problems in this respect. Yet, in spite of the
discovery of large quantities of oil offshore, the British
Government had virtually no regulatory controls over oil
supply. Acquisition of emergency powers seemed a matter of
priority.
For a number of reasons then, the existing licence arid
taxation arrangements between oil companies and the British \ate
were no longer perceived as legitimate by early 197h- The Conservative
Government had itself Acknowledged this by instituting a review
of policy and announcing its intention of modifying the taxation
arrangements to close the 'loophol ^' discovered by the
Public Accounts Committee. Whatever the views of the oil
companies, large numbers of people did not regard these
arrangements as fair and legitimate. This was compounded by a
general economic and political crisist a powerful current of
nationalism in Scotland was accompanied by severe industrial
strife in Britain as a whole, and the first major economic
recession since the 1930s began in Autumn 1973*
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CHAPTER THREE
The Revision of Licence 1?^-?
No other European nation has proposed to subject its
offshore operators to retrospective legislation on
existing licences. ^
Vice-President, Amoco Europe"
To raise the idea that this is a violation of property
rights, which is the sort of behaviour of a banana
republic after a Trotskyist take-over, is to do leas than
justice to the gravity of the Government of the day.
2
Tony Benn, Energy Secretary
1. Steve Antoniuk, Vice-President of exploration and production,
in The Scotsman, 'US Oilman condemns "breach of contract"',
May 16, 1975.
2. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill, H.C. Deb. Standing




2. The role of negotiations in developing the new framework
3. The debate in Parliament
(i) the power to control the rate of production
(ii) other regulatory powers
!+. The meaning of •unilateral'
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I have dwelled at some length on developments which occurred
during North Sea oil's 'pre-history', since they underline the
scale of the problem which faced the Labour Government in 1971+• The
state's involvement in North Sea oil developments had been limited
to actions which assisted the oil companies, and especially British
ones, in whatever way possible. For a period of more than ten
years holders of petroleum production licences in the UK were
entitled to oonduot their exploration and exploitation subject
to minimal regulatory constraints: the best part of a licence
could be held for up to forty-six years; there was no limit
on the rate at which oil was to be extracted once discovered
nor on the manner of extraction; the licensee had an exclusive
right to all the oil once it was extracted; there was no
provision for re-negotiation of licence terms once the licenses
were allocated; the quantity of information the licensee was
obliged to disclose was small; if oil resources were found, it
was up to the private oil companies to decide whether or not
to develop a particular field; and tax avoidance on a large scale
was not especially difficult under the existing legislation.
During this period licences were allocated in four rounds for a
very large number of blocks which by 197U were known to contain
most of the recoverable reserves of oil in the North Sea. Any
effective increase in state Involvement in North Sea oil
development and production had to be directed at the terms of
existing (i.e. pre-197l+) licences.
The manner in which the new Labour Government planned to
secure effective control over oil resources in 197U created a
crisis of legality. The introduction of new regulations into
the model clauses of existing production licences was to be
achieved unilaterally. While there was no legal barrier to
this aotion by the state, it raised a broader question about the
legal seourity of any private interest or interests vis-a-vis
the state. After all, these licences not only contained regulatory
elements in their model clauses, but also had a contractual
character. Since the effect of this action would be to render
the licence less valuable to the licensee, it also seemed
like a form of expropriation. The Government vigorously and
repeatedly denied that this was the case not only because it
implied that payment of compensation should ancompany the
legislative aotion, but also because, if correct, the British
Government appeared to have qualified its respect for the
principles of the Rule of Law and pacta sunt servanda. In order
to respond to the latter, and ultimately more serious implication
of its sovereign action, the Government strove to find a legal
form which reconoiled its legislative intent with an attitude
of respect for the legal principles. In this chapter I explain
how the Government achieved this, and why it mattered so much.
1. The Controversy
However favourable licence ri^its were for their recipients
in the first four rounds, they seemed threatened by the state
intervention proposed by the Labour Government in 197k •
The Labour Party's Election Manifesto for February 197k
had originally set out two prinoipal objectives for a Labour
Government with respect to North Sea oil. Firstly, the character
of this natural resource as a publicly-owned resource had to be
ensured, and secondly, 'the operation of getting and distributing
them' had to be placed 'under full Governmental oontrol with
maj oilty publio participation'It was claimed that public
ownership and oontrol was essential to allow 'the British people,
through its Government, to fix the pace of exploitation of our
oil, and the use to which it is put'. This implied a
considerable reduction of the role of private enterprise in oil
production, and also a reduction in the profitability of
oilfields. Both these objectives were to be vigorously opposed
by companies whose initial interest in, and commitment to, North
Sea exploration had been quickened by the prospect of high
profits once oil was discovered in large quantities.
After considering the matter for four months, the new Labour
Government produced a White Paper in July 197k, in which it put
the objective of securing 'effective control' over the oil
reserves alongside another principal objectives that of increasing
2
its share of rent. By this it meant that the balance between
profits accruing to the oil companies and revenues to the state was
1. All references in this paragraph are to the Election Manifesto,
February 197k» P»3»
2. Department of Energy, United Kingdom Offshore Oil and Gas Poliov.
Cmnd.5696 (197k) (Hereinafter 'White Paper')tthe relevant
passages are on pp.k-6.
to be redressed, as well as marlmising the balance of payments
advantages by reducing remittances of profits to foreign
parent companies. The 'control' objective was to be achieved
by two methods: firstly, new regulations were to be introduoed
into the model clauses of existing and future petroleum produotion
licences; and secondly, majority state participation would be
introduced in all oilfields declared 'commercial'. In November
it was announced that the legislative instrument for achieving
this (non-fiscal) objective was to be the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill (and specifically Parts I and II of
that Bill),3" supplemented by 'voluntary* negotiations on
participation (discussed in the next chapter).
The anxiety felt by the Government over the legality (and
the economic ramifications) of its deoision to unilaterally
revise the terms of existing (as distinct from future) licences
led it to issue an invitation in the White Paper to the oil
companies
... to join in working out a new structure which they
know will be durable because it will be accepted by the
people of Britain.
These negotiations were to be an important means of securing the
companies' consent to a new legal framework for oil licensing, as
well as a means of working out the details of such a framework.
However, the very explicit use of negotiations was also an attempt
1. See The Financial Times. 'Pinal Clarion Calls to Battle',
November 15>, 197W by contrast, the licensees had known
details of the proposed Petroleum Revenue Tax for several
months.
2. White Paper, p.9.
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to deal with a persistent problem in oil company-state relations
in the UK, deriving: from the fact that the state has two
sometimes contradictory roles: on the one hand, it is the
licensing authority, concerned to regulate licensees*
activities, and on the other, it is a party to a contractual
arrangement. This dual role of the state is reflected in the
licences themselves which have both regulatory and contractual
elements. It has not always been easy to distinguish the two,
nor to ascertain which predominates. The use of negotiations
helped cast the state in the role of a 'party* to a bargaining
or exchange relationship, thus mollifying somewhat the use of
political power. Nonetheless, the bargaining only began as a
result of the state*s unilateral decision to invalidate the
original grant of a licence!
However, there was no real alternative to this exeroise
of sovereign power if the Government was to achieve its objective
of 'public control*. By 197U» North Sea oil development had
reached a turning point. Those oilfields which were the largest
and easiest of aooess had been discovered under licences already
awarded. Consequently, any changes in lioenoe terms had to be
directed at existing licences rather than future ones if they
were to have any practical effect in the near future. Such changes
would have an immensely greater eoonomic significance than w uld
the imposition of additional obligations on applicants for
licenoes in future rounds. While changing the terms of future
licences posed few legal problems if any (since new regulations
could be made under the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, with
new model clauses to be included in those licences)t changing
the terms of existing licences posed several.
The Government probably considered three modes of
proceduret
(l) it could have tried to secure the consent of all existing
licensees to the alteration of their licences in the required
manner. Given the diversity of interests and circumstances
among the lioensees this was impossible to do consistently, and
would probably have involved some large financial oost to the
states a most unattractive feature so far as the Government was
concerned. In addition, the amendments which the Government had
indicated it wished to make would have given it new powers the
use of which might impose substantial new costs on the lioensees
and diminish profits (e.g. the proposed powers to impose bigger
development programmes, to restrict rates of depletion, and to
take royalty in kind1)* licensees were unlikely to agree to this.
Finally, many of the existing licences had many years still to
run and were therefore of considerable value to a licence-holder.
In the case of those awarded in the fourth round, they had more
than forty years to runt why should such licensees surrender
any of their material advantages?
1. Principally, Model Clauses 15, 16 and 11.
(2) it could have seoured the enactment of legislation
imposing new obligations )over depletion control, for example)
outside the framework of the lioenoes as a matter of unilateral
regulation. The difficulty with this oou-^ was that it might
create risks of conflict between the contractual obligations
imposed by the licence and those imposed by external regulation.
In its favour it would have kept separate the state's two roles
of contractual party and sovereign power.
(3) it could have secured the enactment of legislation
effecting or empowering the unilateral alteration of the
(contractual) licenoe terms themselves. Since there are no
formal limits on Parliament's legislative oojapetenoe in the UK.
this course was perfectly feasible and, indeed, was the one chosen
by the Governmentt it obtained legislative authority for the
substitution of new terms in existing licences. It also took
the step of incorporating all the clauses for substitution in
existing licences in the same Bill which conferred authority
for the unilateral action, rather than simply seeking the
enactment of a general empowering provision. The salient point
about such a oourse is that it enabled the new clauses to be
discussed in considerable detail (and substantially amended in
Parliament). It also provided a framework which encouraged the
oil companies to make specific their objections to the Government's
proposed changes in the regulations, especially those governing
development and production.
The most controversial provision was contained in
clause 18 of the Bill, and concerned the modification of model
clauses which were standard form for all petroleum production
licences in the UK. Its objective was to alter the terms of
existing seaward and landward petroleum production licences
(i.e. those awarded in the first four rounds) by substituting
the clauses contained in Part II of Schedule 2 and 3 contained
in the Bill for clauses originally contained in the licences. As
Baintith and Willoughby point out, this is an unusual provision.^"
While Parliament frequently enacts legislation which makes the
performance of particular contracts financially less attractive
for the parties, and while it is not unusual for it to enact
legislation which is incompatible with existing contracts and
therefore demands their amendment (for example, the Resale Prices
''t ¥$
Act 196U, and the Sex Discrimination Act, a.77)» 0* even to enact
legislation which authorises departures from such oontracts
2
for the purpose of promoting government policy, they make the claim
that
... it is without precedent in the United Kingdom to make a ,
unilateral alteration of the terms of oontraots by legislation.
They also emphasise that these changes, which were given effect,
were
...not of a purely technical charaoter, but impose substantial
new duties on licensees.
1. Manual, pp.305-6.





Hot surprisingly, the retrospective character of clause 18
Bade it an object of criticism by the Opposition at every stage
of the Bill's passage through Parliament."^ In defence of
the Government's action, Lord Balogh, the Minister of State for
Energy, explained that although it was 'regrettable' that powers
had to be taken unilaterally to alter the terms of existing
licences, this was merely a consequence of the 'unfortunate but
manifest inadequacy of the existing terms'. The Government's
action was
... not retrospective but remedial action in the national
interest; to eliminate certain weaknesses in the licensing
system.~
This was not an example of retrospective legislation in the commonly
accepted sense, and the Minister of State at the Scottish Office,
Lord Hughes, added that
... nothing in the Bill makes anything illegal which at
the time it was done was legal.
While the new regulations certainly did apply to existing licences,
this was 'only in respect of future actions carried out under them' .
There was therefore no question of compensation.
1. 891 H.C. Deb. cols.503-6 (April 30, 1975)? H.C. Deb. Standing
Committee D, cols.1105-72 (July 3, 1975); 396 H.C. Deb. cols.
1JU36-U6 (July 28, 1975)? 363 H.L. Deb. cols.1955-6 (August 7,
1975)? 364 H.L. Deb. cols.546-74 (September 25, 1975)?
899 H.C. Deb. ools.465-82 (November •$, 1975)? 365 H.C. Deb.
cols. 1764-8 (November 11, 1975)• Vox one instance of
possible retrospective effect of ss.l8 and 19 of the Act, in
spite of 8.19(3) which provided that acts or omissions occurring
before a licence was altered are not to be treated as
contravening the provisions of the altered licenoe, see Manual.
p.474 (note to Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, Schedule
5, cl. 40(4)).
2. 365 H.L. Deb. 00I.I768 (November 11, 1975)• See also remarks
by Edmund Dell in the proceedings of the Financial Times
Scandinavian and North Sea Conference, held at Oslo, September 1, 1975•
3. 363 H.L. Deb. col.404 (July 23, 1975)* The following quotation
comes from the same place.
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However, another Minister, Mr. John Saith, was reported
to have said that the legislation 'could enable retrospective
controls to be introduced'. In his view thia was justified
since otherwise the best parts of licences awarded in 1971
would run until 2018 without the Government having control
over rates of production.
In other words, this was retrospective legislation in a
sense but not in a ooEimonly accepted sense J
Against this, the Opposition argued that a unilateral
alteration of a contractual licence which rendered the licence
less valuable constituted a form of expropriation of property
without compensation. As such it was contrary to international
law and certainly marked a diminution in the respect paid by
UK fjoveraments to the principles of the Rule of Law and the
sancifcy of contract. This argument was rejected by the Government,
on the ground that the legislative change was being brought about
... on the basis of good faith and good working relations
with the oil companies ... as anyone dealing with any
British Government would expect.
Undeterred, and in pursuit of their conception of legality (as well
as the oil companies' interests), the Opposition tabled an amendment
which would have provided compensation where a licence was
revoked for non-compliance with a provision unilaterally inserted
1. 'Oil search could now move to Moray Firth' in The Scotsman.
May 20, 1975> In Committee, he saidt 'Of course the changes
are retrospective. I have never made any attempt to deny that.
However, I believe that they are absolutely necessary*.
(H.C. Standing Committee D, col.lllh, July 3> 1975)*
2. 899 H.C. Deb. cols.l*67-8 (November 5, 1975).
in it by reason of the Act. This was however defeated by
the Government.^"
Of course, payment of compensation was anathema from the
Government's point of view, since it would have been on a
massive scale and would have supported the Opposition's
contention that the provisions of the Bill, and in particular
the first part concerning the establishment of a state oil
corporation would lead to a massive increase in public
expenditure, at a time when it was widely accepted that a
general reduction in such expenditure was required.
A further weakness in the compensation proposal was not
discussed at the time. Once the Government had announced its
intention to change the licence terms unilaterally (in form, at
least), the situation of the licensees was changed at a stroke,
making it impossible to establish without the greatest difficulty
what the value of the licences was. The decision to revise the
terms must immediately have altered the value of the existing
licences, thus making any determination of the exact loss which
a licensee would incur a complex if not impossible matter. 1Mb
situation differs from that of nationalisation too. Sere, the
licence is a bundle of contractual rights still of value to the
private party after the state acting as public authority takes a
course of action which has reduced the original value. It is not
possible to asseBs the value lost as a consequence, and hence
1. 365 h.l. Deb. co1s.176!*-8 (November 11, 1975).
bargaining' over compensation ie rendered difficult, if not
impossible. The situation oreated by- a decision to
nationalise is, however, quite different! the Government
announces its intention to nationalise and at a stroke affects
(and probably reduces) the value of the property concerned.
Nonetheless, it is clear that everything is involved! the
agreement reached and the nationalisation Act is one
concerning all the goods and all possibilities of profit.
Superficially there was a parallel between the Government's
action and the sorts of action taken by various OPEC states from
the early 1970s onward. There too one oould find the unilateral
aspect as well as demands for sweeping changes in the existing
legal arrangements between oil companies and governments. Such
a view was enoouraged by statements like that of Lord Balogh when
he said that
... we must look at the outside world and try to draw ^
lessons from what other major oil producers have done.
However, suoh parallels neglect the very important faot that
the forms of state involved are quite different. Whereas many oil
producing states have been concerned to vise their resource as part
of a broad attempt to throw off a colonial yoke and to industrialise
1. 363 H.L. Deb. col.329 (July 23, 1975). Nonetheless, he did not
approve of the more radical conclusion drawn by some members
of the Labour Party, and was suspicious of their use of 'the
idea of national oil ownership'! see 'The North Sea Oil
Blunder' in The Banker. March, 197U, p.288.
their economies, the form of state in Britain is one peculiarly
suited to that of an advanced capitalist society which requires
a very different role for the state. For example, successive
British Governments have always recognised that the British
state has a role of caretaker vis-a-vis the extensive British
investments in overseas countries and <%r,;nnot therefore adopt a
cavalier approach to the international standards of legality
whioh, if respeoted, allow that investment a considerable degree
of security. Government spokesmen were in fact well aware of
this difference.1 Indeed, it was this very difference which made
the unilateral oharacter of the state's action a matter of such
oonoem, and this international range of concerns which made
considerations of international law so important.
There were two ways in which the latter had a particularly
important role to play. Firstly, a unilateral change in licence
terms which was a clear and unambiguous violation of international
law would be likely to produce a political confrontation with the
United States, whose companies constituted the majority of
foreign companies operating on the UK Continental Shelf. Indeed,
the US Treasury registered its opposition to the Labour Government's
plans throughout 1974- For example, British parliamentarians who
visited the United States in September were warned that the
proposed revision of licence terms might encourage American companies
1. Cf. Lord Balogh'a criticism of the Conservative Government's
approach in the fourth round of licensing! 'The Government
continued to give these rather splendiferous terms as if we
were a ba. ana republic', 365 H.L. Deb. 00I.I768 (November 11,
1975); see also Bonn's remark quoted at the beginning of
this chapter.
to withdraw their oil rigs from the North Sea. The House of
Commons sub-committee on energy, visiting Washington to examine
American energy policy, were told that the US Treasury and
the Department of the Interior were studying the possibility
of offering US oil companies fiscal incentives to repatriate
scarce oil rigs from the North Sea to conduct exploration in
American waters.~ In the event, this proved an empty threat,
but it may have lent support to American companies in the
subsequent discussions with the Department of hnergy in Britain.
British MPs were left in no doubt that the US Treasury's
attitude had been influenced by the Labour Government's plane,
including its intended introduction of majority state
participation.
Secondly, international law considerations were important
because of the stake which British-based companies and banks
had not only in the international oil industry but in the world
economy, it was probably thought that the overseas interests
of British Petroleum in particular might be rendered less
secure if the British Government were to put itself in a position
from which it could not assert international law principles
against other Governments should they take actions hostile to
British interests abroad. The close connection between British
1. The Financial Times. September 7» 197&* 'US may offer incentives
to repatriate North Sea rigs'. However, another reason for
the actions of the US Treasury was the so-oalled Project
Independence, under which the Ford Administration committed
itself to making the US self-sufficient in energy by 1935. This
involved several measures like increasing the programme of
exploration and drilling offshore in the US, for which new rigs
were required at a time when there was a worldwide shortage.
Petroleum arid the British Government made it particularly
vulnerable. In 197k this share had inoreased to 68% when
the Bank of England acquired a share previously held by the
Burmah Oil Company. However, many non-oil British companies
and banks also have assets and oapltal investments in other
countries. As Mr. Patrick Jenkin pointed out, Britain is a
•major capital exporting country with investments in many
countries overseas'The continuing importance of this factor
was underlined in the evidence submitted by the Committee of
London Clearing Bankers to the Wilson Committee on the
functioning of financial institutions. It said}
A feature of particular importance to international banks
has been the increasing volume of capital goods exports,
requiring medium and long term financing. UK exports
of capital goods rose from 25 per cent of the total (of
all exports) in 1959 to more than h2 per cent in 1976,
and over this perigd the sterling value of exports rose
roughly eightfold.
Prcan I960 to 1976 the percentage of UK exports going to OPEC
q
countries rose from 5*9 per oent to 12.2 per cent.
Not surprisingly then, the consequences of the proposed
legislation for the security of those overseas investments was
a persistent cause for conoero, especially in the Conservative Party.
When the Bill was going through its Committee stage, it was pointed
out that British companies (and not only oil companies) were already
1. H.C. Beb. Standing Committee D, ool.lli}8 (July 3» 1975)•
2. The London Clearing Banks} Evidence by the Committee of London
Clearing Bankers to the Committee to BevLew the Functioning of
Financial Institutions, November, 1977» pp.122-3.
3. loo.cit., p.123} Table 21.
involved in disputes over their commercial interests with at
least half a dozen foreign countries which had taken action
similar to that being proposed by the Labour Government. The
British Government - or, more accurately, the British state - was
seeking in these disputes to establish compensation for British
subjects in respect of property expropriated by foreign
governments without adequate compensation. In this context
the pre-ocoupation of some members of both houses of Parliament
with the issue of compensation was an expression of a general
concern for the interests of all transnationally operating
capital units based in Britain (or 'international capital'), and
not merely a concern over adverse affects upon oil companies'
2
interests in the UK (although it was that too).
It was in order to extricate itself from this complex
situation that the Government decided on a twofold course of
action: the legislation would be designed to facilitate
maximum discussion and amendment in detail of the proposed regulations
in Parliament; and the oil companies would be invited to 'talks'
with the Government in which they could discuss the legislation and
suggest amendments to it - in private. This way it was hoped to
circumvent the major problems I have outlined above and, in
particular, the possibility of economic retaliation.
1. H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, ools.111*8-9 (July 3« 1975)* See
also the remarks made by Mr. Blacker at 891 H.C. Deb. cols.965-7
(April 30, 1975). The countries included Libya, where £250
million worth of British assets (estimate) had been expropriated
since 1969, and Uganda, where the value of property expropriated
was thought to be worth as much as £500 million. The result of
the Arbitration between BP and the Libyan Arab Republic is to
be found in 1979 ILR at p.297.
2. Frankly admitted by Lord Campbell of Croy at 365 H.L. Deb.
col.1766 (November 11, 1975)*
1&.
2. The role of negotiations In developing the new framework
The new legal framework was shaped both by Parliament and
by the Government and oil company negotiators. In effect, there
were two main sets of discussions over the proposals in the
Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill. The first took place
in Parliament itself between the major political parties, and
the second took place outside Parliament, between the Department
of iEnergy and the licensees, represented by the UK Offshore
Operators' Association. Of the two it is impossible to state
which proved most influential in securing amendments to the
legislation since the latter took place in private.1
The two sets of discussions were not entirely separate either.
There was some interaction between the parliamentary debate
and the confidential discussions in the offices of the Department
of Shergy at Millbank. Possible amendments? to the legislation,
proposed by either party, were advanced and discussed in the private
forum, and then sometimes advanced by the Government itself in
the parliamentary forum if agreement had been reached in the
private discussions. Indeed, many amendments were proposed by
2
the Government itself. Where the Government would not go so far
as to propose or acoept an amendment, it sometimes provided
assurances about its intentions and its use of the powers it proposed
to take.
1. My own knowledge of these discussions is based principally on
the results of a series of interviews I held with participants
in these discussions during Spring and early Summer, 1976.
2. For example, Model Clause 31 (release of data) in response to
suggestions by the UKOOA: H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, cols.
1397-99 (July 8, 1975) and Model Clause li+ (exploration) also in
Committee at cols.l237-U2 (July 3» 1975)I and see s.3 of this
ohapter.
3* >' c example, Lord Balogh gave an assurance about the use of the
Government's power to revoke a licence at the Esporfc stage of the
Billi 305 B.It.Deb. ools.580-1 (October 29, 1975).
I shall examine some of the principal aspects of the first
set of discussions (in Parliament) in the next seotion of this
chapter, hut some general comments on both sets of discussions
are in order here.
The oil companies took steps to ensure that Members of
Parliament were aware of their objections to the Bill. For
example, company advice was freely givent indeed, oil company
advisers were present at the Committee stage where so many-
important amendments were made.1 In addition, a special
2
committee was established to advise the Conservative Party.
The Energy Advisory Committee was set up as a forum in which to
discuss and draft amendments initially to the Oil Taxation Bill
and later to the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill. It
was designed to assist the Conservative Party in its opposition
to the Government's legislation in Parliament. Its members
included the Conservative MPs, Trevor Skeet and Patrick Jenkin,
the latter being the then 'Shadow' Energy Secretary; and several
volunteers from the oil companies, including British Petroleum,
Amoco, and Mobil. It held between 3 and 6 meetings over a five-month
period. According to one source, the smaller oil companies
were particularly active in this forum.^
1. All the persons j interviewed in the oil industry oollfi:nBed
this.
2. The following draws on several interviews with company
negotiators in the Amoco, Mobil and Gulf companies.
3. Interview with Mr. D. Vock, senior counsel, Mobil Oil company.
The second set of discussions between the licensees affected
by the Government measures and the Department of Energy were
•quite frequent* in the various stages of the Bill's passage.*
However, they presented special difficulties, since there were
many different types of company with interests in pre-197h
2
petroleurn licences, and some means had to be found to centralise
the many different responses to the Government proposals. Such
a prooess of centralisation was supported (and encouraged) by the
3
Government itself. As is customary in the international oil
industry, it was the Operator in each licence arrangement who was
assigned responsibility for the negotiations with the Gove ^taent
Since most, though not all, Operators were members of the
United Kingdom Offshore Operator's' Association (hereinafter
the UKOOA), the informal talks and consultations were held
between the Department and the TJKOOA. The latter body had two
committees for consultations with the Government, and the relevant
one here was the Non-Fiscal Legislation Committee. Hot
surprisingly, the Licence Operator was always &n oil company and,
given their considerable interests in the North Sea, the Operator
1. Interview with Mr. A.R.L. Murray, Department of Energy.
2. See chapter one for an acoount of this.
3. See the comments in The 'Seeking one industry
voice on PET', January 10, 1975*
k* For an explanation of the Operator and his role in joint
venture arrangements, see chapter two, s.3« The key role of
North Sea Operators in the negotiations and discussions with
the Government at this time was confirmed by the individuals
I interviewed.
f>. Interview with Mr. M. Ambrose, and Mr. J. Essex, Amoco Oil Co.
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was often one of the major international oil companies or
•the Seven Sisters* as they have heen called. Such companies
were therefore negotiating with the Labour Government on
behalf of all the companies with interests in existing petroleum
production licences.
As we shall see, the lengthy and detailed discussions of
the legislative proposals had the effect of ensuring that
the revision of lioence terms allowed for greater state regulation
hut without any significant reduotion in the future profits of
those companies with North Sea investments.
However, any consideration of legal and political structures
which omits their interaction with, and ultimately their dependence
upon, economic structures must lead to a one-sided view of
developments within those structures. Both the formal and the
informal negotiations took place in a context of growing economio
problems which exerted a considerable influence over the
Government*s plans. It is sufficient to mention only two here.
Firstly, there was a hiatus in investment in the North Sea
from 197b to 1976. During this period the capital invested by
licensee companies in the development of proven fields was reduced
to nil. By contrast, exploration continued and indeed proved
highly successful. In the first ten months of 1975 more exploration
veils were drilled than in the whole of 197b» £he suooess rate
of 1 in every 3 wells drilled was unusually high, and a dozen
probable fields were established.
1. Department of Energy, Development of the oil and gas resouroea
of the United Kingdom (the 'Brown Bock1) (1976).
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In spite of this, a picture was emerging in late 1974
of a 'loss of confidence' on the part of licensees and their
bankers. The initial optimism about North Sea prospects was
rapidly giving way to a mood of pess.lin.ism which was to last
until mid-1976.
The prinoipal reason for this development was a rapid
escalation of costs: to put it another way, there was a decline
in expected future profits. Throughout 1974» oosts had arisen
sharply, adding hundreds of millions of pounds to original
investment forecasts. For example, the estimated cost of
developing the Forties Field was claime d to have risen from
£350 million in 1972 to £750 million in mid-1975.1 This
development and its possible consequences for the future
exploitation of oil resources was considered so serious by the
Government that it initiated a study into cost escalation in
June 1975* However, the report by a Department of Energy study
group concluded that a large part of the cost escalation problem
was the result of inadequate forecasts by the oil companies at the
2
initial stage.
The Report also stated that
1. North Sea costs escalation study, op.cit., p.2. Both capital
and operating oosts continued to increase for some time. For
example, the stockbrokers Wood Mackenzie estimated that in
1978 the operating costs for some fields doubled, and
capital costs increased by as much as 43 P©* cent: cit. in
The Financial Times. Year's operating cost 'doubled in some
North Sea oilfields', November 11, 1978.
2. North Sea costs escalation study, op.cit., p.18. The combination
of an initial under-estimation of the harsh environmental
conditions and the technical challenges on the one hand, with the
rapid time-scale which companies set for their projects on the
other, contributed significantly to the problem.
... as long as oil companies are negotiating with the
Government their public statements on the future
consequences cf cost escalation are likely to reflect
a bargaining position.
It addedt
It is clear that escalation as defined and indeed absolute
future increases in costs will not be determined by action
or inaction on the part of the Government.
Neither Government policy nor the proposed legislative
changes were likely to have any significant impact on the
escalation of cost. However, the oil companies chose to present
a different picture.
It was alleged that
•... excessive Government intervention* was making 'the .
task of oil companies in a troubled period more difficult*.
The Vice-President of Conoco, an American oil oompany, made
sweeping criticisms of Government policy in a paper given at a
Financial Times Conference and widely reported at the time.'4
In his paper entitled 'hliy are we still here?' Mr. G. Maier
identified several reasons for the mood of pessimism affecting
licensees and their bankers. Apart from the escalation in cost, there
1. op.cit., p.19.
2. loc.cit.
3. Dr. A.W. Pearce, Chairman of Esso Petroleum, in the company's
annual report for 197^-5, published April 1975. Cit. in
The financial Times. Esso and BP attack North Sea oil policy,
April 12, 1975.
k- For example, The Guardiant Uncertainty •could foroe firms to
quit North Sea exploration', December 12, 197k'
was a scarcity of necessary materials and equipment, and the
world recession was having an impact in the North Sea. For
example, high rates of interest (up to 1'jfy) were adding to
development costs. In addition, the capital market was in
a 'depressed state', making financing difficult.
He identified three other reasons. Firstly, suppliers
ana fabricators quoted long delivery times ana failed to
meet delivery deadlines, which extended the time taken by
projects to be completed and to generate revenue. Secondly, he
claimed that the results of exploration drilling were not as
promising as they appeared. Offshore areas which had been
thought to contain considerable reserves had produced
disappointing results when delineation wells hid been drilled.
(This suggestion 'coincided' with an announcement by BP of a
second dry well west of the Shetlands.)
Finally, he warned that if crude oil prices declined (as they
did in real terms until 1979)» existing projects might prove
•uneconomic*.
It was into this situation of uncertainty that the
Government's proposed measures were cast. Maier declared that
The industry's confidence ha® been shaken by uncertainty
about Government action on taxes, definitions of majority
participation, and revisions to existing licence terms."
1. G. Maier, Why are we still hereYt paper given at a Financial
Times North Sea Oil Conference, and reported in The Guardian.
'Uncertainty', op.cit. Maier claimed that inflation had
inoreased costs by $Q per cent within six months of commitment
of capital in one project in which Conooo were involved. In
the context of 'uncertainty', see also the discussion in The
Financial Times. Killing industry faith in Government fairness,
September 20, 197k•
The implication was clears the adverse economic situation
was unavoidable but the actions of the Government were worsening
that situation and were doing so unnecessarily.
The consequences were spelled out by a leading American
banker, who said
Unless some problems are solved fast, I can see the date
when Britain becomes self-sufficient in oil slipping
back from the Government target of 1980 to anywhere
between 1981 and. 1985.
Th/s idea of a close connection between Government policy
and the climate of •uncertainty' was also exploited by the
Conservative Party. Mrs. Thatcher was particularly critical
of the 'uncertainty' allegedly produced by the Government's
2
participation plans.
The Government certainly took the threat of retrenchment
seriously. Although the oil companies lad already committed large
sums of capital to the North Sea, many field s were still at
the pre-production stage and required the injection of
further large sums of capital before their proven reserves
could be developed, and self-sufficiency reached by 1980. It
therefore gave assurances to the licensees at regular intervals
from 197U to 1976 to the effeot that the Government's plans would
not preclude a high rate of return for companies developing
North Sea fields. For example, on the very day that Mr. Maier
gave his paper, two Ministers from the Department of Energy made
1. Ed Monteith, reported in The Sunday Times. 'Oilmen push for
deal they cannot lose', July 20, 1975*
2. For example, her remarks reported in The Financial Times,
'Mrs. Thatcher facing US questions on North Sea oil*,
September 15, 1975*
speeches designed to reassure the oil industry about the impact
of state participation.
However, criticism of the Government proposals was not
tha only means of persuasion at the oil companies' disposal.
They could use their considerable economic power to freeze
plans fox the development of existing fields and to reduce
their exploration drilling. There is some evidenoe that
they did both. Some senior executives in the oil industry
certainly thought that this happened.
The chairman of one of the world's largest oilrig operating
companies, Mr. A.J. Laborde, claimed that the oil companies had
decided to 'pull baok' as they awaited clarification of the
Government's plans. He claimed that some oil companies appeared
to be delaying North Sea development as part of a deliberate
negotiating tactic. Major oil companies were 'curtailing
operations and tightenisfig budgets', and his company was one
2
of a number which were 'pulling rigs out'.
A managing director of British Petroleum, Mr. Monty Pennell,
specifically rebutted Government claims that the 'companies axe
bluffing when they talk of reducing exploration drilling in the
North Sea' and suggested that the actual rate of drilling could fall
by as muoh as 6C#6 in 1975* He addedi
1. See The Guardian report. 'Uncertainty1, op.cit,
2. Oil rig chief rejects Hose's North Sea reassurance, in The
Financial Times. September 17, 1975*
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Politicians who look to the current rate of drilling
appear not to understand that rig activity today
results from decisions taken a couple of years or more
ago; and that deoisiona taken over the past few months
will largely determine the rig activity next year.
Such statements hardly make a case for suggesting that
the hiatus was little more than an 'investment strike* by the
2
oil companies and 1 shall not attempt to make such a case.
However, they do suggest that some exercise of economic power
was used by the oil companies to prolong the hiatus and
influence their negotiations with the Government, particularly
on the question of state participation. In addition, at least
one of the reasons given by Mr. Baler for the hiatus lacks
credibility.
The argument that financing was proving difficult due to the
escalation of costs did not hold with respect to the major
oil companies. Such companies were able to finance field
3
development largely from their own funds. Where this proved
impossible, they were able to borrow without difficulty from the
larger banks since their credit rating was high. As one writer notest
1. Esso and BP attack Horth Sea oil policy, in The Financial Times.
April 12, 1972. * 5
2. For a brief discussion of •investment strikes' see Paul Mattiok,
Barx and Keynes. p.li|. "There have been times', Mattick says,
'when capitalists have refused to take 'risks'; when instead
of investing their and other people's money they have held on
to it, an attitude whioh Keynes calls "liquidity-preference*1.*
3. One study of seven international oil companies showed that in
the past five years some 6j/o of their capital expenditure of
over £15,000m. had been financed from depreciation and retained
earnings. These companies would produce at least 70% of
British sector llorth Sea oil by 1980-2t see 'The honeymoon
period is now over', in The Investors' Chronicle. August 30»
197k •
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Whatever on® may say about imperfections in the
capital market and the risks of oil exploration, it
cannot be denied that the large companies involved
have some of the best oredit ratings to be found.
In addition, the major oil companies had never subscribed
2
to the highly optimistic predictions commonly made in 1972—li.
They had accepted that a slowing down of the pace would
develop as the giant fields discovered at an early stage gave
way to smaller structures, not so easy to drill and requiring
more wells. Experience showed that such a development
3
was inevitable.
The escalation of oosts and generally adverse economic
conditions had a different impact upon companies smaller than
the majors. For such companies, the words of one banker had a
special relevance. Ab early as August 1974, Angus Grossart
claimed that
There are clear signs that money, whether in the form of
equity or debt finance is becoming scarce and that
investors and bankers are taking a much tougher line on
the equation which they axe drawing between risk and .
reward and on the terms on which they will supply money.4
The banks were urged to 'participate more actively in the
£
profitability of projects'.
1. Bam, Oil Resources, p.32.
2. See, for example, North Sea Reports, a survey, in The Investors'
Chronicle. May 3» 1974, P»5* 'The North Sea adventure could
beoome Britain's greatest industrial revolution'? also
'Introduction* to Casenove & Co., The North Sea, op.cit.
Apparently, North Sea gas was seen as playing a regenerative
role rather earlier, see Adelman, op.cit., p.21*1.
3. This view has been set out by the UKOOA, in their submission to
the Energy Commission! 'Exploration and Development of UK
Continental Shelf Oil', October 1978.
4. The honeymoon period is now over, in The Investors' Chronicle.
August 30, 1974•
5. Ewan Brown of the merchant bank, Noble Grossart, reported in
The Scotsman. 'Risk more on oil, hanks urged', October $>» 1974*
Such an insecure relationship to sources of finance was not
a general condition for companies operating in the North Sea.
Given their ability to finance development from internal sources,
and their close links with the larger banks,'5" the oil majors
were in an entirely different position. The sharp escalation
in costs came as no surprise to them since they had not
subscribed to the initial optimism; and their access to
sources of finance virtually eliminated problems in
financing field development of the sort which smaller companies
certainly did experience.
There was one other eoonomio development whioh had an impact
upon the Government's proposed legislation; the development of
Jp
a 'fiscal crisis' of the state from 1974 onward.
The scale of Government borrowing increased considerably
during this period and, at the same time, the large increases in
oil prices in 1973-4 exacerbated existing balance of payments
difficulties for the HE. The prospect of revenue from North Sea
oil was essential for state finance since this prospect allowed
the Government to secure loans to meet its current expenditure,
and solve the balance of payments problems. In addition, this
lack of financial resources precluded money compensation for those
companies affected by changes in existing licence terms, and acted
as a constraint upon the form of state participation.
1. Bee chapter one, section 2.
2. For an elaboration of this idea of fisoal crisis, see
James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, pp.1-10.
While it was to the oil companies' advantage to exploit
the dependence of the Government upon future oil revenues, that
dependence was not of their own making. So long as the
Government adhered to the objective of self-sufficiency by
1980, it remained dependent upon the oil companies' control over
capital for the further investment required to meet this
objective.
3« ?he debate in Parliament
While the informal negotiations between the Government and
oil companies took plaoe in the Department of .nergy, the public
debate began in Parliament. This proved to be a highly
controversial and often heated debate, which gave rise to some
considerable disagreement between the House of Commons and the House
of Lords, and which led to substantial modification of some of
the key provisions in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill.
Part II of the Bill concerned the terms of petroleum
production licences, and the proposed new regulations for seaward
areas were set out in Schedule 2. They proposed inter alia to
confer upon the Secretary of State for Energy wide discretionary
powers, the most significant of which were the following!
(i) a power to control the level of production in each field.
The new model clauses 15 and 16 would have allowed the Minister to
tell a licensee not to produce oil from a particular field if he
considered that too much oil was being produced from the North Sea
aa a whole. This had obvious implications for companies'
expectations of future profits, and for smaller companies'
ability to obtain loans.
(ii) a power to revoke any licence in toto in the event of
a breach, even if the breach occurred in one small part of the
licensed area (model clause 39). Clearly, instant revocation for
minor breaches would have contributed greatly to the insecurity
of a licensee's interest.
(iii) a power to impose additional exploration programmes after
the initial six year term of the licence (model clause lh) • The
exercise of such a power would impose additional cost on a licensee
and might prove unprofitable. Model Clause 1$ might have had
a similar effect with respect to development. These were
supplemented by others like the power to regulate more strictly
any dealings in licence interests (model clause 38), to restriot
the flaring of natural gas (model clause 2l), and powers over the
rate and form of royalty payments (model clauses 9, 10 and 11).
The sheer quantity of regulation contained in the new model
clauses (which would of course replace those in existing licences
once the Bill was enacted) seemed to justify the Government's claim
that it was providing the necessary 'public control* which its
predecessors had failed to provide. While in a sense it was indeed
an extension of 'public control*, the form of this 'public control'
was one quite compatible with, and perhaps even necessary for, the
continuation of profitable economic activity by private
companies in the North Sea. There were, nonetheless, considerable
conflicts in Parliament as the Opposition attempted to fetter
these discretionary powers, when they could not persuade the
Government to remove them: one of their successes in this
respeot was the proposed power to control the level of production.
For the rest of this section I examine the ways in which some key
regulatory powers in the Bill were amended and their consequences, with
particular reference to depletion-oontrol, the most important
regulatory measure of all.
(i) The power to control the rate of production
Depletion or production controls are a standard part of the
legislation of most oil-producing countries and even of countries
which have no oil production but which are merely trying to
encourage exploitation. Prior to 197h however, no policy on
depletion seems to have existed in Britain nor did Governments
have any explicit powers to control rates of depletion under the
terms of production licences awarded before that time: in other
words, in the first four rounds of licensing.
'The need for depletion control stems from the physical character
of oil as a finite, non-renewable resource which is not merely
produced but at the same time used up. Once it is extracted
and consumed either directly as fuel or indirectly as raw material
in, for example, the production of synthetic fibres, the oil is
'depleted'. In this sense depletion simply means the production
of a non-renewable natural resource, but the word also conveys the
idea that this production process has a negative aspect. It
Is this feature which gives all the parties involved an
interest in the rate and manner of depletion. However,
whereas states tend to want such controls in order to prolong
the life of their oilfields (and the benefits therefrom), there
are at least two reasons why oil companies should he much less
interested in controlling the rate at which oil is to he depleted.
Firstly, as private companies they produce oil for their own
profit, and the quickest way to make the maximum profit in the
short-term is to deplete the oil fast. Secondly, the high cost
of exploration and development in offshore areas and the long
period between initial investment and actual production has
enoour#ed oil companies to recoup their investment as fast
as possible. After all, the sums involved are massive: an
exploration well can cost between three and five million pounds
(i.e. the equivalent of purchasing a Bme.ll jet aeroplane such as
a BAG l-ll), and the cost of developing a medium-sized oilfield
is between £$00 million and £1,$00 million (similar to the
cost of the entire Concorde project up to July 1977» i.e.
£820 million).* As a consequence of these considerations, oil
companies tend to view the depletion powers of states as potential
threats to their future rates of profit.
There is then a possible divergence of oil company interests
from that of the nation-state in whose territory the oil lies.
1. Figures are from Proceedings, op.cit., vol.1, at p.13.3' A
general account of depletion control offshore is contained in
the Ministry of Industry's Report (No. 30)to the Norwegian
Storting (1973-U), pp.61} et esq.
In Britain's case, this has been minimal however. During
the initial phase of oil and gas exploitation up till 197'-l>
Government policy had been directed at stimulating exploration
activity and achieving ae rapid a build-up of petroleum
production as possible. One of the effects of this policy was
that licenoees were allowed to produce from gas fields with
very few restrictions and to plan to exploit oilfields in the
same way, i.e. without any significant state interference in
this respect. Apart from controls on the drilling of wells, set
out in Model Clause 13 of the Petroleum (Production) Regulations
1966, the manner of exploitation was left entirely to the
licensees.3" This suggests that in so far as depletion rates
were considered at all, it was assumed that the oil companies'
interests and goals would coincide with the 'national interest',
an assumption by no means unjustified.
The new oil policy of the Labour Government seemed to imply
an end to this coincidence of interest between the state and the
oil companies on the question of production control. A major
objective of this policy was to assume powers to control rates of
2
production in the North Sea oilfields in order to deal with a
range of possible future problems which could not be clearly
1. The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 changed
this a little: under this Act, expensive regulations
were promulgated to promote good oilfield practice end
safety iJfcoperations.
2. For example, in the Election Manifesto of October 197k the
Labour Party claimed that a Labour Government would 'take
new powers to control the pace of depletion' (p.12).
gauged in 197ht but -which would arise once 'self-sufficiency'
was cached in 1980. On the other hand, the oil companies and
their bankers needed the maximum degree of 'certainty' for
the large investment decisions involved in field development.
Consequently, the licensees were quick to criticise the
apparent lack of restrictions on the Government powers implied
by the phrase 'to control the level of produotion in the
national interest' contained in the 'white Paper of July, 197k*
The oil companies envisaged a situation in which a British
Government could prevent a consortium from developing a field or
could compel an amendment of production plans once fields were
already in production, thus jeopardising the security of their
existing investment as well as their ability to raise capital
for future investment. In addition, there was a certain amount
of anxiety over the possible exercise of such a power in a
discriminatory way among the various licensees.
So alarmed was the Government by oil companies' criticisms
thai; it acted firmly before legislation was introduced into
Parliament. After consultations with the companies, the rnergy
Secretary, Mr. ric Varley, made a statement in Parliament in
December 197k, which was intended to assure tham about the Government'
intentions.^ Although they were not incorporated into the Petroleum
ana Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill and therefore not legally binding, the
1. 882 E.C. Deb. cols.6'48-50 (December 6, 197^) (Written Answer).
The following passages are taken from this statement.
Yarley Assurances provided the background to the Bill's
provisions on depletion-oontrol and complemented them.
To begin with, Mr. Varley assured the oil companies and
the banks (on which some oil companies were highly dependent
for finance) that
Our depletion policy and our implementation (i.e. of
election commitments) will not undermine the basis on
which they have made plans and entered into commitments.
However, a general power was necessary to ensure that the oil
would be used at a rate which secured the greatest benefit to
the British economy in the long-term. Of course the Government
could not define its long-term production policy before any oil
had been produced and while large offshore areas remained
unexplored, but it remained committed to rapxd development until
1980. For the benefit of holders of licences allocated in the
first four rounds, he set out the following guidelines which
were to form the basis for depletion policy, with the expectation
that these would illustrate the limits upon the exercise of the
Government's proposed powert
1. Disooveries made before the end of 1975 under existing
licences would not be subject to delays imposed upon their
development plans. Cuts in production from discoveries made before
the end of 1975 under existing licences would not be made before
1982 or four years after the start of production, whichever was
the later. This had the effect of stimulating companies to make
faster progress on their exploration programmes.
2. Discoveries made after the end of 1975 under existing
licences would suffer no production outs before 150% of the
capital investment in the field had been recovered.
3. Should it prove necessary to delay the development
of any discoveries made after the end of 1975* this would only be
done after 'full consultation with the companies so that
premature investment is avoided1.
In general, any use of production controls by the
Government would recognise 'the technical and commercial aspects
of the fields in question'. This would generally restrict
production cuts to no more than 20%, and the industry would be
oonsulted on the period of notice to be given before cute became
effective.
In spite of these specific assurances the power over
depletion rates set out in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines
Bill was so broad ae to provoke renewed criticism. Model Clauses 15
and 16 in Sohedule 2 (which were to apply to existing as well as
future licences) proposed to give the Minister a virtually
unlimited power to vary production plans, and to set maximum or
minimum production-rates. It appeared that the Minister could
determine any output rate he wished and there were no constraints
on his ability to alter production rates since he could 'specify
any rate by reference to suoh factors as the Minister thinks fit'.
1. Model Clause 16 (3)(a).
m.
The absence of any provision for appeal provoked some
criticism: he had only to allow the licensee to make
representations and then satisfy himself that his decision
was 'in the national interest' before exercising his power.
However, there were two criticisms of this power mac'.-, by
the Conservative Party: one general and one particular. The
general criticism was a variation on the one they repeated at
every stage of the Bill's passage through Parliament, attacking
the Government's stated intention to introduce the new model
clauses into existing licences by legislation. The Opposition
made it clear that they were not opposed to the taking of a
power to control rates of production,* but they did object
to the inclusion of any such power in the regulations of
licences already allocated. These licences had a contractual
character and therefore the Government ought to find an alternative
means of taking a power over existing licences, or else negotiate
with the licensees over compensation for its inclusion. When
the Government nonetheless maintained that their procedure was
quite 'normal' and had similar consequences for property rights
as a change in the tax environment, the Opposition (rightly) pointed
out that this view was quite mistaken. However, this particular
criticism had as little success with regard to the Bill's
provisions an depletion-control as it had with any other provisions
of the Bill.
1. 'There must be somewhere in our legislation effective controls
on the rate of depletion.': H.C. Beb. Standing Committee D,
col.1128 (July 3> 1975); although they thought a state
regulatory authority was required: 891 H.C, Deb. col.503
(April 30, 1975).
The Opposition had much more success with their specific
criticism that the power set out in the Bill was apparently
unfettered and too general in character. Ironically, Model
Clause 16 was taken out in Committee and a new (rewritten)
Model Clause introduced as a result of a Government amendment
made to placate criticisms from the oil companies in the private
consultations which were taking place simultaneously. By the
time the Conservative Party made their critioisms of this power
in detail, the Government spokesman, Mr. John Smith, was able
to claim that these criticisms had already "been met and that at
least one head of a major oil company had agreed that the
provisions in the new Model Clause were •reasonable provisions'.^
The new clause introduced a system of 'limitation notices'
which were designed to provide licensees with some security
about the use of Ministerial power. When the Minister approved
a development programme he would also issue a limitation notice
specifying the maximum amount of cut-back in production which
he can subsequently enforce. This way the Minister retained
the effective power to cut back production, while the oil
companies and the banks know before any capital is advanced the
limits on the exercise of that power and therefore, in so far as
it is affected by depletion control, the minimum profitability of
the oilfield. In the same olause were new provisions concerning
1. H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D cols.l33S» 13^6-^9 (July 8,
1975).
the Minister's power to increase production, which emphasised
that this would only he used during a national emergency
and that any costs incurred by the licensee would not exceed
the cost of drilling a new well. This allowed the
industry to appreciate clearly that only a minor investment
would be involved in these exceptional circumstances, without
reducing the Government's ability to act in the national
interest. In addition, there had to be advance notice of
any intention to vary production within the limits specified by
the limitation notice and this 'further notice' must also specify
limits. The effect of all this was to provide licensee companies
with a guaranteed floor rate of production, thus protecting
their profitability.
These new provisions, setting out procedural limits to the
exercise of the Seoretary of State's power, supplemented the
substantive limitations set out in the Varley Assurances. An
assurance was given that the guidelines set out by Mr. Varley
were still In operation. Together, they had the effect of
limiting the pr&otical consequences of the Government's power by
ensuring that it would not be used with respect to oilfields
discovered under pre-1974 licences until 1932, and if used at all
in the 1930s it would not have more than a minimal effect on
profitability for the licensees concerned.
The importance of the Government's proposed power over
depletion-rates was, as Proudhon said about property, 'clear to
all minds'. It was 'one of the most important features of
1 2
the Bill' and formed 'the heart of the licence changes'.
According to Mr. Varley,
The need for retrospeotivity arises only because in 1971
no depletion powere were taken in the licences.
Similarly, the oil companies treated this provision as among the
most important in terms of its implications for company profitability.
Hie ohairman of the Esso Petroleum Company, for example, publicly
stated that
The economic consequences of producing well below the levels
for which installations were planned are very serious unless
there are compensating correctives (sic).*
Its implications for fi0 ' d profitability in fhe short-term were not
the most important consideration, so far as the oil companies were
concerned. The real importance of the depletion power was located
in one vital fact* North Sea oil reserves were small by global
standards and might run out before the end cf the century. As a
consequence of this, British Governments world, sooner or later, use
the depletion power to extend the life of a number of oilfields.
The precise form of the new power was therefore a matter of some
consequence to the oil companies in the longer-term.
1. P^rick Jenkin in H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D,
. col.1332 (July 8, 197$).
2. John Smith, loc.oit. at eol.1122 (July 3, 1975).
3. 891 H.C. Deb. col.505 (April 30, 1975).
'fixe Guardian. 'A field where oil firms "know best"', June 19»
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Nonetheless, in spite of the political rhetorio, what is
most striking about the debate on this most important provision
is the degree of concensus between the two parties, which
ultimately extended/the licenseee themselves. Neither the
licensees nor the Conservative Party thought there was anything
objectionable about the Government's acquisition of a reserve
power per se. Most oil producing states already had such a
power, and the oil companies made it known to MPs that some
form of control of production would be 'totally within their
understanding of the reasonable activities of Government'.^ The
chairman of Esso emphasised the need for 'the most careful
2
management of oil and gas reserves to prolong their economic life',
while BP even suggested that a regulatory commission be
established, charged with conservation policies and, where
3
necessary, pro rationing. So far as the major political parties
were ooncerned, both appreciated the importance of a reserve-
power over domestic oil production since the debate on the Bill
took place in the context of a radical change in the world oil
market: fears of an impending shortage of energy and non-renewable
physical resouroes were growing and prices of such resources were
expected to rise further.
1. John Levies MP at 831 H.C. Leb. col.5lo (April 30. 1975) J see
also H.C. Leb. Standing Committee D, cols*1129-30 (Ju-y 3, 1975).
2. The Guardian. 'A field where oil firms "know best"', June 19.
1975.
3. NISC, o^.cit.Memorandum submitted by BP, pp.106-7.
•Pro^ f is a technical term which simply means the
limitation of production from an oilfield at a certain stage
of its 'life'.
Agreement oust have been further facilitated by the fact
that the exercise of depletion controls was highly improbable
before I960 when self-sufficiency would be reached. As one
financial journal bluntly put it,
These oil companies their bsskers aid the financially
nervous Government have one vital .J#®at£-ihcora2non J
they all wanJj; to get the oil out of the ground as fast
as possible.
The Labour Government, like its Conservative predecessors,was
committed to rapid development to realise tax benefits, royalty
revenues, to improve the balance of payments, and to obtain
security of oil supplies. It is not particularly remarkable then
that, several years later, the Government which has ohosen to
exercise the power of depletion control in ly80, as a Labour one
2
might have done, should instead be a Conservative one.
(ii) Other regulatory -powers
The form taken by the other new powers also showed the
influence of the Government's informal discussions with the industry.
At the same time they highlighted the contradiction of a state
presenting itself as a 'private' party re-negotiating an unfair
deal and yet taking regulatory powers which only a state would want.
The power of revocation contained in Model Clause 39 was an
example of this. In the event of a breach in licence obligations,
the Energy Secretary would have the power to revoke the licence in toto.
1. The Banker. May 1977» p.73* 'Over the hump*.
2. The Financial Times. 'Government plans to delay oil field
development', July 2ht I960,
There was no apparent qualification to this power and hence
revocation was possible even when a breaoh had occurred in one
small part of the licenced area. As a consequence it was sharply
criticised by licensees and Conservative spokesmen, who sketched
model scenarios in which total revocation might occur for
relatively minor breaches. In addition, since some individual
licences covered several blocks and more than one oilfield, there
were fears that a breach by one party might lead to revocation of
the whole licence, thus affecting the interests of all parties
and perhaps the actual development of am oilfield.
Initially, the Government thought that assurances about
itB exercise would still the criticism, and Lord Balogh announced
that
There was no question of holding the threat of total
revocation like a sword of Damocles over the heads of
licensees t^ force them to undertake unreasonable
investment.
However, the exercise of such a power would have too great
an impact on company plans for licensees to view with
magnanimity its broad discretionary character. While they made
their disquiet known to Ministers in the informal consultations,
the Conservative Party proceeded to make a connection between the
much publicised hold-up in field development and the 'threat* of
revocation: it was alleged to be partly responsible for 'deterring
1. 36k H.L. Deb. col.881* (October 15, 1975).
1
companies from embarking on offshore operations'. The
Government soon came to acoept the Lords' view that the
companies needed firmer guarantees, and tabled amendments
at the .Report stage which ensured that if there was a breach of
the licence terms in respeot of a programme under Model Clause 15
(concerning the development of oilfields), the Secretary of
State would not be able to exercise his power of revocation so
as to deprive a lioensee of a commercial field in another part
2
of the licensed area where there had been no such breach. A
provision was also made for the lioensee to mice representations
to the Minister prior to the taking of any decisions with which the
lioensee might find it difficult to comply} for example, the
altering of a lioensee'a production proposals.^ Provision was
also made for a period of delay before revocation during which
the lioensee might correot a ohange of control (resulting from
assignment of a licence interest) which the Minister did not approve
of.4 finally, the Minister was given a discretion to make a
partial revocation instead of a total one, if the licensee had
failed to comply with exploration, development or production programmes.
1. 361} H.L. Deb. col.589 (September 25, 1975).
2. Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Act, Schedule 2 (cited
below as 'Act') Model Clause 16(8).
3. Aot, Model Clause 15(7)•
?4» Act, Model Clause 39(3)(c).
5* Act, Model Clauses 1^(6) and 16(9). Their fear was that the
power to revoke would be used in conjunction with the power to
impose additional exploration or development programmes. A
modification in model clause li} ensured that any additional
exploration programmes 'will only be those which a conscientious
licensee with adequate resources would carry out of his own
accord to maximise his commercial advantage', John Smith,
B.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, at col.1239 (July 3, 1975).
The modifications to the power of sanction had the effect
of mollifying the other new powers over exploration ana
development programmes. Ultimately, it qualified the Minister's
ability to enforce the exercise of discretionary power with
respect to the most important new model clauses, and thus
minimised their impact on the terms of existing licences.
Nonetheless, the Minister retains a power to revoke the licence,
and thismt consistent with the Government's general objective
of ensuring that reserve powers over all stages of field
development wess held by the state.
Other regulatory powers were important in a technical
and less controversial sense. Fox example, companies might be
compelled by the Minister to develop a field which covered several
licences as one unit, thus organising different private
interests and avoiding wasteful competition.' The Government
also took the power to demand its royalties in the form of oil
rather than cash, amended in Parliament to oblige the Minister
to take into account the disturbance that might be caused to
an operator's drilling and delivery arrangements in this
2
eventuality. Both of these are common worldwide, as is the most
important 'technical' power of allt the power to control an
assignment of licence interests.
1. Act, Model Clauses 2$, 26.
2. Act, Model Clause 11.
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Strict restrictions on assignments had been present from
the outset of North Sea exploration, providing that a
licensee should not without consent
... assign or part with any of the rights granted by
this licence in relation to the whole or any part
of the licensed area or grant any sub-licence in
respect of any such rights.
However, the massive expansion of aotivity on the UK Continental
Shelf had revealed this simple prohibition to b© insufficient and
•new complex provisions were introduced in model clause 30 of
the Bill. The principal objective was to prevent a situation
in which a Minister could award a licence to a company owned
and operated by one person or group A and later discover it
had been turned over to a company owned and operated by quite
another person or group 2 'who may be of a different nationality1,
2
all without the Minister's knowledge.
While this was an important clause it was not especially
controversial. The Conservative Government had. imposed an
effective embargo on the transfer of licence interests in
November 1973 from which time no future transfers had been
made until February 1975. A market had been developing in licence
interests subsequent to the fourth round of allocation, and they
had. reoognised that existing state regulation was inadequate. The
1. Model Clause 32 of the Petroleum (Production) Begulatii ne 1966,
S.l 1966 No.898, Schedule it.
2. 891 H.C. Deb. col.lt92 (April 30, 1975).
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oil oompanies also appreciated the need for regulation in
this case, and all parties wanted a speedy resolution of
the problem. The escalating cost of North Sea activities
left some companies short of the necessary capital to pay for
their Bhare of the workr in these circumstances they would
normally ' farm-out' or exchange an interest in the licence
with another company in return for the performance of work,
usually the drilling of a well or wells. Since February 1)15,
fourteen companies involving kO licences had applied to the
Department of Energy for various assignment projects.'" The
informal discussions, supplementing the debate in Parliament
ensured that new regulatory controls could be introduced
which would be truly effective and would satisfy all the parties
involved.
The meaning of 'unilateral'
From the foregoing it is clear that the terms of existing
licences were revised as the result of a unilateral decision taken
by the British Government, but that they were not revised
unilaterally. The procedure adopted by the Government vas intended
to allow for, and indeed to enoourage, maximum discussion and
amendment to its proposed legislation. As a result, the new model
clauses introduced into the terms of existing licences had no
discernible adverse impact upon the economic interest of these
licensees.
1. 365 H.L. Deb. col.1776 (November 11, A general
account of the legal aspects of assign 'ait is contained in
'Farm-Ins and Ehrm-Outs' by Andrew W.A. Berkeley in
Proceedings (Paper 17).
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This conclusion is less surprising when one considers,
firstly, the state's role in North Sea oil development in the
longer term (since 1961;), and, secondly, the international
context in which the Government's action was situated.
The regulations contained in the model clauses of production
licences allocated in the first four rounds had been drawn up
on the assumption that if there were oil resources in the
North Sea, they were not likely to exist in very large
quantities! even if there were large quantities these would surely
take a long time to be produced from the difficult conditions of
the North Sea. However, by 1971* many fields had already been
proved to contain recoverable reserves and several had
reached the development stage. Production on a large scale
was certain to begin well before the end of the decade. In this
context the existing body of regulation seemed both too simple
and too sparse to permit the performance of the economic
administration and co-ordination which had been typical
functions of the state from 1971* onward, albeit on a very small
scale.
This was perceived as a problem both by the two major political
parties and by the oil companies themselves. As I explained in
chapter one, a large element of economic regulation is both
necessary and commonplace in the oil industry, and is introduced
by the private oil companies, especially the major ones, as wall as
by the state.^ However, the growing scale of North Sea activity
1. The best example of this self-regulation is the operating agreement,
which inter alia determines the respective shares of the companies
involved in the licence; provides for the appointment of one of
them as operator, as well as his responsibilities to and control
by the other licensees; regulates the financial contributions
of the licensees and their taking of their entitlement to oil;
and generally provides for all matters essential to the
interests of the parties in exploration, development and production
activities.
and the Imminence of actual production presented complex
problems of regulation and co-ordination which the private
companies could not solve themselves - nor did they expect to.
A public interest was required to provide further elements of
co-ordination among the diverse private interests whioh they
oould not provide themselves. Since 1973» the Conservativ
Party had been considering new rules which would allow for
an increase in state regulation of North Sea developments.
The Labour Party of course came to power in 197^4 with a general
mandate to Introduce new rules on this matter. Not surprisingly,
when the Labour Government made their legislative proposals
known to the oil companies, the reaction was far from hostile.
The Government was congratulated for coming forward with
Legislative measures °1early aimed at ensuring, rather
than undermining, $he coiamerciality of the operations
in British waters.
Apparently, many of the larger oil companies recognised that
... a tightening up along these lines is inevitable
and not intrinsically against their interests/
Indeed, the regulatory provisions of the Bill oould be regarded as
No more than the back-up powers over the rate and manner
in which its natural resources are used, which any state
must have at its disposal.^
1. Cit. in H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, col.1163 (July 3,
1975)• Mn. Benn mistakenly refers to 'The Petroleum
Economist', but he means 'The Petroleum Times'.
2. The Financial Times. 'Killing industry faith in Government
fairness', September 20, 197k-
3. The Financial Times. 'North Sea oil: political games that
miss the mark', April 12, 1975•
This favourable view of the proposed regulatory measures did not
extend, to the proposed introduction of majority state
participation into existing licences, and the critical attacks
directed at that were usually assumed to extend to the
former. As a negotiating tactic, the oil companies took no
trouble to disagree with this.
The disagreement began with the precise form of the
required regulation and above all the manner in which It was
to be introduced. The fact that meaningful changes would nave
to be directed at the terms of licences already allocated
was no doubt partly the reason for the Conservative Government's
inability or unwillingness to make any substantial charges
throughout the period when they were conducting a review of licensing
policy: that is, from 1972 to 197U- Whatever the economic
benefits of such s. course, the use of sovereign power to amend the
existing regulatory controls was unacceptable to them. The Labour
Government made a very different estimate of the situation and
proceeded to provide the first legal framework of regulation
designed to apply specifically to the exploration and exploitation
of offshore oil in the TTTC.
It is ironic, however, that the very Government which took
the decision unilaterally to initiate a revision of existing
licences should have denied so consistently that its step was an
unusual one. Government spokesmen consistently professed to see
no difference between this action and the alteration of regulatory
or fiscal measures with the effect of making contracts more onerous
(the second mode of procedure outlined in s.l). In an exchange
with Mr. Jenkin at the Bill's Committee stage, the Energy
Secretary, Mr. Benn, argued that Parliament could, and often did,
alter the legal framework within whioh property rights are
exercised (in taxation, for example), and this was what they
were in fact doing."" However, this was not in fact what they
were doing, since contracts which had been entered into for a
number of years and from which derived rights to property in
oil 'won and saved', were being broken. The Government was not
then s/ttempting to alter the legal framework within which those
rights were exercised. Ho contractual obligation was involved
in the cases Mr. Benn had in mind! for example, the enactment of
the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 lad the
effeot of making existing licences less attractive by reducing
their value, but it did so only incidentally by altering the
regulatory framework in general: indeed, the oil industry did
not oppose the Act and recognised the need for it. Nor was the
measure comparable to changes in taxation announced in a Budget
since such changes have a general character and are not limited
to a particular kind of industry. What the Government proposed
to do was not 'normal', as both Mr. Benn and, in the House of Lords,
2
Lord Balc-gh claimed.
1. H.C. Deb. Standing Committee B, cols.111+6-72 (July 3> 1975);
see also 899 H.C. Deb. cols. 1+65-82 (November 5, 1975).
2. 361+ H.L. Deb. cols.551-572 (September 25, 1975).
The Government*8 mode of procedure was not of course
unconstitutional. The notion that Parliament is unable to
bind itself restricts the oapacity of the Crown to validly
contract so as to fetter its future executive action, and
hence in municipal law there was no formal barrier to the
Government's course of action. The state might be seen as
having a moral obligation to the licensee not to change the
terms of the licence once awarded but it could not hav s.
legal obligation. Hence it might be concluded that, fo
at least, a licensee in the United Kingdom has much less
protection than in Norway where there exists a system of
judicial review on the Supreme Court model.
Nonetheless, in 197U the Government was very uneasy about
the legislative procedure it had ohosen. Reference to the
international context of its action immediately provides an
explanation for this unease, and here one can discern more
elements of historical, continuity in policy-making (i.e. since
196!*). Once again law and policy were significantly influenced
both by the international operations of a powerful sector of the
British economy and by Britain's role of 'junior partner* in a
'special relationship* with the United States. Hot only wore
there many American companies operating in the North Sea win
1. I . aerial,stebolaget Amphitrite v. the kin- [l>2l] 3 - o'O.
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were likely to be affected by the Government's legislation but
their projected rates of profit were very high. For example,
by the early 1980s, Exxon was sspeoting a net cash flow,
after all British taxes, of $350 million a year from the
Brent field alone."'' Similarly, the British Petroleum Company
.Itodf*. .fcyjc * iW ' = v i ! <> jr r-k'/ -v* It
had highly profitable activities in the United States, and Senator Sole
of Kansas was quick to draw this conclusions
As I look sb the billions of barrels of American oil which
the British Petroleum Company is sitting on in Alaska, when
I consider the holdings of the Shell Oil Company in the
United States, it seems to ms that these and similar
holdings must be considered as the British programme to
nationalise the petrol contracted for by American companies
in Great Britain goes forward.
The Republican Senator was not musing idly, nor were the fears
of the British Government on this score unfounded. In early 1975»
BP's credit rating was reduced by an American bank from a triple A
to a double A when raising- a loan, and one of the reasons given
was the possibility of an increase in the state shareholding in BP.
Apparently, the company was told that if this threat were removed
3
it would return to a triple A rating.
In this context the claims frequently made by Mr. Benn and
other Labour MPs that the Conservative Pasty's opposition to changing
the licence terms was merely a defenoe of oil companies' interests
totally misses the mark. It was, as they themselves admitted, based
1. The Economist. 'Who does best out of .America's kj/i> of Borth
Sea Oil', September 2k, 1977.
2. Cit. in 891 B.C. Deb. ool.505 (April 30, 1975).
3. 891 H.C. Deb. col.535 (April 30, 1975).
on a general concern for the interests of all transnati ,nally
operating British companies and financial institutions.1
The Labour Government's decision to incorporate all the
new regulations into the Act and to hold informal consultations
with the licensees throughout 1975 provided a means of
overcoming the obstacles which the previous Government had
perhaps recognised and thought insurmountable. The consequence
was that the revision of licence terms was not done unilaterally
(other than in the most formal sense). Lengthy negotiations
between the Government and the UKOOA took place in the Department
of Energy and undoubtedly persuaded the Government to table a large
number of amendments to its proposals in Parliament, not least
the rewritten model clause on depletion rates.
In addition, the Government asked Parliament to legislate in
detail, instead of seeking from it a broad delegation of power.
The entire body of regulations, new and old, were contained in
model clauses in Schedules to the Bill, which was to be debated
at a time when the Government had considerable difficulties in
obtaining a majority. The substantial modifications to the
original proposals which resulted testify less to the success of
the Parliamentary Opposition than to the Government's desire to
produce a compromise satisfactory to the oil companies. Their
success in doing so allowed one deputy secretary at the Department
1. See, for example, remarks made in H.C. Deb. Standing- Committee
D, cols.1158-63 (July 3, 1975)I 891 H.C. Deb. cole.U;V5ll
(April 30, 1975)} 361* H.L. Deb. cols.5i*3-62 (September 25,
1975); 365 H.L. Deb. cols.1765-66 (November 11, 1975).
of Energy to announce with evident pride that most oil companies
...recognise that they are kept in touch and consulted to
a greater extent in this country by the Government than
elsewhere in the world. They know our doors are always
open.
The result was, however, much more than the modification of
certain key regulatory provisions. As a consequence of th
procedure adopted, considerable obstacles were placed in the
path of any future amendment of lioence terms. The whole of the
economic regulation of petroleum production (excluding ...... n)
is now contained in the licences, but they are treated as if shey
are •wholly similar' to private contracts, with a formal
2
specification of rights and duties. Further legislation is
therefore required before their terms can be altered. Since
there is still no re-negotiation clause, the terms of licences once
allocated can be varied only at the cost of a repetition of the
Government's action in 1975; i.e. a new Act is required. lative
to most other oil-producing states, the petroleum licensee thus
received a considerable degree of legal security in the United
Kingdom.
Finally, it should be noted that the negotiations concealed
some rather brutal economic facts. Firstly, the Government was
highly dependent upon the ability of both oil companies and
international banks to advance the additional capital required for
the development of several fields which had been recently discovered
1. John Liverraan, reported In The Sootsmsr.. 'Government's record
defended', July 27, 1976.
2. T.C. Daintith and I. Gault, 'Pacta Sunt Servanda', op.cit.,
p.1+2.
and which were known to contain recoverable reserves in
sufficient quantity as to justify their development. When
that capital did not seem to be forthcoming in 1975'» the
objective of self-sufficiency by 1980 seemed in jeopardy, and
strengthened critics' arguments that the Government's proposals
wore undermining the 'confidence* of investors. This certainly
influenced the course of the negotiations, as it may have been
intended to. Secondly, the Government's econ; raic forecasts were
highly dependent upon information supplied by the oil companies
themselves. It seems quite possible that this had a decisive
influence upon the Government's actions in 1 7^-5 • In 1975»
official estimates were that North Sea oil production would reach
20 million tons in 1976, rising to 100 million tons by 1 >73-1
However, an American publication called 'The Oil and Gas
Journal* oonducted its own study of North Sea prospects and
produced estimates which differed substantially from those of the
2
Department of Energy. According to the American figures,
production from the UK fields was expected to reach h2 million
tons by the beginning of 1977, compered with the Department's
figure of 30 million tons. The Journal's figures were based on
lengthy talks with the prinoipal oil companies involved in
production work. The Department's estimates of future production
1. Department of Energy, Development of the 11 and : - r 3erve«
of the United Kingdom (1975).
2. The following is based on a report in vh Guardiem. 1 liich
are we to believe?' July 3» 1975*
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levels were based upon information supplied by the oil companies.
At the time one writer commented that
If the companies are more optimistic than they were about
the problems being overcome and leading to a faster
flow rate, then it does oast a doubt over companies'
continuing assertions that many of the North Sea fields
will not be developed because of punitive measures by
the Government.
The Department1 s low figures may have encouraged the
Government in the view that further investment was essential if
self-sufficiency was to be reached by 1930. '"hey certainly emphasised
the continuing importance of the major oil companies and
international banks for the development of North Sea oil.
Throughout this period in which the licence terms were amended,
the Government strove to present a particular image of itself and
its actions: it was extending public control over an essential
national resource, remedying the neglect and mismanagement of
the preceding Government. This was not mere political rhetoric, but
rather the presentation of an image which fulfilled an Important
legitimating function at a time when many people regarded the legal
arrangements between state and oil companies as much too favourable
to the companies. It was also an image which made the legal
1. loc.cit.
aspects of the action seem less exceptional* However, it
had the further effeot of exaggerating the element of change
in the position of the licensees after the Government's
'remedial' action. In this chapter I have attempted to show how
little that position was affected and to explain why this was
so* In the next chapter I examine the more serious threat to
the licensees' interests presented by the Government's
attempt to secure physical possession of the fruits of the
licence: the produced oil.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Introduction of Majority State Participation
Contents:
1. The problem of legality
2. *Voluntary• negotiations.
3. The question of ownership
h- The participation agreements
5. The establishment of 3R0C
There has been too much talk of expropriation,
nationalization, confiscation, just compensation,
and the like, without considering the economic
issues. The parties are negotiating about profits,
and ownership is only the right to future profits.
1
M.A. Adelman
In this chapter I examine a second aspect of the
•crisis of legality* which arose in 197h with respect to
proprietary arrangements for North Sea oil development! the
Government's decision to introduce majority tate participation
into current (i.e. pre-197U) petroleum licences for
commercial oilfields. To what extent did majority tate
participation diminish the economic control of those companies
already holding licences?
I argue that majority 3tate participation, through the BNOC,
has had no significant effect on the dominance of American and
British oil companies in the North Sea. It does not preclude
a considerable degree of economic control being vested in the
private companies. For example, with respect to pre-197U licences,
the key powers over extraction and disposition of oil remained
in private hands, and oompany profitability was not adversely
2
affeoted. Nonetheless, the Labour Government's assertion that
it intended to substantially modify lioenoe rights created a 'crisis
of legality*: the companies holding petroleum production lioences
had assumed their licence rights would be protected and guaranteed
1. The World Petroleum Market. p.212.
2. Throughout this chapter I consider only petroleum licences
which were current at the time when majority state
participation was Introduced, i.e. those allocated before
197U.
by the tate but were confronted with a Government which had
publioly declared that it had no intention of doing so. The
focus of this chapter is upon the resolution of that crisis:
that is, the ways in which the Government obtained greater
•public control', but not at the expense of private control of
key aspects of production and distribution.
1. The Problem of Legality
Like the unilateral decision to revise the terms of production
licences, the proposal to introduce majority state participation
into existing licences in 197k was a most unusual one. The
Government had declared its intention to take a majority holding
in licences awarded on terms that anticipated no such transfer
to the tate.1 While it was incontestably the case that any
British Parliament could do this by exercising its sovereign
power, it has not been the practice of British Governments to ask
Parliament to act in such a manner, particularly with respect
2
to legal arrangements which are contractual in character. An
expectation is therefore established that the Crown will respect
its legal obligations and act 'in good faith'.^ Since the licences
were (and are) contractual in character, this attempt to take a
51% state share of the 'fruits' of the labour carried out under
1. White Paper, p.5-
2. See chapter three, s.l.
3. The influence of this idea can be seen in the justification
advanced by the Department of Trade and Industry for going
ahead with the discretionary award of licences at the time of
the fourth round in spite of the results of the auction
experiment: see chapter two, s.l*.
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these licences, raised the question of how secure other public
contracts were. Prom the Government's point of view, it was
essential to reconcile the sovereign character of its action,
an unusual one in the United Kingdom, with its claim %&■ respect
the Rule of Law, or more precisely, with its desire to
encourage further investment by private companies in offshore
oil development.
Underlying this problem of legality were specific economic
considerations. In particular, it was commonly assumed that
51% state participation meant that 51% of the future profits
from commercial fields would be transferred to the
Government.* While there was no legal barrier to such a transfer,
the Government, by dint of international law obligations, would
have to pay compensation. Such a course would have involved
payment of enormous sums to the licensees. How would the
Government find the money to make such payments?
The Government set out its proposals in a White Paper in July,
197U. To start with, it distinguished 'future' from 'existing'
licences.^ It was to be made a condition of future licences that
the licensees should, if the Government required it, grant majority
participation to the state in all fields discovered under those
1. Apparently, 'most observers were expecting participation ... to
be enacted by legislation with suitable proposals for
compensation to go along with it't Petroleum Times.
July 26, 197U at p.1+5-
2. White Paper, op.cit.
3. op.cit., p.5*
licences. Such participation would follow the 'carried interest1
pattena developed in Norway, which gives the state the option
to acquire ownership of a specified proportion of oil or
1
profits, if it meets the same proportion of costs. Since
the Government was constrained from introducing suoh new
conditions only by their possible failure to attraot bids for
new blocks, this proposal was not especially controversial! it
was their apparent intention to introduce majority ,tate participation
into •existing* licenoes for commercial fields that provoked
controversy, and raised questions of legality. However, the
choice of words here is highly significant. The Government
began by stating its belief that majority state participation
in the •existing* licences for commercial fields provided the
best means for *the nation* to benefit from the oil disooveries.
Sinoe the Government would contribute its share of costs, including
past costs, there would be no unfairness to the licensees. It
pointed out that this sort of arrangement was not unusual* it
had been adopted with the consent of the oil companies in virtually
all the major oil and gas producing states. In addition, public
sector participation via the National Coal Board and British Gas
had already worked successfully 'without injury to oil company
interests'. It oontinuedi
The Government hopes that the companies will recognize the
strength of their views on this. They want the oil
companies to continue to invest in the North Sea on
1. In the event, 'carried interest' waa dropped as a condition in
the fifth and sixth rounds, due to objections from the oil
industry. This form of state participation was, incidentally,
favoured by the then Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath!
see 871 H.C. Deb. (March 26, 197*0, col.339.
profitable terms. They will be very ready to listen
to what the companies say and consider with them
how the common interest can best be served. They are
sure the industry will want to submit their views
at the earliest possible moment and to enter into talks
on this basis. The Government will be inviting
them to do so shortly.
From this passage it is clear that the Government were
uncertain about what to do, but whatever they did, they would
only do as a result of negotiations with the companies. Any hint
of coercion by the state was avoided, and a picture of
•reasonableness' presented.
It is important to note this uncertainty on the part of
the Government if we are to understand subsequent developments.
Neglect of this has led at least one writer to assume a linear
development in the establishment of majority state participation
2
which simply was not there. Tensions and contradictions not only
characterised the process but also were not entirely resolved in
the final legal forms of state participation. At this stage there
were few definite features in the participation policy* the Government
was seeking a majority holding, and wished to obtain it through
•talks' with the oil companies. It intended to hold the interests
acquired through, a national oil company, which would eventually
participate in all stages of the production and distribution of
oil, competing with the private oil companies. The British National
Oil Corporation (HNOC) would represent the Government in the present
1. White Paper, p.5.
2. J.C. Woodliffe, op.oit. Harold Wilson has since claimed that
the Labour Party had not worked out its oil polioy before the
February Election and that it took 'four months before any dear
statement of polioy could be made'* "final Term. p.Ul.
consortia and build up a supervisory staff that would allow
it to take this active part in future offshore oil development.
After the publication of the White Paper, there ware no
positive steps taken to develop these features of majority
state participation until late November 197^• Indeed, the
Government's approach to the three branches of its new oil
policy: taxation, licence controls, and participation, suggests
some scepticism on its part about the very objective of majority
state participation. Discussions between the Government and the
oil companies about the various proposals did not begin
simultaneously. As early as September 197' » the Government had
set out the basis for its reform of taxation and licensing
controls, sending outlines of proposals to all companies with
North Sea interests.1 However, participation was left
undefined at that stage. Even by October, the Government had
not set out the basis on which it would take 51% participation.
In fact, discussions between the Government and oil companies
did not begin until late November. It might be argued that
failure to tackle all three aspects of its policy at once left
the Government with very little bargaining power over the
introduction of participation. The Government could not have been
unaware of this possibility when they ordered their priorities.
1. See The Financial Times. 'Killing industry faith in Government
fairness', September 20, 197^*
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There were several reasons for its hesitation over the Question
of participation. Firstly, a political one arising from the
probability of another General Election in the autumn. Secondly,
the oil companies made their opposition to the proposal very
clear. Finally, there was a contradiction between the
Government's desire to obtain majority state participation in
pre-197/4 licences and its wish to encourage further investment
in offshore oil development.
The taking of any firm decision on an extension of public
ownership seemed to be precluded by the likelihood of a second
General Election in 197k» In the course of the autumn ©lection
campaign, further statements were made by the Labour Party on
oil policy, contained principally in its Eleotion Manifesto.1
They stressed the key role of the North Sea oil discoveries for
2
the Government's economic programme. This made necessary a
degree of 'publio control in the interests of the whole community',
which included the taking of majority state participation in all
future oil lioences, and negotiations with holders of pre-197U
licences in commercial fields with a view to securing a majority
3
state share of their interests. The Manifesto reaffirmed Labour's
intention to establish a British National Oil Corporation through
which the Government would exercise its participation rights. It
would play an active role in the future development, exploration,
1. Labour Party General Election Manifesto, October 197U, pp.11-12.
2. loo.cit. This was merely one expression of the Labour Party's
general economic policy, whioh envisaged a greater role for the
state as a pra-requisite for economic growth and full employment.
3. op.oit., p.11} and also for the following sentenoes.
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and exploitation of offshore oil.
The second reason for delay was the opposition which
the Government encountered from the oil companies themselves
to the idea of majority state participation. Immediately
following publication of the White Paper they made their
dissatisfaction known. The first company to criticise the idea,
Shell, claimed it would slow down oil development.* Apparently
this view was shared by the National Coal Board (NCB) which also
2
had licence rights in the North Sea. BP issued a letter to
its staff stating that the official proposals seemed 'likely
to lessen confidence generally, and to reduce incentive to explore
and develop off the UK' Burmah followed a similar procedure,
setting out its opposition in a letter to its staff In addition,
the press reported the 'anxieties' of various oil company
executives.^
Their principal objection seemed to be thisi if the Government
attempted to take a majority share in lioenoes for all commercial
fields, then a olimate of 'uncertainty' would be created in which
further investment would be impossible. In other words, they would
not advance the capital necessary to develop various fields which
were known to contain large quantities of oil.
1. The Financial Times. 'Oil Companies' campaign against State
plans', July 27, 197U.
2. loc.oit. The NCB's interests were taken over by the MOO.
3. loe.oit.
U* loc.oit.
5. For example, the remarks made by the Chairman of Berry Wiggins,
one of the largest British-based oil concerns, reported in
The Financial Times. 'National Oil Company plans attacked',
September 20, 197U.
nonetheless, opposition was expressed in a discreet manner
at this stage. The letters to staff were private documents, and
were not intended as contributions to a public debate. The
companies had no wish to align themselves too closely with any
particular party when another General Election was expected in
the near future. It was only after the October Election that
opposition from the oil industry became intense.
Finally, there seemed to be a basic contradiction between
the Government*s desire to obtain a majority state share in
current licences and its claim that majority state participation
would not be incompatible with the oil companies* interests.1
If this was to be achieved, state 'ownership' would have to be
divorced from the power to extract and to dispose of the oil.
If that could be achieved, what purpose would state participation
serve, if any?
The problem was not only one of 'squaring the circle' but
of finding a means by which a solution could be reached. The solution
to the problem of procedure was anticipated in the White Paper: there
would be a series of negotiations between the Government and the
oil companies. This procedure had several advantages over
legislation: firstly, if the negotiations were voluntary in
charaoter (and successful), payment of compensation could be avoided^
secondly, it minimised the possibility of retaliatory action against
2
British companies operating abroad; thirdly, it lent support to
1. Particularly when the Government's claim was reiterated in the
uncompromising form given to it by Harold Lever in early 1975*
2. In particular from the US Government for any action damaging
the interests of the many US companies operating in the
North Sea.
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the claim that the Government was aoting 'in good faith', and
perhaps prevent a loss of further investment in oil development;
finally, it cast the state in the role of one 'party' to a
bargaining process, obscuring the fact that the subject of
53% state participation was only put on the agenda as the result
of the state's exercise of sovereign power.
For all these reasons, majority state ownership seemed best
able to be achieved through negotiations between the Government
and the licensees, represented by their operators, the oil
oompanies. However, for any of the advantages to be gained,
the negotiations had to be voluntarily entered into. This was
essential if the state was to be presented as a party to a
bargaining process, distinguished from the other parties only by
its 'possession' of sovereign power with which to bargain.
2. 'Voluntary' negotiations
While the participation proposals were not given top
priority, it would be wrong to conclude that the Government did
not consider them particularly 'sensitive'. So important were
the negotiations considered that they were taken out of the
jurisdiction of the Department of Energy and given to a negotiating
committee, specially oreated to negotiate with the licensees. The
committee consisted of Mr. Edmund Dell, representing the Treasury,
Lord Balogh, Minister of State in the Department of Energy, and was
chaired by Mr. Harold Lever, a non-departmental Cabinet Minister,*
1. His title was that of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
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who was obliged to report to Mr. Varley, the Energy Secretary.1
All these men had. considerable knowledge of North Sea
developments. Both Mr. Dell and Mr. Lever had been members
of the Public Accounts Committee in 1973 when it produced
its controversial report on North Sea oil and gas, which
severely criticised the policies of successive British
2
Governments. Lord Balogh had also been a critic of past
Government policies, having voiced his criticisms as ®&rly as
1971.3
A series of 'talks' with the oil companies on participation
was begun in late November, 197U. A letter was sent to all
licensee companies in oilfields bo far declared commercial,
inviting them to enter into negotiations.^ However, it was
couched in the most general form of an invitation only, and did
not therefore suggest that the Government had any detailed conception
of state participation to discuss. It merely wished to ascertain
the views of licensees on its proposals. The majority of licensees
replied to the invitation, a fact which the Secretary of State
interpreted to mean that 'most of them axe seriously considering
5
the question of participation'.
1. Apparently, some of the later talks took place with separate
members of the negotiating team, and even with senior officials
of the Department of Energy: see The Financial Times. ♦Seeking
one industry voice on PUT*, January 10, 1975*
2. See chapter two, s.t*.
3. loc.cit.
I*. 882 E.G. Deb., cols.lU-15 (November 25, 197U).
5. loc.cit., at col.15.
Since majority state participation would have different
effects according to a field's peculiar characteristics, the
negotiating team met the oil companies individually and not
in groups." In these negotiations with the Government as in
the others, each lioensee was represented by its operator,
always an oil company and usually one of the 'majors'. While
the licensee and -the operator may be one and the same, the
norm in the North Sea is for licences to be held by consortia,
2
participating in joint venture arrangements. It is the
operator then, who assumes the responsibility of seeing that the
work of extraction is done, and who usually represents the
consortium in any major negotiations with the Government.
The first companies to 'talk' with the negotiating team
were those oil companies with the largest interests in the North Seat
BP, Shell, and Esso. These talks were held on November 28th and
29th, and, like all the talks, and the subsequent negotiations,
3
they took plaoe in private. The choice of these companies to
head the list was hardly surprising, since together they controlled
the greatest share of oil reserves yet found in the North Sea.
However, the choice of the Gulf Oil Company to follow them was
less obvious, since Gulf was not even an operator in its
partnership with Conoco and the NCB. Its choice as the first of
1>. The Financial Times. 'Seeking one industry voice on FftT', January 10,
1975.
2. For an explanation of this, see chapter one, and also chapter two,
s.3»
3- The Financial Times. 'Participation! getting down to the nitty-
gritty at last', November 29, 197U* The next few paragraphs draw
on the account given in this article. The fact that the talks
were held in private did not prevent the appearance of apparently
well-informed reports in the press, especially in The Financial TimeB.
the remaining companies may have been determined by its vocal
opposition to the Government's proposals, and its threats
to withdraw completely from the North Sea."^
It is important to stress the preliminary character of
these talks between the oil companies and the negotiating
committee. They were designed to highlight the main problems
before serious negotiations actually began. They did not
represent a willingness on the part of the companies to
negotiate about majority state participation in existing
licences, still less their acceptance of it in principle.
Indeed, Shell and Esso proved highly resistant to the
proposal until mid-1976.
The obstacles to an agreement were now clearly visible,
and they were considerable. Firstly, it was not at aLl clear
what participation was specifically designed to achieve.
Mr. Lever had enunciated a 'no loss, no gain' principle, whereby
acceptance of a majority state share would leave the companies'
profitability from oil production unchanged. In other words,
profits would still be the same under i*9$ private control as they
would have been under 100$ control by the oil companies of produced
oil. In addition, the Government assured the oil companies that
they would be able to buy back the state's share of crude oil output
2
for 'several years'. This made 'majority state participation'
1. This is suggested in the above article.
2. 'Seeking one industry voice on PET', op.cit.
a largely oosmetic exeroise from the outset. However, Mr. Lever
proudly declared that he did not even know what form that
cosmetic exercise would take J"1" Secondly, the manner in which
the Government proposed to obtain majority state participation -
through 'voluntary' negotiations - seemed to contradict the
objective implied by majority participation on any definition.
After all, why should licensees voluntarily surrender the largest
share of profitable fields? Even if the Government were to offer
massive compensation payments in return for a 51% controlling
interest in their licences, some companies might simply not be
interested. One oil executive, the chairman of Exxon, re arked
that, if negotiations were voluntary, his company were not
2
volunteering.
The choice of method, voluntary negotiations instead of
legislation, is easy enough to explain. Negotiations on a
voluntary basis presented a picture of fairness and avoided any
hint of nationalisation. This was important for two reasons: firstly,
it reduced the possibility of a confrontation with the United States,
whose companies constituted the majority of foreign companies
operating on the UK Continental Shelf; secondly, it reduced the
risk of repercussions against BP, at that time Ub% owned by the
Government, and with important interests in the already volatile
Middle East.^ Nonetheless, there was a constant tension between the
1. loc.olt. It was up to the oil companies to make suggestions.
2. Clifton Garvin, reported in The Times. February 3, 1976t 'Exxon
chairman says group not volunteering for state participation'.
3. Cf. Bam, op.cit., pp.106-7.
Government's claim that its acquisition of a majority state share
in current licences would result from negotiations, and the
language of sovereign power sometimes used by its spokesmen.
For example, Mr. Bern commented on the Government's
'determination' to acquire a majority stake, provoking such
an uproar among his fellow MPs that an assurance was
hurriedly given by the Government that the negotiations were
indeed still 'voluntary' As I shall show in the next section,
a small element of coercion was, however, not excluded from
the Government's means of persuasion.
Once the Government had decided to eschew compulsion and
proceed by means of voluntary negotiation, it could only secure
a majority stake in the lioences by making a highly attractive
offer to the companies. The negotiations over the next two
years are the history of their attempts to do this. The only
means of persuasion the Government had at its disposal were:
(l) use of regulatory controls over assignments (a company oould
only sell its interest in a licence if it agreed to a majority
state share); (2) bribery, by offering favourable treatment in
the next round of licensing. Unfortunately, the most promising
areas of the North Sea had already been licensed and unlicensed
blocks were not likely to prove sufficiently attractive to
companies to encourage them to surrender a 51% share in thsir
1. 905 H.C. (Oral Answer) (February 16, 1976), at col.921. He
said: 'We have made it clear in the participation which we
are determined to get with all the oil companies in the
North Sea', but was interrupted before he oould finish the
sentence.
proven reserves} (3) provision of guarantees for
borrowing.
After these talks were completed in early January, the
Government awaited a response from the oil companies. In so
far as any response was forthcoming in 1975 it was not
favourable. Both Shell and Esso, who together controlled
about one half of the fields under development, refused to
participate in any further negotiations until mid-1976. Other
companies did enter into further discussions but no progress
was made, in spite of the reiteration of the 'no loss, no gain'
principle by Mr. Lever. Government spokesmen went to great
lengths to reassure the companies, especially at the time of
the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill's passage through
Parliament. For example, Lord Balogh insisted in July that
... participation is not the same as nationalisation. I
cannot stress that too oftens it is participation (sicl).
I repeat that participation is a means of partnership
between the Government and the oil companies. Our objective
is to obtain by negotiation 51% participation in commercial
fields regulated by current lioenoes.
Indeed, under Mr. Lever's tutelage, the language of
'partnership* quickly substituted itself for the language of
state power so evident in the first Manifesto of February 197^«
An interesting feature of these early discussions was the
differenoe in style between American and British oil companies.
The first American negotiators were described by a former
2
Department of Energy official as 'the mirrors and beads boys',
1. 363 H.L. Deb. (July 23, 1975) at ool.330.
2. Seminar 0n the negotiation of participation agreements between
BNOC and the private oil companies, held at the Centre for
Petroleum and Mineral Studies at the University of Dundee,
April, 1979.
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which says a great deal about their attitude to the Government's
demands.
In general, the American response was noisier and more
aggressive. Crude threats were made as well sis apocalyptic
forecasts of the effects of the participation policy. For
example, the chairman of Allied Chemicals, a former Secretary
of Commerce in the US Government, warned the British
Government that it risked losing hundreds of millions of
dollars of American investment if it persisted with its
participation policy in its present form."'" For the Government
... to come in at a late stage and apply this policy to
successful oilfields raises some question as to how
much investment we can put into chemicals and petrochemicals
in the future.
This bullish approach received little support from the
American Government which was more concerned with the apparently
weak state of British oapitalism as a whole. Reports of imminent
collapse appeared regularly in the Amerioan press at that time.
By the end of 1975 the negotiating committee was still not
able to report any significant success in its attempts to secure
majority state participation by voluntary negotiation with licensee
companies. Seven months after preliminary talks had begun,
Mr. Lever announced that four oil companies had agreed in principle
1. Allied Chemicals has interests in the Claymore and the Piper
fields. The chairman, Mr. Connor, was a member of a delegation
of US businessmen invited by Mr. Healey to look at the
•British economy' at first hand, in an attempt to counter
highly pessimistic reports then current in the United States:
see report in The Scotsman. September 22, 1975s 'US North
Sea oil warning'.
2. loo.cit.; see also The Financial Times. September 26, 197i... 'What
the presidents saw'. According to this report, the delegation
of American businessmen of which Mr. Connor was a member was
unanimous in condemning the Government's policy on state
participation.
215.
to 51% state participation in their North Sea oilfields.^
However, the companies ooraoerned, Burmah, Deainex, Tricentrol,
and Blackfriars Oil, were all xainor ones and were vulnerable
to Government pressures because of their financial difficulties.
So far as the other oompanies were concerned, it was merely
stated that •constructive discussions' were taking place with
a large number of companies, representing half the interests
2
in the North Sea. However, by December, only another four-
small companies had reached agreement in principle with the
Government.
It was not until the banks raised questions about title to
the oil in the course of negotiations with the Department of
Energy that the Government glimpsed a way of obtaining its
51% stake in commercial oilfields without damaging the interests
of the private companies conoerned.
3. The Question of Ownership
Before the Labour Government expressed an interest in th8
ownership and control of North Sea oil, the banks had already
identified this as a key problem, albeit for rather different
reasons.
The large sums involved in developing oilfields in the
North Sea led many oompanies to seek funds from the banks. This
did not apply to the majors who financed field development
from their own funds but it did involve a number of other large
1. 89b H.C. (Oral Answer^ (June 25, 197S)» col.^5. BP was also
reported to be nearing acceptance.
2. loc.oit.
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companies to such an extent that, by May 1977* the banks had
provided about £5 billion for the development of North Sea
oilfields.1 Before lending such large sums they looked very
carefully at the security for their loans. They had to ensure
that in case of failure they could control the extraction of
oil. Any such arrangement had to be cleared with the Department
of Energy which had ultimate discretion over the tenure of
petroleum licences.
When the banks first looked at the question of security they
discovered one oardirial fact about oil resources in the United
Kingdom: the state owned the asset on which finance was to be
secured. In this respect the UK environment differs from the
United States, where most of the oil (at least until the
Proudhoe Bay discoveries) was to be found on private land, and
where operators had a right to the oil in the ground, usually
through a leasing arrangement. Since the banks concerned were
either big American banks like Chase Manhattan, Morgan Guaranty,
Citibank and Texas banks or British banks like Barclays entering
into oil financing for the first time, the American experience in
oil financing provided the prism through which the banks viewed
North Sea development. The -ate'a ownership of oil thus presented
a problem, albeit one which was quickly resolved.
It was quickly appreciated that ownership of the oil in the
ground is of no value unless it is oapable of being extracted and
1. The Banker. May 1977* 'Financing takes new forms', p.75*
marketed and the owner or license® has the right to do so. As
one lawyer commented in a seminar specially concerned with
this question,
It is this right to extract and market the oil on a
continuing basis which lies at the heart of the question
of security, and not any question of title to it as it
lies in the ground.
Apparently, the constitution of a security would be simple
were the borrower the sole licensee. The fact that the borrower
would in most oases be one of several joint licensees complicated
matters. How the bankers and their hired lawyers resolved
questions of security need not concern us here. It is sufficient
to note that they drew the attention of the participation
negotiators to one salient feature of North Sea oil
developmentt the Operating Agreement and its consequences.
When a licence is granted to a consortium, the licensees
collectively have the right to extract oil from the licensed
area. It is their custom to make a separate agreement, called
an Operating Agreement, which will specify their respective
shares, the manner in which the licensed area will be exploited
and the maimer Ax which each licensee will be entitled to appropriate
to himself Ma own share of the oil once produced. The
important point here is that, until the point of appropriation, the
borrower has no separate title to the oil, but only an undivided
interest in common with his co-licensees. One of the licensees
1. G.D.M. Willoughhy, 'Legal Problems in Financing North Sea Oil
with Special Heference to Problems of Creating Security',
p.U (paper presented at Law Society Conference on 'North Sea
Oil and the Law', held at Worcester College, Oxford,
September 1975)•
with experience in oil extraction will be appointed the
Operator and will carry out the actual operations; the other
licensees and especially those with minority interests may,
at least in the production stage, have little or nothing to do
other than to take their oil at the shore terminal and sell it.
Therefore, in the case of one of several licensees the right to
appropriate, exercisable by himself, assumes a greater
significance than the right to extract, which is exercisable
only jointly with the others. Mr. Willoughby identifies this
as the key right from the 'lender's point of view'.1 The
Department of Energy negotiators identified it as a key right
also, but for very different reasons.
The right to appropriate implied a passive participation by
the holder and so suited the embryonic national oil corporation
with its small staff. Securing such a right to appropriate $1%
of the produced oil, on the condition that BNOC would pay for
it at market prices, would 'ensure a title for the British people
2
to the oil iself', but would not affect the beneficial interests
of existing licensees, nor the actual process of extraction, nor
would it incur any additional expenditure since the original
licensees would continue to be responsible for payment of all
capital «a»t-operating costs, royalties and taxes. BHOC was to
hold the Government's share and would become a co-licensee togetherlicence
with existing licensees in every IIck comprising a commercial oilfield.
1. op.cit., p.!;.
2. That is, to produced oili see Lever 886 H.C. (Oral Answer)
(February 19, 1975), at col.1339.
Such a prooedure has in fact been quite common in the North
Sea operations of American oil companies. These companies
have often held their licences in a separate company
registered in the UK. However, in order to retain certain
tax advantages for the parent company, the licensee assigned
the benefits of the licence to an American affiliate, subject
to the latter company assuming all the oosts and obligations
as well.*
This last feature supplemented the 'no loss, no gain'
principle, and, together with a presence for BNOC on the various
operating oommittees, made the British form of state participation
unique in the world. In particular, the idea that companies would
be no worse nor better off as a result of state participation
1. Changes in US tax law have made this arrangement less
important in recent years. Previously, the US tax laws
dictated that for optimum tax treatment all costs had to
be incurred by a company incorporated in the USA. Since
the Petroleum (Production) Begulations in the UK stipulated
(until 1976) that applicants for licences on the UK
Continental Shelf had to be persons who were citizens of the
UK and colonies resident in the UK or companies incorporated
in the UK, there was a potential conflict. The solution
adopted involved the use of 'Illustrative Agreements':
agreements between a lioence-holding UK subsidiary of a US
parent company and an affiliate of that company incorporated
in the US, but operating through a branch in the OK. It
provides that while the UK subsidiary shall remain the
licensee for all purposes, the US affiliate shall put up all
the funds and equipment for exploration, development and
production, and that in consideration for this any petroleum
won and saved shall be owned by the US affiliate. The
economic interest in the licence is thus 'passed through' from
the UK subsidiary to the US affiliate. It is similar to the
roles of trustee and beneficiary, with the UK company holding
the bare legal title and the US affiliate owning the beneficial
interest under the licence. Cf. Adrian D.G. Hill, 'Joint
Operating Agreements', paper ll* in Proceedings, vol.1, op.cit.,
esp. at pp.17-18.
... embodies the essential difference with Government
participation as it has been implemented in OPEC
countries, where the host Governments took a^major
financial stake in existing oil concessions.
Once the goal of participation had been redefined as
'a formal assignment of the lioenoe by the companies to
2
themselves and BNOC jointly*, giving BNOC a right to appropriate
51% of the produced oil at market prices, the Government expected
agreements to be reached with the major oil companies in the
near future. As 1 show in the next section, this did indeed
happen. Nonetheless, there was little the Government could
have done to foroe them to conclude agreements.
The use of state power was not entirely absent from the
negotiations however. Several of the smaller oil companies
found themselves in financial difficulties in 1975 <md required
additional finance to cover their share of development costs.
One means by which this oould be done was a 'farm-out' arrangement,
which involves assigning an outside party a share in a licence
in return for providing development capital. Since all such
assignments required approval by the Department of Energy, the
Government was given an opportunity to insist on participation.
For example, a small British company, Berry Wiggins, assigned one
half of its 23£i£ share of a lioenoe for several unexplored blocks
to Consolidated Gold Fields in return for the latter company's
undertaking to meet some of the exploration costs. However,
1. Robert D. Vock, 'Government Participation UK Stylet Some Legal
Aspects', in Proceedings, op.eit., vol.1, Paper 18, at p.2.
2. Dr. Dickson Mabon's wozda from the second reading stage of the
Participation Agreements Billt 939 H.C. Deb. (November 18,
1977) 00I.98I.
Departmental approval was conditional on acceptance by both
companies of the principle of majority state participation
in the event of a future commercial discovery.*"
Other small companies were led to accept the principle
of state participation by their need for Government guarantees
to raise capital to cover their share of the cost of field
developmentt in Tricentrol's case, its share in the cost of
developing the Thistle field (£280m.); in Burmah's case, acceptance
of the principle was one of the conditions for the Bank of
England's intervention to save the company from liquidation.
However, the exploitation could work both ways. Companies
experiencing financial difficulties could use participation as
a means of obtaining capital from the Government or guarantees
which would then allow them to borrow privately. The state's
role in the Thistle field development shows a facilitative rather
than a coercive role. As early as autumn 197k t two companies
in the consortium, Tricentrol and United Canso, discovered that
they lacked the corporate assets necessary to raise funds for
the development of Thistle on theL r own credit. The Government
resolved this firstly by providing 'holding* guarantees to the
other partners; in other words, it stated that it would meet
their share of expenditure if necessary. Secondly, the Department
of Energy provided a £38-3®» loan guarantee to support
Tricentrol's share of the development cost in exchange for a broad
1. Dam, Oil Resources, pp.116-118.
participation agreement. Had the state not intervened in this
way, the development programme for this field would almost
certainly not have gone ahead as rapidly as it did.
The only time when the Government seems to have
considered the extensive use of state power in its negotiations
was in early 1975* At a Press conference in New York,
Mr. Lever claimed that failure to reach widespread agreement
to the proposed $1% state participation "by voluntary means,
could force the Cabinet to consider using statutory powers to
reach this goal.However, this •threat' was clarified in the
House of Commons very soon afterwards. Mr. Lever insisted he
had made it •absolutely plain' to the oil companies that the
Government would •sorupulously honour all their contractual
2
and commercial obligations'. He had no statutory powers to
compel them if they decided not to participate on the terms
outlined. If they did not wish to participate, he added,
... the Cabinet might feel obliged to nationalise that
proportion of the lioenoes that it thought right
to nationalise ...
with compensation, of course. Indeed, the companies' present
assets and future profits were treated with considerable respect
in these negotiations at all times. In reply to criticisms from
the Left of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the chief negotiator
declared that if they wished the negotiations to result in
1. The Financial Times. 'Lever warns US groups over North
Sea oil', February 5, 1975*
2. 886 B.C. Deb. (Oral Answer) (February 19, 1975) cols.l3U0-l.
3. loc.cit.
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acquiring 'the right to compel companies to sell their assets
at below cost', then they had the wrong negotiator.*
In so far as the Government eschewed the use of political
power in the participation negotiations, the appearance of
a bargaining process between two 'parties' could be maintained,
in spite of the gross differences in their respective economic
power and, more importantly, in spite of the intention of the
negotiating team, the Government, the Treasury and the Department
of Energy (i.e. the state) to re-define its own goal in a manner
acceptable to the other parties.
U. The Participation Agreements
The ideological significance of majority state participation
was never in doubt. Success was a prerequisite to legitimating
the relationship between the British state and the international
oil industry in the face of a soeptical public. Mr. Lever emphasised
that agreements on participation would enable the Government
... to convince the British people that there is now a
visible form of partnership with the oil companies which
is fair to both parties.
The existing arrangements were not being re-negotiated in such a
way that companies would lose financially, nor was the Government
intending to make any compensation payments for negotiation. What
1. 90U H.G. Deb. (Oral Answer) (February 2, 1976) cols.959-961.
2. In a speech delivered at the Institute of Petroleum's Annual
Dinner, reported in the Petroleum Review. March 1976. He also
said that the Government sought 'closer partnership with the
oil companies' (loc.oit.). This theme of partnership was
repeated by Mr. John Smith, Minister of State at the Department
of Energy in a speech made to the UK Offshore Operators'
Association on March 30, 1976 (my copy).
the companies were being offered, according to Mr. Lever, were
agreements which legitimated their economic activities.*
Nonetheless, the oil companies were in no hurry to secure
this legitimation, and negotiations continued from 1975 to
1977» making it the biggest exercise in commercial negotiations
ever undertaken by a British Government, and a remarkable example
of government by agreement.
Hie first agreements to be announced were with the Continental
Oil Company (Conoco) and the Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) on
2
February 26, 1976. The arrangements affected three oilfields,
Thistle, Dunlin, and Statfjord, in which the state already had
a share through the NCB. That share was thereby increased from
one third to 51% • Although much of the detail remained secret,
the broad outlines were made public. They indicated that the
BNOC was not to acquire a 51% equity interest in any of the
fields under development, but would increase the one third share
it had held from January 1, 1976 when the NCB's interest was
transferred to it, to J>1%. The BNOC would have the option to
acquire and to market the crude oil from $1% of the production to
which it had title. As for the companies they retained their
33 % working interests their working obligations, and beneficial
interests remained the same, and all three parties had to agree
on major decisions. For the first three years after these fields
1. loc.cit.
2. 906 H.C. (Written Answer) (February 26, 1976) col.301.
■began commercial production, the two private compariie had
the right to all the output} subsequently, the BNOC could
exercise an option to acquire $1% of the output, rising to
57/o after five years. Once the BNOC decided to take its
share of the oil, it would have to pay the companies the
full market price to ensure that they incur no financial loss.
Significantly, in the light of the state's 'fiscal crisis',
the MOC was not to make any additional contribution to costs.
The private companies would continue to be responsible for
capital and operating costs arising from the interest
assigned to MOC.
The Government stressed that these arrangements were not a
•blue print for future agreements'^" and Mr. Lever added that
There is no signle standard participation model, because
circumstances vary from case to case.
Nonetheless, the seven subsequent agreements signed in 1976 involving
thirteen companies, contained similar features.
After the earlier announcements about acceptance of state
participation in prinoiple by small or financially weak companies,
the first agreements to be actually signed came as a surprise,
since they involved two of the largest companies in the North Sea
and ones which were American-owned. Given the important role of
specifically American interests in North Sea development, and
their apparent anxieties over state participation, the fact that





The conclusion was quickly drawn by some observers
that this arrangement did not remotely resemble the kind of
dramatic state control originally expected. Andrew Shcnfield,
the economist, claimed that
What the Government has secured, through the British
national Oil Corporation, is not OWNERSHIP in any
sense that the word is generally understoci: that is,
the power to dispose of the asset as the owner sees fit,
and an absolute right to all the profits from it. It
has been satisfied, indeed, to establish a privileged
position as a B0YE3R of North Sea oil: it has obtained
a first option to purchase 51% of the oil output. And
it has got that by guaranteeing to the companies that
they will not be worse off by selling the oil to it
rather than to anyone else: that is, that they will be
paid the market price for It.
A leading firm of stockbrokers went further and claimed that
this sort of agreement on majority state participation had shown
the term 'participation' to be 'somewhat of a iaisnomer': the
2
agreements could be better defined as 'option deals'. Neither
of the essential elements of participation: a Government option
to buy 51% of production at market price, and Government
representation in operating committees, would affect the profit
interests of the companies concerned. Indeed, another firm of
stockbrokers thought so little of the participation agreements
that, since profitability was not affected, they did not bother
to show the Government as having an interest in those blocks
1. The Listener. March 18, 1976: 'Enfeebled Government'. He
thought the securing of places for Government representatives
on the operating boards made no great difference to this
conclusion.
2. Wood, Mackenzie & Co., A Summary of UK/Norwegian Offshore
Events of 1976. p.2.
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where participation had been conceded 'in principle* or
otherwise in their diagrams."*" Professor Dam concluded that
'the White Paper promise of participation was carried out in
2
form rather than substance'.
One important matter was left unsettled after these
agreements s what control would MOO have over the day-to-day
operation of the fields in which it had a majority stake? In
these cases, BNOC already had a seat on the operating committee
(which u&kes all the vital decisions about the manner in which
a field is to be developed) through the former KGB holdings
and the negotiating team had agreed not to seek a bigger vote
in decision-making than it already had (although, since all
major decisions had to be decided unanimously, a greater voting-
power would not have made any significant difference). However,
other companies might be expected to resist any attempt to give
BNOC *a voice and a vote* on the operating committees, and hence
the ability to influence the way in which a field should be
developed. Indeed, one interpretation of the 'no loss, no gain'
principle was that BNOC would have the greatest voting power on
the operating committeest a view encouraged by the Government's
publicly stated determination to obtain a seat on the operating
committees as well as options to the oil.
The formula set out in these agreements was intended to solve
the 'participation problem'. At this stage there was growing concern
1. Bcrymgeour .Research, The North Sea Oil and Gas Review. 1976,
p.9.
2. Oil Resources, p.123.
over the development of several North Sea fields. The investment
hiatus which I discussed in chapter three had not yet ended
and several fields had reached the development stage, requiring
the injection of very large sums of capital. These sums would not
be forthcoming unless the international banks and the larger
oil companies were 'confident' that their investments would
be secure. The real test of this participation formula was
whether it would lead to the massive investment required to
develop those fields.
Several more participation agreements were reached in the
following months (for example, with Tricentrol in March), but it
was not until July that the Department of Energy reached its
first agreement with an oil major! the British Petroleum Company.
Although an acceptance of majority state participation in
principle was made by HP as early as April 1975» a preliminary
agreement with the Government and BNOC was not concluded until
July, 1976, and a final agreement only reached in June 1977* The
negotiations were not only lengthy but were punctuated by reports
of difficulties and disagreements.
In 1975» HP had agreed to enter into discussions with the
Government with a view to agreeing on terms for participation
1
in BP's North Sea oil holdings* However, problems arose §&:■
working out the details of the 'no financial loss' assurance, and
1. 891 H.C. Deb. (April 30, 1975) col.1*88.
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BP sought guarantees over the way in which the Government would
exercise its controlling share. PreBs reports suggested that
negotiations had proved difficult, and Sir Eric Brake commentedJ
We have been having a continual but rather desultory
exchange with the Government.
One of the main obstacles was BP's insistence upon a premium
price in compensation for the loss of security of oil supplies
to its large refining, marketing and chemical activities. While
the final agreement did not include such a premium there was a
compromise which left the company with jurisdiction over a large
part of its crude oil.
The preliminary agreement or Memorandum of Principles concluded
2
in July had three main features:
(1) the Government, through BNOC, would have the option to
buy 5l% of BP's crude oil from the beginning of 1977*
This was to be a book-keeping arrangement for the first two
years. BNOC would sell all the oil taken up back to BP at the same
market price.
(2) BP undertook to train several of BNOC's staff in 'downstream'
activities (that is, refining and marketing).
This provision distinguished the BP agreement from the others
reached at that stage, but there was not to be any direct involvement
1. Reported in The Financial Times. November 11, 1975* 'Burmaht
"State control unlikely"*. Pessimistio reports appeared in
The Times (e.g. February 26, 1976: 'Gulf agrees to North Sea
share for state'} March 12, 1976: 'Uncertainty over terms
slows Forties takeover*; and March 26, 1976: 'Lengthy talks
bring success'. In the former report it was claimed that
negotiation of a detailed pact with BNOC had 'run into difficulties
arising from deeply held objections to the scheme in the upper
echelons of the company'.) Indeed, shortly after Mir. Varley
had announced to the House of Commons that BP was prepared to enter
into discussions (see footnote 1 p.228 ) the chairman publicly
denied that any agreement in principle had yet been made: The
Guardian. May 2, 1975* 'BP says handover not agreed yet'.
by BNOC in refining and marketing for at least five years. The
daily management and the development of the oilfields would
remain under private control.
(3) BNOC would have a non-voting presence at BP's main
refining and marketing meetings. This would give it an insight
into North Sea operations.
To some extent the success of this agreement was undermined
by the fact that the Government had a majority shareholding in
BP. Suggestions of 'arm-twisting* were common, and were given an
impetus by the transfer of 21.0$ of BP shares from the Burm&h Oil
Company to the Bank of England in 1975- According to one report,
BP refuted suggestions that the possible dispersal of the
Bank of England shares has been used as a negotiating
point in talks about North Sea participation. Nevertheless,
it is understood that the two issues have become related,
to some extent.
The ambiguous legal status of BP partly undermined the impact
of this agreement on the remaining companies which had expressed
resistance to the idea. Itae success of the Government's
redefinition of 'majority state participation' would ultimately be
measured by its acceptance by these companies, and by Shell and
Esso in particular. The two companies operated jointly in four
of the fields which were at that time commercialt Auk, Cormorant,
Brent and Dunlin. The Brent field was the biggest field yet
discovered in the North Sea with two billion barrels of recoverable
1. The Financial Times. November 2$, 1975* 'Burmah: 'State control
unlikely"•.
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oil reserves. Together Shell and Esso were the biggest
operators in the North Sea with an estimated investment of
£l*,$00m. in the North Sea by the end of 1980.
However, in December 1976 both companies accepted a
version of the 'option to buy' offer, when it was supplemented
by an assurance that the oil would be sold bank to the companies
for use in their refineries. In return, the Government secured
a right of supervision over the whole of each consortium's oil
flows, and not merely $1%. BNOC would have access to just over
of the total oil production by 1980.
As a prelude to a legally binding agreement, Memoranda
2
of Principles were agreed between the parties. They had the
following features1 BNOC would be a joint licence holder with
Shell and Esso in all present and future 'commercial' oilfields
found under existing licences; the corporationvould have the
right to partioipate in the decision-making process for field
development: it would he represented on the operating committees
and could vote on decisions, but oould not veto them; BNOC staff
would receive training in crude oil supply, transportation and
refining operations.
The key feature was the Government's promise to sell the oil
back to the companies if they needed it to meet demand in the
British market. Since the two companies would certainly need the
1. The Scotsman. January 18, 1978: 'Largest single investment in
North Sea oil *.
2. See the Department of Energy, Participation Arrangement-between
Her Majesty's Government, the British National Oil Corporation
and Esbo Petroleum Co. Ltd.'3 Memorandum of Principles,
January $, 1977* (Each memorandum was virtually identical.)
These principles were embodied in participation agreements
concluded on November 21, 1977* J»e Department of Energy,
Shell/EsBo: Participation Agreements: November 21, 1977.
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oil to feed their large refining and marketing operations in
Britain, the Government's control was likely to be very
temporary indeed. In addition, a number of other features
suggested that this form of agreement had the character of
a planning agreementi for example, the companies were to
inform the epartment of Energy of production levels, refinery
throughput and output, pricing policies and investment plans.1
The success of Shell and Esso in protecting their interests
had been considerable. While the Government did obtain certain
rights over their oilfields, the precise value of these rights was
not easy to ascertain, given the duties also imposed upon it
with respect to the exercise of those rights. From the outset,
the companies had assumed an unoompromising stance in their
negotiations with the Government. After an initial refusal to
volunteer for any negotiations at all, they only began to do so
when it had become clear that the Government had modified its offer.
The agreements were only concluded after six months of hard
bargaining during which they refused to compromise on their
principal objective! to retain oontrol over all the oil they
expected to produce from UK offshore fields, which they planned
to use as feedsi@©k for their large refining and marketing operations.
Without an assurance that they would retain such control, it would
have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reach a
voluntary agreement on participation.
The oil companies were far from reserved in their reaction
to the arrangement. The ohief executive of Shell's UK subsidiary
sent a message to the company's 16,000 employees explaining how the
1. Summary, op.cit.
new concept of participation plus the assurance that companies
would be no worse off financially gave full protection to
the interests of both employees and shareholders.'1' In it,
he olaimed that this modification of the original concept,
was due to the company's strong opposition to the Government's
attempt to buy a 51% controlling interest in their North Sea
assets. Interestingly, the company cha man was reported as
saying that the publio relations aspect of participation was
one of the most cogent reasons for accepting the deal in
2
principle. He also expressed support for a greater exchange
of information between oil companies and the Government. The
protection of company interests by this participation agreement
3
was a theme echoed by the chairman of Esso Petroleum.
Further agreements followed swif J.y. American oil oompanies
like Texaco and Mobil, which had proved so fierce in their
opposition to participation, reached agreement with the
Government negotiators shortly afterwards.^ These agreements
were modelled on those reaohed between Shell, Esso and the
Government. Like Shell and Esso, both Mobil and Texaco had large
1. The Finanolal Times. January 6, 1977* 'Shell and Esso win right
to sell North Sea oil'.
2. loc.cit.
3. loc.oit.
U. 92^ H.C. Deb. (January 25, 1977) col.503 (Texaco); 92i* H.C. Deb.
(January 25, 1977) col.50l* (Mobil). An agreement with Chevron,
another US major, was reached at about the same time as the
one with Shell and Esso: 923 H.C. Deb. (December 21, 1976)
col.123.
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refining and marketing operations in the TJK, but the agreements
assured them that their North Sea oil supplies would be available
for their refineries! they could buy back from BNOC as much
participation crude oil as they could prove was necessary to
support their UK refinery operations.
While there were minor differences in the various
agreements1 they all articulated the 'option to buy'
principle, and gave BNOC the right to information and a power
to vote on, but not veto, the making of decisions.
In retrospect, the decisive stage in introducing majority
state participation occurred in early 1976 when the definition
of such participation as little more than an 'option to buy'
agreement was enunciated. Of course, protracted negotiations
did take place after the Gulf/^onoco agreement, but these were
largely about the particular form that participation would take
with respect to the very diverse interests of the companies
conoerned. Companies like Gulf and Conoco which did not have the
substantial 'downstream' operations of Easo and Shell found it
relatively easy to reach a participation agreement in the 'option
to buy* form. The sale-back provision in the Shell/Esso agreements
has to be seen in this light rather than as an example of the
power of 'big multinationals' over a 'weak' Government.
1. For example, where agreements were signed with oil companies wishing
to start up refining operations in Britain in the future, like
Aaaerada Hess and Texas Eastern, the BNOC gave an undertaking to sell
them back enough oil for their refineries in the UK. This was
hardly an inconvenience since the companies would probably wish to
utilise their newly-built capacity in the UK for this very purpose.
Since consumption of oil in Britain is very high, a requirement
to refine lagge quantities of crude oil there was hardly an
imposition! much oil would be sold as a matter of course to their
UK marketing subsidiaries. Nonetheless, the companies did lose the
ability to sell any surplus oil on the 'spot' market where they
might have obtained a premium on the current market price.
Two other developments lend support to this viewt firstly,
the changes in the personnel of the negotiating team and secondly,
the end of the investment hiatus in 1976» Shortly after the
first participation agreements were concluded, Mr. Tony Benn
replaced Harold Lever as head of the ministerial negotiating team.
The main lines on which participation would he negotiated were
by this time well established. Other changes at this time included
the replacement of Mr. John Smith by Dr. Dickson Mabon as
Minister of State at the Department of Energy. Mr. Smith had had
the responsibility of 'steering* the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipe-Lines Act through its parliamentary stages. Another member
of the negotiating team, Mr. Edmund Dell, who had been a
principal member of the Public Accounts Committee when it investigated
North Sea developments, was replaced by Mr. Joel Barnett, Chief
Secretary to the Treasury. Finally, Lord iearton became a member
of the negotiating team.
These changes also reflected the growing control of the
Department of Energy over the negotiations. Once the contradiotions
were removed from the Government policy, negotiating participation
became more and more an administrative, as distinct from a
political, matter. The bureaucratic mentality defined an 'active'
role for the state in terms of the acquisition of information and
expertise, and so long as this did not require the expenditure of
massive sums of capital, it was an objective that oould be
pursued without fear of intervention by the oompetitor arm of
the bureaucracy, the Treasury.1
1. Hie Treasury had made it clear at an early stage that it was
strongly opposed to providing cash for an equity stake in
commercial oilfields, and indeed it wanted to minimise its
share of development costs* see 'State oil deal by Christmas'
in The Sunday Times. November 23, 1975 •
Secondly, the investment hiatus came to an end in 1976
with several major investments. The Government had provided
sufficient assurances on its policies, including majority
state participation, to encourage companies and hanks to invest
capital in field development. For example, the Occidental
Group and Thomson Scottish Associates raised about £l5$m. to
finance their share of the Claymore field in February. The
ohief executive of the International Energy Bank, which
organised the financing with the Republican Rational Bank of
Dallas, claimed that international ba%s were now very oonfident
in the North Sea 'as a lending prospect
In conclusion, it can be said that the 'private' face of
majority state participation, developed in the negotiations with
the various oil companies whose interests would be affected, was
one which provided the companies with an assurance that their
profitability and access to oilflows would be unchanged in spite
of a transfer of legal title to 51% of the oil to BNOC. This
assurance was, moreover, articulated in legally binding agreements,
which also ensure that BNOC's presence in decision-making is
little more than a presence. The scale of these negotiations was
simply immense: by February 1976 there had been over 150 meetings
on participation in lit commercial fields, involving the Department
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of j&ergy, the BNOC, and representatives of 36 companies; and, to
1. 'The Sunday thmaw. 'Business Diary* Banks ahoy!', February 2,
1976.
2. 905 H.C. (Oral Answer) (February 16, 1976) 00I.91U.
compensate for inadequate staffing, the Government employed
legal personnel from the London firms of Freshfields and
Herbert Smith.
The objective of showing the course of the participation
negotiations in this section has been twofold. Firstly, I wish
to emphasise the decisive influence of these private
negotiations upon the form of state participation. Secondly, it
underlines the ideological importance of the idea of property.
The agreements not only had to be acceptable to the oil
companies but they also had to legitimate a relationship
between oil companies and the state in the eyes of a broader
public: hence the Labour Government's determination to
secure title to $1% of the produced oil, irrespective of the
length of time it took to obtain it. This legal oonoept lent
credence to the view, often expounded in public, that oil was
a national resource and was national property.
5. The Establishment of BNOC
The British National Oil Corporation (MOC) formally came
into being on January 1, 1976. However, by the time that the
instrument of majority state participation had been fashioned,
the definition of participation had changed to such an extent that
it was not clear what the instrument was intended to achieve.
In addition, the constitution of the corporation contained many
peculiarities! the circumstances of its birth had left MOC with
powers best suited to an active, interventionist role, while the
•option to buy* agreements suggested a very different
role for BNOC, as trader in crude oil.
In this section I shall demonstrate not how the state
oil company was established but how it was established as a
quasi-private concern. The important point here is not that
•private* functions of the BNOC were separated out from public
ones in the parliamentary debate on its constitution; but
rather that such a separation was only partly successful.
It is impossible to explain the establishment of a state
oil company by reference to economic factors alone. It was
not necessary to create a large new public corporation in Britain
simply to increase the share of revenue accruing to the
Government: that could have been achieved by a combination of
taxation and royalties. Similarly, a corporation was not
required to apply restrictions on the rate of depletion of the
reserves under the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Act 1975:
this was to be undertaken by the Department of Energy. Indeed,
the range of regulatory oobtrols to be excluded from BNOC's
supervision was so extensive that an editorial in the 'Financial
Times' asked: what is left?^*
The motives for establishing BNOC were in fact political and,
as political oircumstances changed, so too did the objectives
of the state oil corporation. The politioal pressures which gave
birth to the corporation sketched out in the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipe-Lines Bill in April 1975 proved temporary. Originally, the
1. 'Unnecessary oil deal', January 6, 1977*
Labour Party had olaimed that, if elected, it would take a
majority controlling interest in offshore oilfields.* While
not bound in any constitutional sense by this manifesto
commitment, the highly unstable politioal climate in 1973-k
had created a crisis of legitimacy in Britain which had, as
one of its consequences, the effect of elevating the status
of both Labour Manifestoes in 197h» Prom February onward, there
was a tendency for the Government to justify its actions by
reference to the appropriate manifesto* a fact of political life
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much commented on at the time. 'Control* of oil 'multinationals'
was an important plank in securing acceptance of the Labour
Government's right to govern. However, this political
consideration became far less important in 1975-6, leaving
the Government fax less constrained by election commitments
to exert 'greater public control*. Nonetheless, state
participation in some form, implying a majority controlling
interest, with BNOC as agent, remained essential, to the political
credibility of the Government.
The establishment of BNOC was accompanied by a process of
de-politicisation of its future role. This was done in two ways.
Firstly, amendments made to the corporation's constitution during
the Bill's passage attempted to distinguish economic from political
functions, to fetter the latter and to define them in purely
administrative terms. Secondly, the chairman of the corporation,
1. See the Manifesto of February, op.cit., p.3*
2. For example, John P. Mackintosh, 'The declining respect for the
law', in Why ia RHta.1 n " ecoming harder to govern? (ed.
Anthony King) , PP.7U-95.
2U<:
Lord Kearton, expounded a view outside Parliament from 1975
coward which presented BNOG as a quasi-private corporation,
engaging in purely economic activities. The Corporation would,
he claimed, act according to 'ordinary commercial criteria'
I shall now look at both of these in turn.
The principle of a national oil corporation was opposed
in Parliament by the Conservative Party, although as I have
already shown at least some senior members of the Labour Government
had little enthusiasm for it. Outside Parliament the oil
companies and the large banks did not oppose the idea but
certainly opposed many of the BNOC'a proposed powers. The general
context in which the parliamentary debate took place should be
notedt not only was there a hiatus of investment in field
development, but the press (or at least the influential section
of it) carried many reports of speeches and statements made by
private interests about the 'error' of state participation and
its present and future consequences. One company, Amoco, even
placed full-page advertisements in the principal newspapers
criticising the Government. Other companies responded less
directly, by placing 'informative' advertisements in the press,
explaining (and justifying) their role offshore.
The constitution of the corporation proved sufficiently
controversial to occupy much of the discussion time allotted to
the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill. The debate focuased
1. For example, in his first public speech as chairman-designate,
reported in The Financial Times. 'State oil corporation will
act commercially', October 2, 1975*
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on the principle of a BMOCi whether or not there ought to
be a state oil company, and on the particular functions of the
new corporation. The major sources of contention in the latter
oategoxy were the following i
(l) the advisory role of BNOC.
Clause 1 (2)(c) of the Bill required the presence of two
civil servants on the Board of the Corporation to assist it in the
performance of its obligation 'to tender advice to the Secretary
of State with respect to any matter connected with petroleum'.1
Besides allowing for a considerable degree of communication between
the BNOC and the Department of Energy, this provision ensured that
BNOC would be subject to a greater degree of state control than
most state oil companies, and particularly more than BP. It is
a provision unprecedented in legislation establishing public
corporations to carry on industrial and commercial activities in the
U£, and was heavily criticised by the Opposition.
The presence of civil servants on BNOC's board seemed to threaten
the distinction between the 'commercial' or quasi-private functions
which it would carry out, and the political, advisory role which
it was also to have. BNOC might well be put in situations where it
would have access to the (confidential) commercial plans of the
companies with which it was competing, giving it an unfair
advantage. The Government's response to this criticism was to point
to clause 31 of the new model olauses which prohibited the disclosure
to any person not in the service or employment of the Crown of returns
1. Clause 3(3)
made by companies to the Department of Energy in pursuance of
lioenoe obligations: according to clause l(!|) of the Bill, the
BNOC was not a servant of the Crown, and therefore confidentiality
would be preserved. In addition, the civil servants were not
to have a vote in the board's discussions,* and were not necessary
to make a quorum, allowing the other members to meet
without them! The Government insisted that the Corporation's
status vis-a-vis third parties would be that of Government
consultant and these parties' consent would be required for
disclosure of confidential information by servants of the Crown
to BNOC.
The opposition to this provision was not only considerable
(the House of Lords removed the civil servants from the board,
only to have them put back on by the House of Commons at a later
stage in the Bill's passage), but it is also a comment on the
relative failure of dirigisma in the United Kingdom. In Prance,
by oontrast, the presence of civil servants on the boards of
nationalised industries is common: there are 5 on the board of
Eleotricite de France, 3 on ELF, 6 on ERA? (both oil companies), and
2 on the Ccmpagnie Fraacaise des Petroles. Outside France, all
the members of the Danish Natural Gas Organisation are civil
servants, and in Italy, 5 out of Ik members of the board, of ENI,
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the state petroleum company, are civil servants.
1. Schedule 1, para.5.
2. John Smith, the Under-Secretary of State for Energy, made
this comparison in the Committee proceedings (June 12, 1975)
in ools.361-3.
(2) HHOC'b commercial activities
The commercial activities of a corporation not subject to
the laws of the market clearly presented a threat to the private
companies operating offshore, and this theme was taken up
by the Parliamentary Opposition. The Government replied by giving
many assurances that BNOC's commercial activities would not lead
it to compete unfairly with private companies: when in partnership
with them as a co-licensee it would aot like a private company.*
When acting as an agent of the Government, the Corporation would be
in the same position as any private undertaking performing such
activities for the Government.
However, the financial position of MOC seemed to contradict
these assurances. Clause 9 of the Bill exempted BNOC from paying
the new Petroleum Revenue Tax, which provoked the criticism
that unfair competition might result: if BNOC was to act
commercially, why did it not pay the special tax like the other
licensee companies? It was also an unusual provision for a
nationalised industry: the British Gas Council was not granted
a similar exemption on its North Sea operations, and the BNOC itself
had to pay oorporation tax. The outcome of the debate was a
Government amendment which compelled the Corporation to calculate
its hypothetical liability on PET and the consequent effeot of
that liability on its corporation tax liability and to publish
2
this figure in its annual report.
1. For example, H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, ool.Ull (June 17,
1975): 363 H.L. Deb. col.1936 (August 7, 1975); 36U H.L. Deb.
col.37U (September 2k, 1975); 365 H.L. Deb. col.527 (October
29, 1975); 365 H.L. Deb. col.1761 (November 11, 1975).
2. 365 H.L. Deb. ools.533-38 (October 29, 1975). Another objection
which the Conservatives made to the original proposal was that
it might lead to the imposition of penalty taxation against British
oil companies operating abroad, particularly since it might unfairly
prejudloe the North Sea operations of American oil companies: 365
H.L. Deb. ools.387-97 (September 2U, 1975).
21|1*.
(3) MOC'S finances
The method of financing MOC also gave rise to extended
criticism. Tinder clause hO of the Bill a national Oil Account
(NOA) would be established as the centre of BNOC's financing.
All payments would be made into the NOA from royalties and rents
to the Government, and the revenues from participation in crude
oil trading would also go into this account; and all expenditures
incurred by BNOC would be met from it. The Opposition was
concerned both with what seemed like a lack of proper
accountability and a lack of candour about the scale of
borrowing required to fund BNOC'a operations.1 Would the
Corporation's activities not lead to a massive inorease in
state expenditure? In reply, the Government spokesmen claimed
that BNOC's expenditure would in fact be subject to 'normal'
Treasury control and that its role justified exemption from
2
payment of FRT. Nonetheless, they made several amendments designed
3to 'make it easier to see what is happening*. The Corporation's
financial duties were to be published and specific assurances
were given that the Government would take into account the sort of
return expected by a private oil company,'1 that before the financial
objectives were set Parliament would be informed about them, that
1. E.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, cols.1627-76 (July 15, 1975)•
2. loc.cit.
3. 365 H.L. Deb. ool.527 (October 29, 1975).
Ij. H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, col.811 (June 26, 1975).
5« loo. ©it.,cole.811-12.
exemption from petroleum revenue tax would not be allowed
to confer an advantage on MOC over its partners or
competitors when it comes to appraising investments.^ The
Government also agreed in principle to ensure that in its
annual report MOC would give details of its non-commercial
activities, but it might exclude matters like the financial
2
details of its subsidised canteen!
In general, the Opposition's argument was that a MOC
was not neoessary. There was no need for a state oil company
when private oil companies were quite willing to undertake the
work of exploration and field development. Why use public
finance when private capital was readily available for this work?
It must necessarily lead to an increase in state expenditure and
perhaps also inhibit further private investment. They also
argued that extra regulation, where necessary, oould be carried
out by an Oil Conservation Authority, which they proposed to
3
establish. While not accepting this argument, the Government
response was in general remarkably weak, meeting the Opposition
on its own ground. For example, it asserted repeatedly that
some tasks might not be sufficiently profitable or might be too
risky to be carried out by private companies, thus providing a
role for the Corporation. This implied a thoroughly secondary role
for BNOC, subordinate to the private companies. Dy contrast, the
1. H.C. Deb. Standing Committee D, col.953 (July 1, 1975)-
2. 365 H.L. Deb. col.5U0 (October 29, 1975).
3. 896 H.C. Deb. cols.1301-13^6 (July 28, 1975).
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principal raison d'etre of BNOC received little emphasis:
the function of holding the interests secured by the agreements
on participation negotiated by the Secretary of State in
pursuance of the Government's policy of majority state
participation in commercial fields. There were only two
references to this in the Bill.1 Perhaps the low profile
given this function by Government spokesmen in the parliamentary
debate was due to its association with 'polities' and 'sovereign
power', the very qualities which might seem inoompatible with the
claim that MOC would 'act commercially'.
Despite several hundred amendments to the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill, many of which ooncerned the
constitution of the MOC, the Corporation was formally established
on January 1, 1976, and the chairman, Lord Kearton, then
proceeded to give it a role whloh corresponded to the grand one
implicit in the Act and in the idea of majority state participation.
His success in doing this was partly due to his recognition that
by this stage the political origins of MOC had little connection
with its final form as a quasi-private corporation, and partly
due to his appreciation that a state oil company was an important
asset to British capitalism at a time when economic rivalries among
the advanced capitalist states were increasing, and fears about
the security of oil supplies from OPEC sources showed no signs of
disappearing.
1. In clause? 2(l)(e) and Ul(l).
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Under Hearton'a direction it was stressed that the BNOC
did not intend to interfere in companies' rates of return from
commercial oilfields. Its objectives of limited physical possession
and information were met in three ways J
(i) MOC became a holder of the licence on a joint basis with
the other licensees*
(ii) MOC was granted an option aishrined in the operating
agreement to acquire the relevant percentage of petroleum in which
it would have some form of beneficial ownership and in return for
which it would pay the relevant company or consortium who would
otherwise have received the petroleum for the current market price.
(iii) MOC became entitled to be represented on all committees
set up under the operating agreement with a vote to make its
presence felt.
However, this was not in itself sufficient. Both Lord Kearton
and the Government wished to demonstrate publicly that the new
oil corporation was an active one, with as important and
extensive a range of activities in the North Sea as any major oil
company. Hence during the fifth round of licensing in 1976-7 (the
first one since 1972), much publicity was given to MOC's
involvement. It was however a very small round of licensing in
which a mere 1*1* blocks were allocated, compared with 31*8 in th® first
round and 282 in the fourth. This was less than half the size of
the smallest of the first four rounds, the third (1969), in which
106 blocks were allocated. In addition, objections from the oil
1. See the Petroleum (Production) Eegulations 1976 S.l 1976 No.1129»
companies persuaded the Government to abandon the id a of
X
carried interest for MOC in this round.
The small size of the fifth round was an indicator of
the stage reached by North Sea oil development, by the time
MOC arrived on the scene* It had now become dear that the
oilfields discovered under the very large number of lioenoes which
had been allocated in the first four rounds were the ones which
would allow Britain to reach 'self-sufficiency* by 1980. They
were probably the biggest oilfields and certainly the ones which
presented the fewest problems of aocess. Future rounds of
2
licensing would therefore tend to be much smaller.
Lord Kearton himself seems to have been aware that MOC
had arrived in the North Sea rather like Hegel's owl of Minervai
after dusk! Giving evidence to the House of Commons Select
Committee on Nationalised Industries in 1978, he admitted that the
largest fields had now been found and that the risks and the
cost of developing smaller fields made them far less attractive
3
to the oil oompanies. And more recently, the Corporation claims
in its annual report that
The fields will be smaller, more difficult to produce,
some in deeper water. There will probably be more
projects of smaller average size, but they will call for
ever more sophisticated technical skills.
Further support for this view came from a detailed report
submitted by the UK Offshore Operators' Association to the Energy
1. UK Offshore Petroleum Production Licensing Fifth Found. A
Consultative Document, Department of JSnergy, May 1976, esp.
Appendix 1, s.9.
2. The sixth round (1978) resulted in the allocation of a mere l\2
blocks. A further round is in progress at the time of writing
but the result is not yet known.
3. Seventh Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised
Industries, Resorts and Accounts of the tnergy Industries (1977-8)
H.C. 583, pp.U5-6. ~~~
1*. The British National Oil Corporation, Report and Accounts. 1979» P«
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Commission in 1978.* Apparently, the 161 exploration wells
drilled by the end of 197U made 37 discoveries, while the
16U exploration veils drilled in the period 197U-7 resulted in
UO further disooverles. However, of the 3 major fields
discovered in the North Sea by 1978 (i.e. those exceeding $00 million
barrels of theoretically recoverable oil), only one was found in
the latter peMod. The report concluded that
... the existing commercial fields are thus concentrated
in the earlier period of exploration, during which about
eleven of the fifteen million barrels of the total
theoretically recoverable oil were discovered. This general
shift towards smaller discoveries confirms general
industry experience elsewhere in the world that the major
fields tgnd to be found earlier in the exploration
history.
The overall success in exploration drilling, as measured by
the ratio of total exploration wells to those wells which found
some oil, has been quite good by average standards, but it reached
its peak in 197k, and has deteriorated since. The other important
measure of prospects is the size of discoveries, and success in
9
finding larger fields has declined dramatically. The report
claims that
While about one well in five has found some oil, only
one well in fourteen has discovered fields expected to be
commercial under existing fiscal arrangements.
1. Exploration and Development of the OK Continental Shelf,




In spite of this, the Corporation had considerable
relevance for British capitalism as a whole, as became
apparent from early 1979 with the onset of a seoond 'oil
crisis'. The proprietary interests in produced oil which the
Government had obtained through the various participation
agreements gave it some power to influence its destination.
At a time of crisis when the American and European companies
who owned the bulk of it might wish to divert it elsewhere, the
BNOC could take up its options and keep a portion of it in the
UK. This had particular relevance to Britain's membership of the
SEC: if supplies of oil from OPEC sources were interrupted,
some member states of the EEC, like Britain, might wish to
conserve their oil and gas reserves for their own uses, while
others, less well endowed with petroleum reserves, might wish
to assert a principle of Community solidarity and share the
Community's reserves. B(y obtaining proprietary control through
BNOC of 51% of the oil extracted from the TJE Continental Shelf,
the Government could, if neoessary, secure the use of that oil in
Britain rather than elsewhere in Western Europe, without imposing
regulatory restrictions on exports whioh would clearly contravene
Article 3^ of the Treaty of Rome.*" Thin had the effect of
increasing Britain's bargaining power within the EEC.
Majority state participation, through the BNOC, therefore
made no essential difference to the interests and economic
activities of the existing licensees. The new legal arrangements
1. Treaty establishing The European Economic nnrmrrmn-ity- Some,
March 25, 1957• Article 3h forbids such restrictions on
in .fa EEC trade; although it might still be in breach of
Article 37 if it followed such a course.
for licensing vere both a response to the growing complexity
of oil development in the North Sea and an attempt to find
a relationship between oil companies and the state which would
win popular approval. The latter points to the ideological
role of the lav in this cases for example, the electorate
had. to be persuaded that it was majority state participation
that was being introduced and hence the figure of 51% was insisted
upon. Had the Government merely wished to obtain *security of
supply', this could have been achieved just as effectively
with 33 % of a licence interest. Besides, in a national emergency
a Government would probably make the appropriate new rules whether
it was the majority shareholder or not.
Nor was the ideological factor an accidental by-product of the
legislative process. Throughout the period 197h-77t it helped
t0 present a picture of radical change in oil policy initiated bjr
the Government, in spite of the fact that its attempts were
thwarted at almost every turn both by the vulnerability of
British-based international capital, and by the dependence of
the state and much of domestic capitalism upon the oil companies
for future revenues (to alleviate balance of payments problems,
etc.). While sweeping changes in the form of state intervention were
indeed introduced in 197U~77» the element of discontinuity in law
and policy, and of disagreement between the two major parties
was not as great as their speeches and statements tried to suggest.
The Conservative Party was in the process of rethinking its policy
on North Sea oil, and the Labour Government (as I have shown) was
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unclear before late 1975 about the form of its most
radical innovation, majority state participation.^
A major difference did arise, however, over the Government's
justification for its action. Government spokesmen justified the
changes in proprietary interests in two wayst firstly, they
claimed the Government was merely altering the regulatory
environment in which licensees oonduoted their operations (a very
dubious argument in law), and, secondly, that the Government was
obtaining property in most of the produced oil through state
participation, as a result of negotiations voluntarily entered
into by the licensees. Again and again they claimed that oil
was one of those essential natural resources to which the nation-
state has prior olaim over any private interest or interests.
By contrast, criticism of the Government action by both the
Opposition and the oil o mpanies emphasised the contractual character
of the petroleum licence, and the proprietary character of the
rlghtB it conferred. While this emphasis corresponded more
closely with reality than the former, the Government insisted upon,
and obtained, their ideological victory. At a time when debate about
the impact of 'multinational* corporations upon the sovereignty
of nation-states was widespread and intense, the Brit, Ji Government
appeared to be asserting 'public oontrol' over some of the biggest
(and mainly American) 'multinationals', I shall discuss the
significance of this in the nsxt section.
1. It is a measure of the acceptability of HNOC in its present
form to both parties that the Conservative Government, one
year after its election, had .been unable to think of any
major change which it ought/Wtke to itj it has confined itself
to minor changes which increase the quasi-private character
of BNOC, like making it liable to the petroleum revenue tax
through the Finance (No,2) Act 1979*
Part II»
Private Property and the States
some prenafofl quaptloftq
FCTRi
It must be kept in mind that new forces of production and
new relations of production do not develop out of nothing,
nor drop from the sky, nor from the womb of the 3 elf-positing
Idea; but from within and in antithesis to the existing
development of production and the inherited, traditional
relations of property.
Earl Marx1
1. E.Marx, Grundrisas. p.2?8.
Contentat
1. The development of capitalism
2. Property rights
3* 8tate Intervention
Just as the establishment of a licensing system for
petroleum exploration and exploitation was both an attempt to
remove obstacles to the commencement of large-scale exploration
drilling offshore and also a •protectionist' instrument for
British companies, so the capitalist social system modifies
its social and legal arrangements to overcome obstacles to its
reproduction and expansion. But how far does this modification
go? What are its limits? Since the oil firms succeeded in utilising
their licence rights in a manner recalling rights of property,
is the change in legal form nothing more than faoilitative? Does
even a considerable degree of state intervention present no real
problems for the profit-oriented large capitalist firms and banks?
In the Introduction I sketched out a theory of capitalist
development which I shall now develop with a v^®w to answering these
questions, albeit in a rather brief and provisional way. There
are two caveats however. Firstly, the object - capitalism
and its development - is such a vast one that the following
discussion must inevitably take on the character of an outline.
Moreover, it is one which, not surprisingly, gives greatest weight
to those aspects of capitalism like the state and rights of
property which are the principal concern of this study. Secondly,
this theory is not an 'appendage' of the foregoing study since it has
both informed and guided it; it also provides the basis for the
discussion of conceptions of property in the next chapter, a fact
which will be apparent from the historical illustrations in the
first section.
1. The development of capitalism
The dynamic of capitalist development is provided by the
impulse to accumulate. The accumulation of capital establishes
a growth in the scale of social production as 'a permanent structural
feature of capitalist society1.1 However, it is also a process
generates contradictions, the temporary solutions to which push
the development of capitalism in specifio directions.
In a capitalist sooiety, where the money economy is developed,
exchange transactions among commodity owners are governed by the
impersonal forces of the market. The immediate tie between
production and consumption, found in pre-capitalist societies,
is broken. Production is no longer geared to local, known needs,
and, because there is no definite agenoy whereby production is
adjusted to consumption, there is an inherent anarchy in
capitalism. By 'anarchy* I do not mean to imply that it
necessarily operates in an arbitrary or chaotic manner, but
rather that it runs without central direction. Individual firms
or capitalists are free (within limits) to do what they likei to
produoe what they like and to invest their capital where and how
they like, and hence it is an unplanned system. The principal means
by which a measure of equilibrium between production and
consumption is maintained is the pursuit of profit on capital. A
'crisis' occurs when a sufficient yield on investment is not achieved,
and where a significant volume of overproduction occurs, creating
a vicious oirole in which consumer power is diminished through the
1. Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment. p.77* A good
account of the following is contained in Anthony Giddens,
Capitalism and Modern Social pp. 1*6-61*.
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laying off of labour and a further decline in the rate of
profit. The occurrence of a crisis and its resolution eventually
recreates equilibrium conditions, but a lower productive
capacity, from which a new upswing in production may then commence.
Three sets of tendential properties can be distinguished in
capitalisms a tendency for the rate of profit to fall; a tendency
toward endemic crises of overproduction; and a tendency toward
concentration and centralisation, all of which have the effect
of partially undercutting capitalism's own premises. The latter
tendency, for example, can serve in part to counter the anarchy
of capitalist production. In a monopoly situation, corporations
are potentially able to regulate prices and therefore profits in
a direct fashion as well as to regulate the needs of consumers,
even if only by the exclusion of certain alternative products.
Similarly, the centralisation of the market, that is the
amalgama .on of different firms into much larger units, and
manifested in the domination of a limited number of financial or
credit agencies, can introduce an important element of regulation of
market operations.
The intervention of the state has had a similar role in
removing impediments to the process of accumulation in the post-war
period in all the capitalist societies. Earlier, the state had
played an important role in fostering capitalist development in
countries like France and Germany. However, this role has been
generalised to all capitalist societies since 19^5* The state has
effectively intervened to tackle certain weaknesses in capitalist
economies, and this implies a significant degree of conscious
recognition on the part of jovernmental agencies of the need
to rectify or alleviate the 'pathological• tendencies in the
system. The •mechanics* of capitalist production itself do not
give rise to such a development.
However, the Keynesian strategies of the advanced capitalist
state represented a solution to one series of constraints or
impediments to the aooumulatlon process at a particular stage of
capitalist development which have turned themselves into
impediments constraining the process of accumulation in the
subsequent stage. In other words, the 'solutions* have only a
temporary efficacy before themselves generating new impediments
which constrain the accumulation process. As Erik Olin Wright
commentsj
It is in this sense that the impediments to accumulation
can be considered contradictions in accumulation rather
than merely obstacles to accumulation.
They are contradictions because the •solutions' to a particular
impediment become themselves impediments to accumulation, which
must in turn be removed for capitalist production to continue. Not
that these obstaoles are necessarily the same ones each time, but
are rather a different series of constraints appearing at different
stages of capitalism's development.
In addition, they cannot be passively accepted by the capitalists
1. Erik Olin Wright, Class. Crisis and the State, p. 112.
themselves. As individuals, they must try to overcome these
obstacles simply in order to survive in a competitive world,
while, as a class, they must attempt to remove them in order to
contain class conflict. Accumulation underpins much of the ideological
legitimation of the inequalities of capitalist society. The 'ever-
expanding cake' allows for a steady increase in the standard
of living of the working class and helps legitimate the
vastly higher standard of living of the capitalist class.
Consequently, a prolonged period of 'no-growth' must seriously
undermine suoh legitimations and lead to an intensification of
class conflict.
Every capitalist enterprise (and every capitalist nation) is
thus driven to expand its own capital at the expense of other
enterprises (and of other nations if necessary). Nonetheless, one
major response to the constraints on accumulation is to limit the
degree of conpetition among capitalist firms by a process of
concentration end centralisation of capital units, as 1 have already
mentioned. Historically, the scale of production in the successful
firms has increased, and more and more direct methods of
integration have allowed different firms to collaborate with each
other. As I showed in Part I, the principal form of suoh
centralisation in offshore oil development is the ^oint venture
arrangement, which allows several different firms to participate
together, thereby spreading the risk. This represents a recognition
of the limits of a 'pure' private enterprise system. However,
despite the introduction of forms of social oontxol by private
firms and the state, the capitalist mode of organising production
has again and again proved too restricting. For example, the
national framework of capitalist operations oeased to be
adequate to the expansionist drives of the largest corporations
and banks and compelled them to extend their operations abroad.
Haw materials enterprises, like the oil companies, were among the
very first 'multinational' corporations, quickly extending their
interests across the globe into every continent. Indeed,
even by the first decade of the twentieth oentuxy their ruthless
expansion and cut-throat competition was so well documented that
their operations provided Lenin with extensive illustrative
material for his theory of imperialism.*
There was nothing metaphysical about this expansionist drive.
The fall in the rate of return on capital invested in traditional
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areas provided the basis for the imperialist imperative.
Capitalism beoame a world system in order to overcome one speoific
obstacle to the process of accumulation: the tendenoy for the
organic composition of capital (or the 'fixed element of cost',
as economists oall it) to rise and to lead to a fall in the rate
of profit. The high level of oapital intensity reached at the
very end of the nineteenth century led to a qualitative change in
capitalism.
The logic behind this development can be explained fairly simply.
1. V.I.Lenin, Imperialism.
2. Although another important incentive was provided by the need
to alleviate class oonflict. As Cecil Rhodes remarked: 'The
Itapire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question.
If you want to avoid oivil war, you must become imperialists';
cit. in Lenin, op.cit.,p.9i;.
3. This paragraph relies heavily on the account in A.Sohm-Rethel,
Intellectual and Manual Labour. pp.ll|i|-7.
A growing capital intensity and a rising organic composition of
capital leads, at a certain stage, to a change in the costing
structure of production amounting to an increasing dominance of
the indirect or fixed element of the cost. Shis element does
not vary with output and still remains constant even when production
might have to halt temporarily as in a deep recession. These
invariable overheads are made up of the interest on borrowed
capital, depreciation, insurance, maintenance, leases, rents,
and so on. If this part of the cost is high relative to the direct
costs (i.e. materials and wages which vary according to the volume
of output), the firms concerned will not be able to respond easily
to the kind of regulation brought about by the market mechanism.
In other words, if demand reoedes and prices begin to fall, production
ought to be cut back and supplies be diminished: however, the
heavy overheads will cause unit costs to rise with a reduced
output, with the paradoxical consequence that adaptation of
supplies to falling demand forces the oost to rise when prioes fall.
The consequence is that the rising organic composition of capital
makes production increasingly inadaptable to market regulatives.
The firms affected by this must react in such a way as to obtain
control over the movements of the market, simply as a matter of
survival.
It was this reaction which Lenin viewed as the major source
of the monopolising tendencies which were clearly visible by the
late nineteenth century, after a long depression from 1873-U to
the 1890s, comparable to that of the 1930s. The decline in the
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rate of profit was felt most acutely in the very industries with
the highest organic composition of capital, like synthetic
chemistry, electricity, and heavy iron and steel manufacture.
These monopoly tendencies sparked out a remarkable debate
among social theorists of differing perspectives as to their
significance. Many 'new' and familiar ideas about'organised
capitalism' and 'oorporatisia* had their origins in this period.
For example, Fiudolf Hilferding argued in his hook, 'Finanakapifcal',
that industrial and banking capital had become closely connected
as a result of the banks' provision of the large sums of moixey-
oapltal required for large scale industrial production. A new
combination of industrial and commercial interests (finance
capital) pressured the etate into a deliberate policy of expansion
since 'finance capital needs a state which is strong enough to oarry
out a policy of expansion and to gather in new colonies'State
protection of industries was directed less at establishing
monopoly positions for domestic companies at home than toward
establishing monopoly positions abroad and national political power
was used to seoure markets for oapit&l export, and sources of raw
materials. The nation-state had the task of protecting the large
investments made by finance capital worldwide in their competition
with other national firms. By contrast with Hilferding's emphasis
upon the organising tendencies in the 'new capitalism', Lenin
1. Finanzkapital, p.300} cit. in M.Barratt Brown, The aoonomics of
Imperialism. p.6J*. Hilferding's principal work has not yet
been translated despite the considerable influence it had.
The argument is summarised and criticised in Paul Sweezy, The
Theory of Capitalist Development, pp.256-69; 29U-306.
emphasised its potential for social disintegrationi the ordered
division of the world's markets, for example, constituted merely
a temporary truce in an economic war and ultimately the rivalry
among nation-states would break out into war.
In the decades after the 'Great Depression' of the late
nineteenth century, capitalism relied on the fulfilment of two
conditions for its reproduction and expansion. Firstly, there
had to be an expansion of the existing markets by opening up
new territories and resuming colonial expansion on a new scale, a
path easie for wealthy countries like Britain, France, Holland,
Sb
and Belgium. Secondly, a substantial increase in the rate
of exploitation of the labour employed in the industries at home was
required. Industrial 'rationalisation' along the lines of
♦scientific management' accompanied the imperialist drive across
the •world.1
While these oondltions had proved spectacularly insufficient
by the 1930s, the period following the Second World War saw the most
successful solution to the problems of accumulation which had ever
been achieved in capitalism. A combination of unrepeatable
features like ch ap and plentiful supplies of Middle East oil and,
e
in some countries, a weak or non-existent degree of unionisation,
and also extensive state intervention, led to a 'post-war boom* which
lasted until the late 1960s.
1. At the same time (1895) as Cecil Bhodes made his remarks
about imperialism being a 'bread and butter' question,
Frederick Winslow Taylor introduced his work to the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers with a lecture
entitled 'A Piece Rate System, being a step toward a
Partial Solution of the Labour Problem'.
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During this period the structure of private ownership
underwent two major changes. Firstly, basic industries like ooal,
steel, communications, energy, and transport, were nationalised
by the state, thus establishing a large public sector in most
of the advanced capitalist societies, and giving rise to the idea
that this was a 'mixed economy'. Nonetheless, these industries
were no longer proving profitable to private firms, and, once
compensation was paid, a state takeover freed the firms concerned
to invest their capital elsewhere at a more acceptable rate of
return. The operation of the nationalised industries proved
the general rule that state-induced competition is non-competitive,
being primarily concerned with goods and services that have no
place in the market. The appaarance of a 'mixed' economy with a
public as well as a private sector tended to conceal the fact
that there was still only one capitalist economy which the state
had a supportive role.1 Secondly, there was a remarkable growth
in legislative regulation of the rights to use, and to dispose of
property. A variety of legal instruments develop®® to allow
state regulation of economic activities and many of these, like
licensing, placed a considerable degree of discretionary power in
the state bureaucracy. This development provoked some concern among
2
academic lawyers about the control of such discretionary power.
1. See the discussion in Mattick, op.cit.
2. For example, G.Ganz, 'The Control of Industry by Administrative
Process', Public Law (l967)» pp»93-106; G.Ganz, 'Allocation
of Decision-Making Functions', Parts I and II, Public Law (1972),
pp.215-231; and 299-308; H.Street, Justice in the Welfare
State, pp.69-96; and Glanville L. Williams, Qp.cit.
Other regulatory instruments, like those of compulsory purchase,
respected the owner's right to benefit, though not necessarily
to use and to alienate.
Some writers interpreted these legal modifications to the
capitalist framework as evidence that private property was being
'■undermined' As a consequence, the liberal conception of
2
property would have to be 'redefined'. Yet a more plausible
interpretation of this phenomenon is that private ownership was
in some cases proving to be an obstacle to capital accumulation in
the nation-state. At the time when these incursions into private
ownership took place, the international rivalry which Lenin had
noticed much earlier had given way to a rivalry between two
opposing social systems, capitalist and communist, with a limited
competition among the advanced capitalist states under the
dominance of the USA. It is in response to this international
competition that capitalist economies became increasingly
organised, although this tendency has never gone so far as to
abolish competition within any particular nation-state, merely
limiting it somewhat. Failure to socialise a particular industry
in decline, like the coal industry, might have led to a cessation
of production in that industry, and a consequent decline in the
competitive position of the national capitalism vla-a-vis other
national capitalisms. In the case of coal production, failure to
produce at a profit under private ownership and direction rendered
1. Stein and Shand, op.oit.
2* V.Friedmann, op.oit.
the future of the coal industry in Britain problematic. The
assumption of ownership and management by the state secured a
basic fuel for the national oapital units (and also secured the
votes of the large number of miners involved). Similarly,
subsidies to private produoers, expenditure on military and
spaoe programmes, as well as on welfare, education, and social
security, were essential components in maintaining social and
political stability, and in the reorganisation and expansion of
capitalist production after the Second World War.
State regulation has had a similar role in the North Sea.
As I have shown, the adoption of a system of discretionary licensing
had advantages for British capitalism in an environment which
was, from the outset, certain to be dominated by the superior
expertise and greater capital resouroes of American firms. Perhaps
it is no accident that the only serious advocate of an auction
system oi licence allocation for the UK Continental Shelf ia an
American.1 After 197U, non-fiscal state intervention had as one
of its goals the administrative one of reorganising the ad hoc
arrangements whioh had been set up during the preceding decade.
1316 BNOC, for example, had a® one of its less publicised goals that
of centralising the various forms of state participation which had
been introduced during that period. This, and other aspects of
state regulation between 197U and 1977 might suggest that the quasi-
1. K.W.Dam, Oil Resources. This would certainly have resulted in
a greater proportion of American companies obtaining licences
than under the discretionary system.
proprietary function of licence rights was being •undermined'.
Yet I have shown in some detail that this was very far from being
the case.
This growing international rivalry does not of course have
the same consequences for all property-owners. The close
relationship between the largest capital units and the state has
been remarked on frequently since the beginning of the twentieth
century. A close involvement with the internal structure of
the state allows the holdere of large scale property to ensure
that obstacles to further capital accumulation which can be
surmounted by legislation are tackled by legislation which they
themselves have had a hand in drawing up. This can be achieved
as the oil companies did in 197U-5, through extensive consultations
with the relevant Government Department. It was just such a
relationship between large firms and the state apparatus which
led Paehukanis, the Soviet jurist, to contrast the attitude of
capitalists toward property rights in the nineteenth century, where
the owners' freedom to use, to alienate and to benefit was treated
with a special reverence, with the 'ad hoc' approach characteristic
of monopoly capitalism.^
This modified attitude has its roots not only in a perception
on the part of capitalists of the need to place the removal of
potential impediments to capital accumulation above ideological
considerations, but also in a series of changes in the capitalist
class itself. John Scott has reoently written extensively on this
1. E.B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, pp.129-30.
phenomenon of 'depersonalization' of property-ownership which
lies behind these changes.Capitalist development led to
the replacement of a dominant class oompoeed largely of
individual entrepreneurs, family firm®, and rentiers, by one
in which such elements play only a very minor role. The major
role is played by large Industrial firms, banks and institutional
investors. It is just this 'faceless' dominant class which, as
Harris notes, no longer needs
... to commit itself to the defence of private property
as first principle, much less the defence of the
mass of small private property owners.
The ability of these owners of productive property to
develop and utilise close links with the state apparatus, rather
than simply the governing party, means that they have less need
for a general theory of property rights and the state, which might
inter alia set out limits to the 'publio sphere' in a systematic
way.
Furthermore, it was just this very group of large-scale oapital
units which benefited most from the post-war boom in oapital
accumulation. Throughout this period, and at the same time as the
state's role was being deliberately expanded in all the advanced
capitalist countries, there was a continuous movement toward
interpanetr&tion and interdependence of trade, investment and
1. J. Soott, op.oit.j see also Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau
to Lenin, pp.^5-108.
2. Nigel Harris, Competition and the Corporate Society, p.2k9>
finance. Restrict ions on trade and capital movements
constructed during the 1930s and during the Second World War
were systematically dismantled. Linked to this expansion of
trade, export of capital, and establishment of production
worldwide, was the development of a stable international monetary
system, dominated by the American dollar. The economist,
Andrew Shonfield, has claimed that
The great postwar- movement of liberalisation in
international trade in the West can be regarded
in part as a by-product of this curious and ^
necessarily impermanent monetary relationship.
It is this context of the inteznationalisatlon of capital
and the consequent intensification of competition among national
capitalisms that state intervention in the national economy has
to be understood. Those who oonoluded with Shonfield in the 1960s
that economic planning was the most oharaoteristio expression of
the new capitalism based their conclusion on stabilising tendencies
occurring within the framework of the nation-state, underestimating
the extent to which the inter-nationalisation prooess was, in the
longer term, a destabilising one for the system as a whole.
The tendency to generalise about change in the social structure
from the particular and limited features of this 'new capitalism'
was common at that time. The post-war boom and the unprecedented
prosperity it brought to many, although not all people in the advanced
capitalist societies, provided the stimulus to a great many theories
of 'post-industrial' society. While placing a different emphasis upon
1. That is, the dollar's role as international reserve currency*
Modern Capitalism, op.cit.,p.33«
particular changes, they all concluded that 'industrial society'
(i.e. capitalism) was on the verge of a transition to a new
kind of society which had overoome the conditions of scarcity
and the tendency toward slump. These theories were rooted
firmly in the 'industrial society' tradition in the social
sciences, and now seem, as Anthony Giddens observes, 'almost
archaic, following a period of heightened political and
economic conflict •
The changes which seemed most likely to lead to a movement
beyond capitalism were bound up with the new interventionist
role of the state. The impact of the various forms of state
intervention upon key institutions of capitalism like private
property and the market was so great that a reappraisal of the
dominant conoept of property as private property seemed appropriate.
2. Property Rights
The process which I have described in the foregoing section
in terms of 'obstacles' and 'impediments' to capital accumulation
is, obviously, based on Marx's conception of capitalist development
as a dialectical relationship between forces and relations of
production. At a certain stage in the development of material forces
of production in society, these come into conflict with the framework
which organises them. V/hen this occurs, the relations of production
cease to function so as to fully utilise the productive forces
available, and instead they fetter the further development of those
1. 'The Prospects forSocial Theory Today', in Central Problems of
Social '... *
forceB.^" Marx envisaged the possibility of an integration of
various forms of social control into the capitalist economic
framework which might defuse the resulting tensions somewhat,
but was convinced that they would not have more than a
temporary efficaoy.
The role played by property rights in this process is
complicated by several factors. Firstly, not all property rights
have the sane social significance. For example, property rights
in objects for personal use have little relevance to the foregoing
sketoh of capitalist development. Many individuals in capitalist
societies have personal possessions but they are 'propertyless'
in the sense that they do not own a share in the means of social
productions their principal marketable 'property' is their
power to work. Indeed, the vast bulk of productive prope: y in
these sooieties has remained concentrated in the hands of one
small group of individuals, making them a 'class' by virtue of
their ownership of the means of production. Ihis is not contradicted
by the fact that almost everyone in a capitalist society is
nonetheless a subject of legal rights and is therefore capable
of becoming an owner of means of production! this attribute is
a formal one which certainly does not make them owners of
2
productive property in fact.
1. See the 1859 'Preface' to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy, pp.19-23. By 'forces of production' he
has in mind the various means of production like railways,
refineries, oilrigs and also the power to work. By 'relations of
production* he simply means those relations within which
production is carried on, like the work relations in a factory.
2. Of course, a large number of Individuals have a share in
productive property indirectly through trade union membership or
holding insurance policies. The fact that such institutions have
shares in productive property does not, however, give strategic
control of these funds to the particular individuals whose 'wealth'
is managed by an elite.
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tthile ownership of productive property has a vastly
greater socio-economic significance than ownership of objects for
personal use, it must be emphasised that this is more than a
question of title or of 'holding* oapital resources. Capitalists,
whether firms or entrepreneurs, are compelled by competition to
utilise the objects of their property in order to make profits.
For the most part their property in means of production becomes
a means by which capital can be accumulated in the form of profit.
Hence there is an important connection between modem property and
the idea of convertibility. The right to alienate the objects of
property as commodities on the market becomes vital in capitalism
since all production is gaared to the realisation of capital
invested and also surplus value.
It was Just this feature which attracted the attention of
E.B.P&shukanis in his analysis of modem property.1 In his view,
the freedom to transform oapital from one form to another distinguished
the modem property right from its feudal predecessor which tended
to have restrictions imposed upon alienability. It is in these
market transactions that the notion of property as a right in the
most absolute sense acquires its social significance. In a
capitalist society, the legal right of property had its real
significance as freedom of disposition in the majr et and not merely
as a means of securing the possession of things vis-a-vis other
possessors. The real material basis of modem property rights is the
1. E.B.Pashukanis, "The General Theory of Law and Marxism', in
Pashukanla. op.oit.
development of a universal market which increases the number
of individual owners, competing against each other. Since these
individual private interests exist in opposition to, and in
competition with, each other, the individual owner must be
secure in his right against all other property owners, but it
is always a control with a view to alienation that matters to
him, and the time, place and manner of the exchange are his own
'business'.
A second complicating factor results from the apparent
'decline' of property rights in the twentieth century. A
considerable body of literature now exists on the impact of the
modem large corporation upon rights in productive property, and
several writers have interpreted it as requiring a firm separation
of conceptions of property in legal and economio senses, and a
designation of the former as superficial. For example,
Nicos PoulantzaB notes that 'it is possible for the forms of
legal ownership not to coincide with real economic ownership','1' and
then uses 'economic ownership' to mean control of the means of
production, or the power to assign the means of production to given
us& and so dispose of the products. The trouble with this, and all
attempts, to distinguish legal from 'economic' property is that the
latter is usually conceptualised in juridic terms like ownership,
use and possession.^
1. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, p.19.
2. For example, Karl Renner, Institutions, p.281*. More successful
are the attempts to define 'economic ownership' as the power
to appropriate the product and to control the work process
(Bettelheim, op.cit.,pp.l3l*-5» Poulantzas, op.cit., p.18).
See also G.A.Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, for a novel
treatment of this.
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Much of the justification for making such a distinction
derives from the perception of a real separation betwepKi legal
ownership and economic control accompanying the rise of the joint-
stock corporation. Hie thesis that legal ownership has been
dispersed among various shareholders and eoonomic or strategic
control delivered over to a class of professional managers has
been a common one in neo-liberal thought since the 1930s.1 It
sees a divorce between the actual property rights held by a large
number of stockholders and rentiers, of whom few owned enough to claim
a voice in a firm's direction, and the oontrol exercised by a
•teohnostructure' motivated less by maximisation of profit than
2
by other goals like status. Similarly, MacFherson argues,
Individual investors of all sorts become rentiers and
beoome aware that this is what they are. Their property
consists less and less of their ownership of some part
of the corporation's physical plant and stock of
materials and products than of their right to a revenue
from the ability of the corporation to manoeuvre
profitability.
However, there is a growing body of empirical research which shows
that propertied interests still play a major role in deciding the
destinies of major corporations, even if stock ownership is to some
extent diffused. For example, a study by Maurioe Seitlin argues
1. The ori.vinhL' version of this argument was advanced by
A.A.JBerle and G.Means in The Modem Corporation and Private
Property. It was developed by inter alia Half Dahrendorf, in
Class and Glass Conflict in an Industrial Society.
2. See j.K. Sal'braith, The Hew Industrial State.
3. C.B.MacBierson, Democratic Theory, p. 13>1*.
inter alia that financial institutions have an important role
as owners of company interests."*" Share ownership, through the
credit and banking system, still has a central importance in
the exercise of strategic control. Impirical research also supports
the view that managers of large corporations tend to become
large property owners in their own right during their progress
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toward tenure of managerial positions. However, Zeitlin's approach
to this 'separation' breaks away from the individualist focus
of liberalism and interprets the development in terms of a
managerial reorganisation of the propertied class. He arguest
Although the largest banks and corporations might
conceivably develop a relative autonomy from
particular proprietary interests, they would be limited
by the general proprietary interests of the principal
owners of oapital. To the extent that the largest
banks and corporations constitute a new form of class
property ... the "inner group" ... of interlocking
officers and directors, and particularly the finance
capitalists, become the leading organizers of this
class-wide property.
The relationship between legal ownership and strategic
economic control in the large concentrations of property is therefore
a oomplex one, and empirical research strongly suggests that the
*dist *nco' between legal and economic structure in this case (that
is, productive property) has been much exaggerated. Further, a
real basis does not seem to exist for arguments to the effect that
1. Maurice Zeitlin, 'Corporate Ownership and Control', in
the American Journal of Sociology, vol.79 (197U) 5? see also
A.Francis, op.cit. who bases his argument on results from
the Oxford Growth of Firms project.
2. See Blackburn, op.oit., pp.166-8.
3. Zeitlin, oit. in Scott, p.120. Italics in the original text.
property rights are of declining social and economic relevance.
It is certainly true that individual capitalists have less
legal discretion today over their holdings than they once did.
They have fewer rights over what they own, for example, as a
result of legislative regulations over use. However, it does
not follow that capitalists as a class have less control over
the means of production. A reduction in oontrol by individual
capitalist® may result from increased oontrol by capitalists as a
class through the state.
A final but no less important complicating factor in ascertaining
the implications of capitalist development for property rights
is that the socio-economic relations which constitute a society
rarely correspond exactly to their legal representations. In
various remarks which he made on the subject, Marx thought that
relations of production 'develop unevenly as legal relations',1
a considerable degree of freedom and equality in law was
compatible with, and necessary to, economic exploitation. This
irony was possible because legal relationships were predicated on one
particular part of the economic structure, the market. Hence
generalisations about individual rights based on characteristics of
the legal structure were not only bound to contain an element of
distortion, but were also likely to prove advantageous to those
wishing to conceal or minimise real elements of social inequality.
1. 'Introduction* to Sruadrisse. p.109.
While I am entirely in agreement with the view which sees law
and property rights as * superstructural• and therefore in some
more or less complex manner *deriving' from economic structure,
it does seem to me that too much ought not to he made of this insight.
Property rights, even when modified to allow some social control
over use and so on, still provide the sort of legal assurance
required by economic interests in capitalist societies. One
may of course conceive of situations in which existing rights of
property seem to have scarcely any basis in capitalist economic
relations and which even present problems for them, but these
will be exceptional situations and will not be found in the
more profitable branches of production.
However, changes in economic structure may compel a
reassessment of the suitability of specifioally property rights
for a particular type of economic activity. In particular, the
extension of capitalism at a stage in its development when property
rights in general are subject to a range of regulatory controls
over use, disposition and so on, may be carried out under legal
arangements which allow private interests rights bit not property
rights.
As I noted above, ownership in general has various incidents
not all of which have equal significance for a capitalist* For
example, A.M.Honore claims there are as many as 11 distinct
incidents necessary to ownership in the 'fullA or 'liberal* sense.1
1. A.M.Honore, op.cit.
Similarly, some writers have preferred to view property not as
a right but as a 'bundle of rights'. Lawrence Becker, for example,
argues that
... property rights are typically aggregates of different
sorts of rights and rights-correlatives.
The importance of these distinctions is twofold! they allow us to
conceive a possible situation in which certain key property
right8 or incidents of ownership might come to be associated with
a non-proprietary legal arrangement over objects or in relation to
specific economic activities in which some social control through
state regulation is considered essential; and secondly, they
help explain why a multitude of statutory restraints can be
imposed on certain rights without affecting the essential onesi
in Marx's language, the right to appropriate surplus value through
the medium of speoific legal rights is left untouched.
' In the light of the foregoing remarks about property rights
in capitalism. I shall now reoonsider the licensing relationship
examined in detail in Fart I.
The petroleum licence is the legal link between the Crown's
possession of rights to offshore petroleum resources and private
exploration and exploitation of those resources. It is the
vehicle by which some of the Crown's, rigjhcs are transferred to
private companies. This is effected principally through model clause 2
which is standard form in all lioences! it grants to the licensee
1. Property Rights, p.21. Cf. V.Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society.
and O.Kahn-Freund, in 'Introduction' to K.Banner, op.cit.
'exclusive licence and liberty ... to search and bore for, and
get, petroleum'."'" The licensee therefore receives an exclusive
right, but a right to what? If one oonsidera it as a right
to the oil in place, the answer is not entirely clear. However,
it is clear that the licensee will not view his exclusive right
in this way. Ownership of the oil in the ground is of little
importance to the licensee unless the oil is capable of being
extracted and marketed, and unless the owner or licensee has the
right to do so. Even then, the licensee will be content to
aoquire those rights necessary to give effective control over
the oil once it is extraoted: that is, at the well-head. Whether
or not the licensee 'owns' the oil in place is not a question
which vexes the companies, nor their lenders, the banks. This
was made clear in the discussions on lenders' security when the
first generation of oilfields became ready for development
in 1975-6.2
In relation to other capital units which may wish to operate
in the North Sea, the holder of a licence has a better right in his
block or blocks than anyone else. He is granted a monopoly right
which will be protected by the state which will act to prevent non-
licensed companies from drilling. The licence therefore gives the
recipient a right which is 'better' than anyone else's right.
Whether or not he is an owner of oil resources in place is much less
1. Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, Schedule
2. For example, the paper by G.P.M.Willcughby, op.cit.
important both economically and legally than whether or not hie
right is good enough to allow him to do xi in this case, x is the
extraction and marketing of any oil found in order to make an
•acceptable• profit, the goal of the initial capital investment,
The oil companies' assessment of the value of a licence will
focus not only on the characteristic of exclusivity attaching to
the right transferred, but also on the ability of a licensee to
take possession of produced oil and convert it into some other
commodity at a profit for themselves. In this sense, oil companies
are no different from General Motors, whose business, as Alfred Sloan
remarked, is to make money. Once the oil is produced, it can
be transported as a commodity to a market and sold, or, alternatively,
used as a raw material in the refineries owned by various major
oil companies. This right to appropriate which the parties to a
lioence consortium have, and the freedom of disposition (not in
ay view significantly affected by BNOC's rights) give a lioensee
the same kind of economic control as a property owner.
By emphasising the connection between modern property and
exchange, Pashukanis* conception of property right (unlike
MaoFherson's which emphasises the feature of exclusivity"1') helps
to explain why oil companies are so concerned to obtain (and to
retain) rights to the produced oil, and are almost indifferent
to the question of ownership of oil resources in place.
This does not of course mean that ownership of oil resources
1, See the next chapter, section 1,
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in situ is completely irrelevant, nor that the resources in that
oondition are without value. Middle Eastern governments who
insist on extracting their oil at slower rates than oil companies
would prefer, do so in the full knowledge that the remaining
recoverable reserves of oil will gain in value as prices rise.
In 1979/30 alone, oil and gas reserves in situ in the UK trebled
in value as a result of increases in the world oil price.'2"
Nonetheless, ownership of oil resources in situ has a completely
different economic significance from ownership of the means to
explore for and exploit them. Prom a state's point of view
the criteria it adopts to assess its proprietary or
sovereign rights have nothing to do with business-directly. The
British case illustrates this point.
through the Continental Shelf Act 19&U the Crown poss ises
oertain rights to which it can lay claim in international lawt
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'sovereign rights' to explore and exploit. The Act gave the Crown
a monopoly of effective control over the UK Continental Shelf. It
had acquired a right which it could enforce against other states.
That right had an exclusive character being, firstly, a right to
prevent others getting petroleum resources, and secondly, a right to
extract. The petroleum resources could not therefore be res nulliua.
This did not represent 'sovereignty' but it did give the Crown the
1. The Financial Times. 'Oil and gas reserves treble in value',
July 21, 1980.
2. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf stated the
then customary international law. The latter has changed
since that time and therefore the Convention no longer has
the last word on the meaning of 'sovereign rights'.
'beat' right vis-a-vis other States, which was sufficient for the
purposes to which it would be put. Those purposes were not,
however, to allow the British state to aot like an Exxon or a
Shell and develop whatever petroleum resources it might have.
The assumption of sovereign rights was merely a prerequisite for
the establishment of a licensing regime which had, as one of its
goals, the objective of attracting sufficient interest from the
oil companies to invest the sums of oapital, expertise, and so on,
necoBaary for exploration to commence. Sovereign rights in the oil
in place have then quite different eoonomic consequences than
the quasi-proprietary rights in produced oil which the licensees
are ooncemed to obtain, and in this case do obtain.
3« State intervention
The most visible expression of a 'decline' in the role of
property rights in modem capitalism is the interventionist state,
especially in respeot of its intervention in specifically economic
activities. Yet this phenomenon is characterised by two general
features which show how paradoxical such a view of the state's
role is.
To begin with, state intervention has a remarkably superficial
effect on the workings of advanced capitalist economies. As I
argued in seotion 1, state intervention has a reactive
character. It is one means by which obstacles to capital accumulation
oan be overcome. Such obstacles have their roots in the
antagonistic character of the capitalist mode of production,
in which productive forces repeatedly expand faster than the rate
at which the production relations oan change in order to utilise
them. The state's involvement in North Sea operations provides
several illustrations of this.
As I explained in chapter two, the initial involvement of
the state in regulating North Sea exploration was partly because
the technology, equipment, labour and eo on, were available but
the legal framework for organising those foroes of production
was inadequate. Companies oould have begun exploration drilling,
as they had begun asking seismio surveys before 1961*, but they
had no means of restraining competitors from taking advantage of
any success they might have. The division of the continental
shelf into blocks and the introduction of a licensing system
resolved this problem. Similarly, the improvements in rig
technology in the late 1960s created the possibility of
exploration in the northern sector of the North Sea, and the
Government reacted by issuing a large number of licences in two
rounds, the third and fourth, between 196$ and 1972. In so far as
the individual capital units, in a condition of competition, were
not able to provide the basic or general conditions for the
utilisation of new productive forces, these conditions were provided
by the state.
In establishing a legal framework suitable for oil
development, the state is acting in a manner characteristic of
atates in capitalist societies. Such states have their origin
in the phenomenon of generalised commodity-exchange among property
owners, each with his own private isolated interest, each
opposed to the other and the united only in the relationship
of buyer to seller. As Pashukanis noted,* neither of the persons
effecting an exchange can emerge as the dominant regulator of
that relationship and a third party is required to embody the mutual
guarantee which commodity owners give to each other as owners.
This third party, the public authority or state, personifies the
rule of the intercourse of commodity-owners, and is the
guarantor of market-exchange. It is therefore the existence
of freedom of competition, private property and equal rights in the
market which makes a specific form of public constraint necessary.
This does not, however, exclude a monopoly of force, always a
feature of states, capitalist or otherwise.
This view of the state serves to underline its irrevocably capitalist
2
character. It also allows for the possibility of a 'relative
1. See Law and Marxism. pp.l3U-l50r for an account of this?
but also see the section on 'public law' in T.S.Midgley, The
Language of Equality. Edinburgh University Ph.D thesis (1978)•
2. This point is discussed in much of the current literature on
the state t for example Ottan Therbom, what Does the Tullng Class
So When It Rules?: John Holloway and Sol Picciotto (eds.),
State and Capital; and Colin Crouch (ed.), State ex>* ftp
Contemporary Capitalism. * *"""
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autonomy* of the state from particular capitalist interests. The
state is not a neutral instrument in the hands of a 'power elite'.
In the overall interests of the system, the state cannot align
itself with some interests as distinct from others - at least not
for any length of time. It must pursue the general interest of
a national capitalism, if necessary against the interests of
individual capital units. This does not lead to the performance
of purely peripheral funotions: on the oontrary, the two
notions of 'accumulation' and 'legitimation' group togehter a
series of functions which the state performs and which are of
crucial importance to modem capitalism. Under the first heading is
included state expenditures on arms, transportation, communications,
and similar activities, which have the effect of increasing
productivity and the utilisation of industrial capaoity. If production
is not profitable or else its extent is too broad to be performed
by capital units with their special interests, the state can 'intervene'
and do the work, since it is not obliged to follow the di tates
of the profit-motive. It provides the general conditions of
production which private interests could not, of their own accord,
provide, and above all provides *a unified and universal!stia
legal framework for free enterprise'."1' Under the second heading,
the state carries out activities which co-opt potential sources of
popular discontent by attempting to transform political demands
into economic demands. The securing of 'majority state participation'
1. Therborn, op.cit., p.103.
in existing consnercial oilfields by the British Government is
one example of this legitimation functions indeed, more
broadly, the very activity of legislating has, or is intended
to have, this effect. For example, the Labour Government
responded to the outbreak of olass conflict in Britain in the
early 1970s by initiating the biggest legislative programme
since the 19U5-51 Labour Governments the legislative output of
the 197U-5 Parliamentary session was in fact quantitatively
greater than the busiest session in that earlier period."
The state's intervention is then a reaction to problems in
the economic structure, which is itself the presupposition of the
state's existence as a capitalist state. Moreover, that reaction
is designed to solve those problems in such a way as to permit
the reproduction and expansion of private production both by
•economio' means and by means of securing consent. On this view
of the state, it is quite wrong to conclude from the fact of
considerable legislative restrictions on private property that
they are hostile to private ownership in general.
Another paradoxical feature of state intervention is the
extent to which it is accompanied by private intervention in the
state. That is, private interests, especially the larger and
better organised ones, beoome more and more involved in the
1. Keith Middlemas makes too much of this in his book, Politics
in Industrial Society. He argues that the British 'establishment'
deliberately stimulated a tripartite relationship between big
business, trade unions and government during the years 1916-26, which
successfully: avoided political crises and integrated the
unionised working olass until the mid-1960s. However, the
corporate bias in government is not peculiar to Britain and
the systemic forces contributing to it are more influential
than the policy directions of the dominant olass.
state'e extending range of activities. To cope with this, the
inner structure of the state itself -undergoes changes. This feature
is central to the questions of why state intervention assumes one
particular form and not another, and which interests secure
the greatest benefit from a particular state's intervention: are
they industrial or financial, in the main? Are they international
or national in their base of operations? If state intervention
works principally to the advantage of specifically private
interests, does this relegate the actions of social democratic
governments to the same role as government overtly concerned to
promote the private interest? These are questions which I do not
attempt to answer here, although some light may be shed on them by
the empirioal study in Part I. Ity goal here is simply to note
that a view whioh sees the state's intervention as an exercise
of 'control' over particular private interests can only be held
with considerable difficulty once one recognises that the highly
concentrated economic structure of contemporary capitalist societies
gives them (at least) a considerable degree of influenoe over the
form of state intervention. As I showed in chapters three and
four, this influence can be very considerable indeed, and can be
welcom, 2 by a government which publicly espouses a rhetoric of
•control', 'regulation', and the language of sovereignty.
Together these two paradoxioal features of state intervention
suggest the need for a cautious appraisal of the state's role,
and particularly the 'liberal' use of the term 'corporatism'.
If J.T.Winkler had considered the modifications to the Industry
Act 1975 more seriously he might have hesitated to cite it as
an example of a trend toward the so-called corporatist state.A
The importance of this latter point is obvious. If there is
a tradition of direct involvement of particular firms in the
activities of the state (that is, 'consultations*, 'talks',
or 'discussions' with a particular Department), then those firms
are likely to acquire a degree of assurance of the security of
their interests which goes beyond the specifically juridical
security visible in the character of the rights
which they possess. That this was certainly the case with
respect to the activities of many international oil companies,
ensured that the rights transferred by the petroleum production
licence by British Governments had an aspect of permanence about then
which was not, in my view, removed by the events of 197^-77•
Certain social and economic features of capitalism in Britain
also contributed to shaping the form of state intervention in
this case, showing that, in addition to the broad constraints on
capitalist states sketched out above, there are other more specific
constraints deriving in part from historical development. Among
1. 'Law, State and Economy: the Industry Act 1975 in Context',
in The British Journal of Law and. Society (1975). Vol.2,
more critical view of the Act, and its
implications for the corporatist thesis is provided by
Tom Eadden in 'The Industry Act 1975*» 39 Modern haw Kiview
(1976), pp.318-21.
the various advanced capitalist societies, Britain occupies
a unique position. The first country in the world to industrialise,
it also became the first real world power, both economically and
politically, extending the capitalist mode of production across
large parts of the world. While the status of world power was
soon acquired by other countries like the USA and the USSR and
Britain's political influence deolined, the economic structure
of British capitalism continued to refleot the key role in the
world economy of many of its economic institutions, principally
those in the City of London. However, the largest industrial
unite like BP arid ICI also have important and extensive overseas
interests. While both the City and the British-based multinationals
have found their international operations extremely profitable,
both the domestio economy and the state itself are (relatively)
weak, a feature explicable
... not by the simple decline of British capitalism
as such, but by the very strength of the cosmopolitan
activities of British capital, which has helped Jo
undermine further its strictly domestic economy."
There is then a oonflict. between the nationally and the
internationally operating sections of British capitalism, and the
very strength of the former has reinforced the long-term deoline of
1. B.Rowthorn, in M.Radice (ed.). International Firms and
Modern Imperialism, p.174. See also Prank Longstreth, 'She City,
Industry and the State', in Colin Crouch (ed.), op.cit.,
pp.157-190.
British capitalism as a whole. Such a conflict was visible
in the debate over licensing terms and the policy of rapid
exploration. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the latter
policy worked to the advantage of the large British and Amerioan
oil companies, even though Governments realised that, as a
consequence,
... less time was left for their own indigenous induetry-
to make itself ready to seize opportunities."
Similarly, the overseas interests of BP and indeed all British-
based companies operating abroad were an important influence upon
the domestic petroleum policy and the choice of licensing terms
throughout the 1960s, and also upon the revision of terms in
197U-5J throughout the entire period covered in the empirical
study, from i960 to 1977•
The thrust of this latter observation is this. The close
relationship between the largest capital units and the modem
state can provide juridical arrangements between private parties
and the state (like government contracts and petroleum licences)
with a degree of extra-juridical security which might, in the period
of classical capitalism, have been contained in the juridical form
itself: for example, certain rights might have been designated
property-rights. However, an additional element of extra-
juridical security is provided for the private interest(s) if it is
one which is located among the bloc of private interests traditionally
1. Sir Robert Marshall, Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry, in the PAC Report, op.clt., p.lUl.
favoured by a particular state: in Britain's case, this is
'international capital'. The company concerned may be American
and not British-based, but because of the general dominance of
•international capital' over the state in Britain, it shares the
same element of extra-juridic security in its interest.
As a consequence of this view I have not dwelled upon the
•corporatist' implications of the panoply of Ministerial controls
built into the revised Model Clauses in 1975* Just as we saw
earlier that Winkler's failure to give proper weight to the
legislative process led him to exaggerate the significance of the
final legislation, in this case we must avoid the beguiling
character of legal 'appearances'. The regulatory powers contained
in the Act were the outcome of intensive and lengthy negotiations
between the Government and the parties concerned, as well as a
parliamentary debate: while not eliminating the possibility of
future conflict over the exercise of these powers this procedure
did ensure that it would be minimal, by allowing for considerable
1
modifications in the original proposals. Nonetheless, on the
evidence presented in the thesis, it is unlikely that the exercise
of these powers would be inimical to the interests of
international capital.
While it has not been my intention in this section to provide
a general theory of the state, I have attempted in making these
remarks to situate legislative restrictions on the exercise of
property rights in atroader context, and also to suggest that the
close relationship between large capital units and the state ensures
1. For example, the original depletion power was radically modified
(see discussion on pp.168-9 and esp. p.175)5 other major
changes are mentioned on pp.l8l-2 (esp. p.l8l, footnote 5)*
that the difference between property rights and (some) other
rights need not be a matter of great practical import. The point
is not that this or that legal alternative would have led to
greater 'control' but rather that whatever course of legal
action had been adopted, it would still have been subjeot to the
kind of structural constraints which I have set out in this
thesis. The basis for a thesis about 'new property' lies here.
CHAPTER BIXi
The Trwmoandenoe of Private Property?
Contentst
1. New Property - in theory
2. New Property - in practice
296.
1. Hew Property - in theory
The massive extension of the state's role in advanced
capitalism has made an increasing number of persons dependent on
the state for some sort of guaranteed income. The Hew Property
theorists have taken this particular phenomenon as a basis for
an attempt to replace the liberal conception of property with
another, more 'general' one.
Their ideas about property are of interest because they
constitute one way in whioh writers with a commitment to
liberalism (and I include MacPherson in this category) have
attempted to revise classical liberal ideas to 'fit' the
oiroumstances of advanced capitalism. The moralistic trend
of capitalist development in which the large corporation supplanted
the family firm of the entrepreneur as the basic economic unit
rendered the individualist premiss of the older writings on
property less and less satisfactory. However, the problems
posed by the interventionist role of the state went to the heart
of liberal thinking, since liberalism, as Lukes notes,
May be said largely to have been an argument about where
the boundaries of this private sphere lie, according to
what principles they are to be drawn, whence interference
derives and how it is to be checked. It presupposes a
picture of man to whom privacy is essential, even sacked,
with a life of his own to live.
This concern with delimiting the private sphere is underlined by
1. Individualism, p.62. In arguing that capitalism is now a
'post-liberal* society, Roberto Unger also places considerable
emphasis upon the ohanged role of the state: see
Knowledge and Politics, and Law in Modern Society.
Gianfranco Poggi who points out that many of the early liberal
theories invented devices to secure the private sphere from any
incursions by the state.^ For example, those ideas based on the
notion of a natural law: the existence of righ£ of man, including
property rights, prior to and above those of the citizen, or
interpretations of constitution-framing reminiscent of the social
contract theory.
Ironically, the qualitative change in the state's role in
the period after 19^5 did not produce the feverish re-assessment
of private property that one might have expected from liberals.
Without much discussion, the idea became accepted that property
rights could he, and in some cases ought to be, restricted in the
common interest. Such restrictions occurred if, and to the extent
that, legal controls were established which diminished the scope of
an owner's powers and freedoms (e.g. of use, disposal, alienation)
over the thing he owned. This idea has become so common that even
a conservative liberal like Lawrence Becker thinks it necessary to
include three kinds of limitation in any specific justification of
2
a general theory of property-rights. Firstly, he claims that there
can be no full, liberal ownership in land. Secondly, ownership of
vital depletable resources like fresh water, fossil fuels and
mineral deposits
1- The Development of the Modern State, pp.10^-7.
2. The following extracts are taken from Becker, op.eit.,
pp.116-8.
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... may have to be restricted to the rights of income,
transfer and limited transmissibility, with management,
use and actual possession effectively under public
control.
He emphasises that this has nothing to do with 'social justice* but
rather it follows from this startM13^ admission:
If the necessary conservation measures cannot be guaranteed
(with any significant probability) under a system of
full liberal ownership by individuals, then something
along the(se) outlines ... seems the only rational course.
Finally, he accepts the need to introduce measures to limit
accumulations of wealth (for example, by a wealth tax) to prevent
such accumulations from undermining 'the democratic ideal' in
government.
These are formidable concessions to the anti-property
arguments which Becker dismisses in a mere 11 pages, laying most
of the eapbftsis, incidentally, on the anarchist views of
Proudhon rather than the critique of Marx.
One consequence of limiting 'possessive individualism* in
this manner is a blurring of the distinction between property rights
and other (non-proprietary) rights. Hence the idea of extending
the applicability of the property concept to some of those non¬
proprietary rights is not quite as radioal nor as surprising an it
might at first appear.^"
The New Property theorists nonetheless had a more radical
goal than Becker. They wanted to redefine property in such a way as
to go beyond the conventional identification of property with specifically
1. Particularly when there is a general tendency to widen,
indeed inflate, the use of the concept of a right.
private property* an exclusive right to use, alienate or otherwise
benefit from some thing. They argued that the scope or sphere of
property is 'extended' if new types or categories of thing come
to be recognised as subject to individual proprietorship. The
growth of legal relationships between individuals and the state in
advanced capitalism has created new forms of legal control over
diverse resources which ought to be recognised as property. Some
people, they suggest, have already begun to do so. Both Reich
and MacPherson give speoific examples of what they mean by 'new
property', and both see licences as one such examples either as
objects of property or as means by which rights of a proprietary
character are transferred to individuals.
I shall now give ,<3ome consideration to their ideas, briefly
indicating what seem to me to be their principal shortcomings.
It has been my argument so far that a New Property thesis might be
based successfully on the theory of capitalist development outlined
in the previous chapter, which assigns the state a limited but
'creative* role in this respect. The following writers, however, make
different assumptions and, as a consequence, their arguments have
serious weaknesses.
Easily the best of the New Property argument e is that of
C.B.MacPherson who argues that the very idea of property as an
exclusive individual right rests on the acceptance of a narrow
paradigm of property.^ Property is and must be an individual
right but that right need not be a right to exclude others from
the use or benefit of something. The equation of individual
property with exclusive property is only a special case, and
MacPherson advances a new paradigm which supplements the individual
right to exclude others with an individual right not to be excluded
by others from use or benefit from the social products in other
words, by an individual right to equal access to the means of
labour and of life. The 'broad* paradigm proposed has two main
features» firstly, it requires an equal right of access to fche
accumulated means of labour, whether social capital or natural
resources (implying a right to work), and secondly, it is a
right to an inoome from the social product, unrelated to work.
However, MacPherson's argument has a historical dimension whioh
is its principal support. He recognises that the liberal conception
of property as an unlimited exclusive right has definite social and
historical roots. Conceptions of property ultimately derive from
the real conditions of social and economic life, and the prevailing
conception derives from the development of capitalist society. It
is, he claims, 'an invention of the seventeenth and eighteenth
2
centuries* and appropriate to a fully autonomous capitalist market
sooiety. Yet, advanced capitalist societies are moving away from the
idea of property as exclusion. This development is rooted in the
growth of state expenditure and intervention which has partly abolished
1. Property, op.cit., and 'Capitalism and the Changing Concept of
Property' in Ksunenka and Neale (eds.), Feudalism. Capitalism
and Beyond, op.oit.
2. Democratic Theory, p.122.
market control, and has rendered the exclusive conception 'less
, 1necessary*.
MacPherson's approach is, therefore, first to assume a
general connection between ideas of property and their socio¬
economic context, then to connect the liberal conception with the
specific property-ownership relations characteristic of an early
stage of capitalist development when market forces were allowed
to operate with relatively few restrictions, and finally to c nclude
that changes in market relations resulting- from state intervention
are now leading to, and require, a change in this liberal
conception of property.
However, this argument is flawed on several counts. Firstly,
the suggestion that the modem conception of property represents
a 'narrowing down* of the pre-capitalist or feudal one is nighly
contestable. It is certainly true that in seventeenth century
England, for example, the term 'property' had a wide range of
meanings. Locke defines it in this way, as 'Lives, Liberties and
2
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property'. Similarly,
Hobbes observed that
Of all things held in propriety, those that are dearest
to a man are his own life and limbs; and in the next
degree (in most men) those that concern conjugall
affection; and after them riches and means of living.
1. Property, p.10.
2. Second Treatise of Government. section 123. He also uses
property in a more restricted sense to apply to material
possessions.
3. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, pp.382-3.
Nonetheless, such "broad definitions of property, and the
existence of a conception of property as an individual right of
access to the common property, maintainable against others,
does not allow us to generalise about a 'feudal1 conception. In
small but important urban areas where market relations had
developed, early versions of the modem 'narrow' paradigm could
be found.^ It was from these areas that the 'burghers' or middle
class began the activities that were eventually to undermine
feudal economic relations, and it was the generalisation of
their market relations and their conception of property as an
exclusive individual right to use, alienate and to benefit that
became a characteristic feature of the emergence of capitalism.
Pre-capitalist society is excessively 'feudalised' by MacRierson
to reinforce his argument for a return to an up-dated version of
the alleged pre-capitalist conception of property which included
rights to access and to a revenuei in modern terms, as including
and allowing for claims to employment, social insurance, community
action, participation, and state largesse.
A second criticism derives from MacPherson's emphasis upon the
market. He is certainly correct in viewing the universal market
as the major institutional change distinguishing the capitalist
economy from its predecessors. However, the exchange relations
of capitalism are bound up with relations of production which are
1. A good account of this is contained in E.Schlatter, Private
Property. It is worth recalling that capitalist relations of
production had been maturing for more than two centuries before
the Industrial Revolution! see M.Dobb, Capitalism Yp»tprrifly
and Today, p.20. However, forced labour was oftien used instead
of wage-labours for example, the use of convicts in mining.
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also relations of domination. The contrast between the 'appfaxailC€'
of equality and freedom in imarket relations on the one hand and the
sooial domination in capitalist production was a theme developed
by Marx in 'Capital*.1 By basing part of his argument for conceptual
change upon changes in market relations, MacPherson runs the risk
of misinterpreting developments in a part of the economic
structure which are neither fundamental nor free from distorting
elements. The indisputable contemporary fact that the market no
longer does the whole work of allocation could be, and has been,
interpreted in ways which have quite different implications for
the liberal conception of property. For example, Becker can accept
this fact (and many others which show that contemporary capitalism
differs radically from its laissez-faire' predecessor) and still
argue that a modified liberal conception is possible, and worxh
having.
ThiB leads on to a third weakness. His preoccupation with
changes in market relations leads him to attribute considerable
significance to the element of economic planning introduced by the
state, although he is also aware of how large firms also introduce
an element of planning into the market. This has such significance
for him that he is led to distinguish 'mature capitalism' from
an 'immature' predecessor. Yet, as I have shown in the previous
chapter, a considerable degree of social control is compatible with,
and even essential to, the further development of capitalism. The
1. Capital I, esp. chapter 6.
persistence of the 'narrow' liberal oonoeption of property might
well be that it remains, in spite of the transition so '(guasi-
market society', relevant to capitalist market and production
relations.
Charles Reich is another theorist who, like MacPherson,
sees property as becoming essentially a right to a revenue,
and who also bases his argument for an extension of the
application of the term 'property* upon ohanges in the role of
the state. He 33^33 thus.
For an increasing number of individuals property has become
a right conferred by or dependent on state largesse and state
licence. This represents an unintended and incidental effect of
the emergence of the state's new welfare and regulatory roles, and
endangers one of the classical functions of property: the
securing to an individual of an area of freedom from domination
by society or the state. The state now has command of vast
material and organisational resources, and has the ability to
reward, to deprive and to frustrate prospective and actual
recipients of those resources. For example, it has the ability to
invalidate a driver's licence, to withdraw a professional licence
or to deprive an individual of employment by the state. He notes
that a precondition for the changing role of the state is a massive
expansion of man's influence upon the material environment. States
now have a means of social control in their ability to extend or
withhold goods, services and other resources. Because ihe 'new
1. Charles Reich, 'The New Property', op.cit.
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proper's y' is dependent on state fiat and executive and
judicial interpretations of legislation, it does not secure
but invades the area of individual freedom. Apart from the
obvious comment that, in the view of many writers like Eousseau
and Marx, property rights have never provided protection for such
an area of individual freedom for the vast majority of people,
there are several criticisms that can be levelled at Reich's
argument.
The idea that state largesse tends to erode individual freedom
as it expands is one which Reich himself has difficulties with.
He examines a list of state functions and notes that some benefit
private firms. He concludes that state power 'falls unequally
on different components of the private sector*,"^ and that largesse
can be a form of assistance for private firms, especially .11 the
award of leases for publicly owned resources. Largesse may thus
create a partnership which aids rather than limits the private sector.
The publio sphere may, he admits, be used by private interests in
their conflicts with other interests, and so this 'great system of
power created by government largesse' can become a means to advance
some particular interests. This represents a considerable weakness
in Reich's arguments his initial assumption of an antagonism
between state and private individuals is only supportable when it is
subjected to several important qualifications.
1. op.cit., p.761*.
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Indeed, Reich'b conception of the state leaves much to
be desired. He claims that 'the emergence of government as a
major source of wealth' is a new development, and that these new
forms of wealth are replacing private property. But where does
this wealth come from? What are the causes of this new role
for the state? Reich provides no answer to these questions, and
his analysis lacks the kind of historical perspective which might
mdc e the origins of state largesse less nysterious. A broader
historical perspective than the post-war period might have
suggested that the state's expanded role could in part be located
in the failure of the institution of private property to do some
of the work of social and economic organisation necessary for
•economic growth' or capital accumulation. By concentrating solely
on state functions and by taking as given the state's expanded role,
Reich gains much plausibility for his view of the 'decline' of
private property and his estimation of state power. However, the
expanding role of the state during that period developed alongside
an unprecedented expansion of the capitalist economies, which
produced a large number of 'multinational' corporat^%s whose
oapital resources exceeded the GHPs of many nation-states. Reich
indirectly acknowledges this phenomenon in the qualifications he
makes which I have mentioned in the foregoing' paragraph. The absence
of a broad theoretical framework in Reich's analysis has the effect
of underestimating the many constraints upon state intervention.
Much more than Macfherson's theory, Reich's is time-bound to
the period of uninterrupted state intervention which followed
the Second World War. This is the real basis for his exclusive
foous upon the state as the source of 'new property'. The
types of new property to which Reich refers display an empha, B
upon the welfare roles of the modern state which recent events
have shown to be unwarranted. The rights which have been granted
through the welfare state are usually passive or recipient rights,
which are held concurrently with a considerable degree of control
by government offioials and professionals. These rights do not
have the same or even a similar degree of significance for social
and economic organisation in a capitalist society as those rights
in productive property discussed in section two of the previous
chapter (that is, property rights). Since such rightB have become
no less important in the real world, it is surely unjustified to
sake conceptual changes which would have the effect of blurring
distinctions between such very different tyP®8 right?
The same dependence upon rights created by the state's welfare
roles occurs in Wolfgang Priedmann's argument for a redefinition
of property."^ He claims that property is confined less and less
to the control of tangible things and is being 'extended to the
2
whole field of legitimate economic interests and expectations'.
1. Wolfgang Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society.
2. op.cit., p.117.
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This is only a little less vague than his assertion that the
right to use one's labour and skill should be considered a
property right. Conveniently, Friedmann's radical redefinition
does not presuppose any redistribution of the objects of
property rights. His criticism of the inequality in property
ownership is confined to a criticism of the unequal protection
of property rights - although of course the courts have been
quite consistent in what they do since they have not included his
'objects' in their category of property. However, Friedmann's
redefinition of property might well obscure inequalities which really
do persist. It may have the effect of making the law of property
conform to popular aspirations about equality, but it would do so
only by concealing the real situation, which remains one in
which property is unequally distributed. If this is a contemporary
•social fact', albeit an unpleasant one, then surely we might ask
that it not be concealed.
This redefinition of property has to be rejected for several
reasons. Firstly, there has been no actual redistribution of
property, and therefore an 'extension' of the current juridical
conception to include certain relationships between legal subjects
and legal objects, along the lines he indicates, would lead to a
loss of clarity. Secondly, while the social and economic
significance of legal ownership is beyond doubt, it is only specific
types of property which h ave this important role. Legal ri^its
arising from the activities of the 'welfare state' can only he
considered rights of property at the risk of losing sight of the
fundamental role of one particular type of property - property in
the means of production. A more plausible explanation of the
phenomenon of 'increasing protection* of rights which he
identifies is that more people are now involved in legal
relationships than before, though not necessarily proprietary
ones. Finally, Friedmann, like Reich and even MacEherson, has
too simple a view of the state's interventionist role, whether in
respect to welfare functions or to economic ones. The state is
seen (by implication here) as a neutral institution and little or
no weight is given to those theories which see it as having a
thoroughly partisan character. This of course makes it much easier
to see it as a vehicle for the creation of new forms of property
which co-exist and perhaps compete with specifically private
property. In describing his own conception of property as 'more
elastic' than the traditional one, Friedmann, makes an assessment
which is certainly appropriate.
A principal source of weakness for these redefinitions of
property lies, then, in their almost indiscriminate search for
new forms of property, so long as they involve some element of
legal dependence upon the state. However, instead of looking at
rights created by the state's welfare roles as examples of 'new
property* rights, a much better case for the existence of a 'new
property' oould have been made with reference to the state's
increasing economic functions, whioh all of the above writers
identify but which do not receive the same attention as the welfare
functions.
Perhaps the reason for this emphasis upon welfare rights
is to be found In the general (liberal) perspective of the
above writers."1' The ability of these writers to conneot notions
of 'property* and of 'individual rights' to the rights of real
individuals, as opposed to corporations, is increased to the
extent that they focus upon rights created by the expanded welfare
functions of the modem state. To designate these rights as rights
of property might seem, to some liberal writers at least, to
represent a return to the 'basic model' of property-ownership in
liberal thoughtt that is, the model of a single individual or
family unit owning a tangible 'thing* like a plot of land. This
is all the more reassuring at a time when the rights in productive
property remain concentrated in a very few hands and when much
control is exercised by corporations rather than the single
individuals in the basic model.
Nonetheless, most liberal writers have rejected such an
approach to conceptions of property, and therefore I shall not
attempt to generalise from the above writers' arguments, tfy
concern here is not with liberalism and the conceptions of
property associated with it, but, more narrowly, with the question
of the significance of new legal modes of holding property which
involve the state to a considerable degree. This is a question
they have asked, but not answered adequately.
1. The inclusion of MacPherson here is justified since, in spite
of his quasi-Marxist approach, he is concerned to 'retrieve'
what he considers of value in the liberal-democratic tradition,
and often seems to make assumptions about, for example,
individual rights, which are shared by some variants of
liberalism.
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2. Hew Property - in praotice
On the face of it, the system of petroleum licensing seemed
to be en example of the transfer of rights which are de facto though
not perhaps de iure rights of property. By focussing upon the
socio-economic consequences for the holder of these rights, I showed
that an analogy of licence rights with property rights was
possible. Moreover, the resemblance of these rights to rights
of property is greater, and has in my view a broader significance,
when one considers the general trend toward tolerance of
legislative restrictions upon the exercise of property rights in
advanced capitalism, as well as the extra-juridical security
provided by the close links between private firms (especially the
large ones) and the state. The full extent of private dominance
is masked by a legal form which appears to depart from that
most closely associated with private power in capitalism: private
property.
However, there are certain disadvantages in analysing any
legal institution in terms of its sooio-economio function, and I
have made some attempts to avoid relying solely on that kind of
approach here by examining the Bpeoific form of the licence, and by
explaining how it assumed that form. To characterise this approach
as 'functionalist* merely beoause it is concerned with inter alia
the social and economic consequences of particular legal instituions
seems to me to be misledding. It is widely known that Karl Renner
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conducted an intensive study of the 'social function' of legal
institutions like private property, basing himself upon his
particular conception of Marxian theory."'" However, it is less
widely known that Franz Neumann, a member of the Frankfurt School,
who wrote much on the Rechtss,^ aat and its relationship to Fascism,
also focussed upon the 'social function of legal institutions
2
like property in his studies. Unlike Renner, Neumann's approach
was in the mainstream of modern Marxist thought and was associated
with a view of capitalist development as a contradict&ty process
which could not be understood in terms of 'evolution*. Indeed,
a conoem to discover the socio-eoonomic consequences of specific
institutions like private property seems to be an important
component in Marxian social theory, and it is therefore not
surprising that those Marxists who have examined legal institutions
should have paid attention to it. If, as Anthony Giddens argues, this
makes them (and Marx) guilty of a functionalist bias, then there
■3
may be something to be said in favour of functionalism!^
Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to reconsider in some
detail the formal characteristics of the petroleum licence which
assumed significance in this study. To begin with, one of the
most striking conclusions of the empirical study was that before
1. Karl Renner, op.cit.
2. For example, in the various essays collected in The Democratic
and the Authoritarian State.
3- Hie comments to this effect are set out in Central Problems of
Social Theory.
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licences could function as a vehicle for the transfer of
property-rights, the licence form waB modified to suit the
intended function and acquired certain unusual and perhaps
unique characteristics. As I explained in section 3 of chapter one,
the character of the petroleum licence was altered by the
Petroleum (Production) Aot 193^ in such a way as to distinguish
it from most other forms of licensing. It became more than just an
•administrative permission*, and the contractual character which
licences acquired as a result provided the licensee with a
considerable degere of legal security for the rights transferred.
While it is quite coreot to assert that, until 1977 at least, licence
rights allowed private firms the kind of effective control usually
associated with rights of property and that most of the state regulation
was facilitative, it does not follow that other forms of licensing,
regulating different economic activities, have or might have this
effect. We cannot generalise aba^t licensing per se in contemporary
capitalism from this particular case in spite of the fact that petroleum
licensing, more than any other form of licensing in the UK, seems to
be an example of one kind of property holding which the Hew Property
theorists claimed was becoming increasingly significant.
Indeed, the self-description of this legal form as a 'licence*
is perhaps a misnomer. In the United States the term 'lease' has much
the same meaning and in the "UK, the terminology of the petroleum
production licence, permitting the licensee to get petroleum which
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once possessed is his, whatever its status before that, secures
the same result as a mining leaset that is, it entitles its
holder to exhaust rather than use the leased property. The
House of Lords has described the mining lease as tantamount to
a sale of minerals in place.1 Despite the fact that the licence
makes no explicit conveyance of the petroleum in situ, English
law recognises, under the name of profit a prendre, a right to
take the produce of another^ land (for example, to fell and
take away timber, or to catch fish) which is a property right in
the sense that it can be invoked against any third parties that
interfere with its exercise. It is this kind of right which, by
reason of its exclusivity, and the oonferment of a right to take
from the soil, a petroleum production licence most closely
resembles. In Scots law the comparable institution is the lease
of mineral rights, which alBo conveys a real right to the
2
resources of land not owned by the possessor of that right.
Of crucial importance to the licensee is the exclusive
character of his right to search and bore for, and get, petroleum
under a specific licence area, which ensures that he may aot
directly to restrain any unlicensed drilling or other exploratory
drilling in that area. Possessors of profits a prend' .e and analogous
right8 have, in the past, been held able to prevent unlawful
3
invasions of their interest in many cases.
1. See their decision in Gowans v. Christie (1873) 11 M.(H.L.)l.
2. See Rankine, The Law of Leases in Scotland (third edition, 1916),
p.2.
3. For example, Mason v. Clarke [1955] A.C. 778 (a dispute about
rabbiting rights); and Stephens v. Snell [1939] 3 All E.R. 622
(invasion of exclusive fishery rights).
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In the USA too, this particular economic activity has
created problems for traditional legal forms of property,
especially with regard to property rights in petroleum in situ.
Some States like Texas have held that oil is like a hard mineral
and is vested in the owner of the surface, who could deal with it
as with other minerals by sale or licence; others like Oklahoma
and Indiana have held that it is incapable of ownership in situ
and oan only be the subject of a personal right to explore; still
others like Pennsylvania and California have held that ownership
was not absolute until the oil was brought to the surface and
reduced to possession, but pending this step, the landowner has
a definable real right in the oil in the ground, similar to a
profit a prend " or a lease.*
These particular characteristics of the licence distinguish
it from the many other types of lioence which are common in the
UKs wireless licences, gun licences, dog licences, and so on.
Such licences are regulatory in character, granting the holder
exemption fn legislative prohibitions, for reasons ranging from
revenue-raising to the preservation of standards. By contrast,
the Petroleum (Production) Act 193^> which was the basis of the
subsequent legislation for offshore territory, ensured that
petroleum production licences had the character of a concession
by the Crown of some of its rights to a private party. This
characteristic is shared by licences for the continental shelf although
1. Manual, p.222; see also John M. Blair, The Control of Oil.
316.
the rights possessed in that case and conceded by the Crown are not
the same as those held on land. Not surprisingly then, the
licences beoame contractual in form and displayed certain elements
of a commercial transaction like the assignment by the Crown over
a specific period of certain valuable rights, in return for
annual payments, royalties on the produce of those rights, and,
in some cases, premium payments also. This contractual element
supplements the regulatory elements which are still involved in
the licensing process, both in the rules governing the method of
allocation and in the content of the licences the; elves with their
model clauses regulating working methods, safety, and so on, and
reserving to the Minister considerable powers of discretion over
the licensee's activity. This combination of contractual and
regulatory techniques represented by petroleum production licensing
is unusual and makes 1; sui generis.
Since licence rights have, for practical purposes, incidents
more or less akin to leasehold property, subject (as such property
commonly is) to restraints on assignment, it is not particularly
surprising that they should have socio-economic consequences for
the licensee similar to those which rights of property have for
a lessee. The conclusion seems inescapable that petroleum
production licences have changed most of their legal form better
to fit their actual funotion.
However, as I have shown, the changes in legal form were not
entirely successful in combining an element of regulation with
the provision of conditions necessary for exploration and exploitation.
The combination of contractual and regulatory elements presented
a serious problem when the licence terms were amended in 1975 • I
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have dwelled on this at some length in order to show how various
procedural devices were introduced to resolve what I termed a
'crisis of legality', as well as to argue that the increased
regulatory content of licences did not have the adverse impact
upon licensees* interests that one might have expected. The
network of legal and extra-legal techniques (consultations,
•talks', negotiations, and so on) was designed to minimise not
unly the uncertainty created by the Government's particular
proposals, but also to assure the licensees (and others) that the
general relationship between the state and private interests, in
which state intervention plays a facilitative role, was not
altered by the co-existence of regulatory elements with
contractual ones in the licence. In attempting this the
Labour Government was certainly successful, and the practical
consequences of any tensions between regulatory and contractual
elements in the licence were not particularly important in the
longer term. Indeed, tensions were only visible at certain
momentsi for example, when the terms of existing licences were
aotually being revised, and in a more complex way, in the
establishment of BNOC. Such moments had passed away fey the
late 1970s, giving the earlier period from 197U to 1977 an
'exceptional' character. The unusual character of the events'
of this period is greater when it is recalled, firstly, that
they were a response to the first world oil crisis and were
carried out at a time when all national governments were hastily
attempting to co-ordinate their energy polftj*f.6s$ and secondly,
that an increase in state intervention is the general rule once
considerable reserves of oil aire discovered* the British case
is perhaps unusual only because the award of so many licences
before this time rendered retrospective change necessary on a
large scale.
Furthermore, the tensions between different elements in the
licence was far from being a purely legal or formal matter. They
were inseparable from particular economic interests. In particular,
the Government's intention to use the state as a state and revise the
terms of existing licences created dangers for British
•international capital'. The Government appeared to be treating
licences as mere regulations which could be varied at Parliament's
sovereign will, an action whioh might endanger the legal
arrangements by which British companies1 and banks' overseas
interests were safeguarded, particularly in the United States.
The structure of 'civil society' in Britain compelled an attitude
of respect toward existing licence rights.
The co-existence of regulatory and contractual elements in the
licence form has, however, a more general significance. The
problems it presented when licence terms were to be amended
represented in a particularly vivid way a basio antagonism which
must follow from the state's self-presentation as sovereign
power or licensing authority on the one hand, and as a quasi-
private individual on the other. An elaboration of this idea has
been given by Pashukanis, who argues tha t the close association
of law with the phenomena of the markets equal individuals
buying and selling commodities, including labour-power, of
their own free will, and so on, gives legal relations a
character antithetical to the relations of power and
domination characteristic of the state. In a capitalist society,
•law* and 'state' exist uneasily as partners but also as
opposites. Once the state becomes increasingly involved in
market organisation the latent tension between the two also
increases. There is much in the foregoing empirical study to support
this view (at a general level at least), but since a pre-occupation
with the form of the licence as opposed to its socio-economic
consequences is only a secondary theme in this study I do not
claim that this view is in some way 'confirmed' by it."L
The co-existence of contractual and regulatory elements
in the licence also had a legitimating significance in this caBe. In
particular the association of property in oil with 'the nation' and
the regulatory element in the licence helped conceal the
extent to which North Sea oil has been, and continues to be,
exploited by predominantly private interests. As I explained in
chapter two, the idea of oil as 'national property' was exploited in
1. Of course there is now a considerable literature on this
theme of the contradictory character of state intervention.
Many writers with different and opposing perspectives see
this phenomenon as one which contains risks for the capitalist
oharacter of these societies. JtLrgen Habermas, for example,
sees a conflict resulting from the fact that the state is
supposed to perform many economic and redistributive functions
without violating the functional preconditions of a capitalist
economy ('Legitimation Problems in the Modern State', in
Communication and the Evolution of Society). In. a similar
vein, James O'Connor has argued that the attempt of the state
to meet welfare demands while also trying to advance the
capitalist economy generates a fiscal and general political
crisis of the modem state (The Fiscal C isis of the State).
political debate from 1963 onward. Its vagueness permitted
its utilisation by Conservative Government to support a
policy of maximising the involvement of British based
private companies in North Sea developments, and by Labour
Governments to support^-similar policy but with the addition of
some participation by state companies. However, from 1974 on
*
the notion acquired a much greater significance when it was associated
with a considerable increase in the regulatory aspect of licensing.
A considerable effort was made by the Government to mask the
degree of continuity in North Sea oil developments, and
especially the role of private companies and financial institutions,
by pointing to the juridical ohanges being made as illustrative
of sovereign power and social control through the state."1" This was,
as I have already pointed out, part of a broad response to a
crisis of legitimation whioh manifested itself at the time in an
outbreak of the sort of class conflict, whioh some had thought
obsolescent in post-war capitalism.
These aspects of the lioence form have been important in my
examination of the various socio-economic oonsequences deriving
from possession of a petroleum lioence. A failure or an inability
to distinguish between superficial and essential elements in the
licensing process can quite easily lead to an overestimation of
the degree of real (i.e. economic) change brought about by
spefic' - legal developments. The many legal qualifications placed
sxiy
1. The extent to whioh the Government clung to the idea of majority
state participation in form at least is perhaps the best
example of this.
upon the licensee's control over oil should not obscure the fact
that the key right is not the right to possess oil in the
ground, but to take the produced oil and to convert it into
something else, whether it is money or a commodity like
synthetic fibre. Further, the ability to obtain this right will
be dependent upon the exclusive possession of the oapital resources
required to explore for and to exploit the resource. So long as the
oil companies have possession of the massive resources required
to develop oilfields in high-cost areas like the North Sea, they
have the (power to persuade states to give them that right and
any associated rights. The starkness of this fact may, however,
be concealed beneath the appar. i of legal regulation and
participation which a state is obliged to introduce for
purposes of securing legitimation or facilitating oil
development or securing a share of the benefits for other
private interests which operate in less profitable sectors of
the economy. A growth of this 'superatruoture' can provide
evidence of a decline in the role of private oil companies and
perha even partial erosion of their economic power. It has been
my argument, however, that such an assessment of the empirical
data produces wrong conclusions, and that my own view
only allow for a more oomplex interrelationship between social,s
economic, legal and political phenomena, but also helps explain
the remarkable resilience of private power in this case. I do not
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claim that the view of law and state as highly influenced by
the •needs' of capital accumulation would find the same degree
of support in a study of, for example, the sorts of citizens'
rights which Charles Beich also considered important. Rather
I have tried to show how, in one particular case, a legal
institution can be so flexible that it can incorporate an
increased quantity of state regulation, much of which is
advantageous to the private parties concerned, and yet have
similar, if not quite identical, socio-economic effects as
before.
Actions taken by the British Government from 197U to 1977 to
extend the state's proprietary control solved a number of serious
problems for the transnationally operating capital -units
involved.1 This was not the result of some predetermined prooess
but one in which initially critical and radical demands for social
control through the state were transformed into ones not
unacceptable to the beneficiaries of the status quo. Demands which,
if given legislative form, would have resulted in radical
alterations in property arrangements were not simply thwarted or
ignored. Instead they were made to 'fit' certain dynamic forces
pushing for change in the existing framework for North Sea oil
development.
1. For example, the existing arrangements had by 197U ceased to be
regarded as acceptable by a broad section of opinion in Britain
(pp.132—above). The oil price rises and consequent windfall
profits created a situation in which the oil companies could no
longer be assured of public consent to their offshore operations
and needed to act to restore their credibility. In addition, the
bigger companies and the state had an interest in orderly offshore
activity and hence in the resolution of a number of regulatory
problems which had not been anticipated when the first regulatory
framework had been drawn up 10 years earlier (see pp.178-85). In
particular, a market had been developing in licence interests since
1972 over which the state had no control. The Sonservative Government
had responded by imposing a temporary prohibition on transfers of
interests. Yet such 'assignments' were (and axe) essential for
smooth economic operations in the North Sea. New regulations were
required to replace the old (and evidently inadequate) ones (see pp. 18'3-1
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At no point did I argue that these particular legislative acts
and Government agreements were essential to the international private
concerns. Bather I argued that some state action was essential in
order to restore credibility to the licensees' operations in the
eyes of a sceptical and hostile public at a time (197U) when both
Government in Britain was extremely weak and future profits from the
North Sea looked immense. In addition, the regulative, facilitative
functions of the state"'" could not be carried on effectively once
fields reached the development stage without extending the legal
framework. Some form of Government action was essentialt that it
took the particular form it did was the result of a complex process
in which the oil companies, the bankB and others in sympathy with the
interests of 'international capital* played a crucial role.
The theory of capitalist development outlined in chapter five
is a considerable asset in explaining both the flexibility of this
legal institution, and also the legitimating character of much of
2
the law-making process itself. Above all, it showB how a real
basis can exist for perceptions of a partial abolition or
•transcendence' of private property and the articulation of
redefinitions of property which are, at the present time, premature.
1. Cf. pp.287-8.
2. I have discussed this in general on pp.287-90 above. The specific
ways in which this legitimation function influenced the Government
actions between 197h and 1977 a**® set out on the following pages:
(participation) pp.211-13, pp.223-37 (Harold Lever's remarks)
pp.223-1* and also the paras, on pp.232-33* 250-52; (new
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Although the interviews conducted in 1976 were an important
background source, their Informal character together with
assurances to the interviewees about attribution, precluded
direct quotation and compelled caution in use of this material.
Consequently, I have avoided relying solely on remarks made
in any one interview to substantiate a point in the text.
Where I was unable to find corroboration in a published
source for any material used, I oompared the results of
several interviews for agreement on the particular point
before using this material.
